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1. Introduction
Debate concerning how children come to understand the
social and psychological world, now often known as chil-
dren’s “theories of mind,” has become increasingly con-
cerned with the influence of social interaction. Recent stud-
ies have found that individual differences in preschoolers’
competence on measures of false belief understanding are
correlated with aspects of children’s socialization history. By
suggesting that social interaction may influence the devel-
opment of children’s mentalistic understanding, this re-
search has reopened issues that have long been discussed
in the debate over how children come to understand the
mind.
As an example of this research, Perner et al. (1994) re-
ported that preschoolers with siblings demonstrate false be-
lief understanding at an earlier age than children without
siblings. This “sibling effect” was replicated by Jenkins and
Astington (1996), although they found it to be less pro-
nounced for children with more advanced linguistic abili-
ties. Lewis et al. (1996) also found in one study an associa-
tion between number of siblings and performance on false
belief tests, but, overall, they found a more consistent ef-
fect of older siblings and kin on the development of false
belief understanding. In a series of experiments with a large
number of participants, beneficial effects were found for
older but not younger siblings (Ruffman et al. 1998). The
sibling effect was not replicated, however, in two more re-
cent studies involving working-class families (Cole &
Mitchell 2000; Cutting & Dunn 1999). This research sug-
gests the possibility that, rather than just the number of
people in the household, it is the nature of the relationships
children experience that influences development (Hughes
et al. 1999). There is further evidence of correlations be-
tween social cognitive development and parenting style
(Hughes et al. 1999; Ruffman et al. 1999; Vinden 2001), as-
pects of parent-child conversation (Sabbagh & Callanan
1998), attachment (Fonagy et al. 1997; Meins 1997; Meins
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et al. 1998; Symons & Clark 2000), mothers’ education
(Cutting & Dunn 1999), and socioeconomic circumstances
(Holmes et al. 1996).
Furthermore, a number of studies have found correla-
tions between language and social understanding (e.g.,
Cutting & Dunn 1999; de Villers 2000; Happé 1995; Jenk-
ins & Astington 1996). In longitudinal studies, forms of
family talk about mental states have been found to be re-
lated to later success on false belief tests (e.g., Brown et al.
1996; Dunn et al. 1991a; Moore et al. 1994; Ruffman et al.
2002). In addition, mothers who think of their children in
mentalistic terms (“mindmindedness”), and therefore,
presumably talk to their children about the psychological
world, have children who are more advanced in under-
standing beliefs than are other children (Meins & Ferny-
hough 1999; Meins et al. 1998). Similar correlations be-
tween family interaction and the development of children’s
understanding of emotions have also been reported (e.g.,
Dunn et al. 1991b; Hooven et al. 1995; Kuebli et al. 1995;
Steele et al. 1999). In a longitudinal study, Astington and
Jenkins (1999) found that earlier language abilities predict
later false belief performance but earlier false belief com-
petence does not predict later language abilities, support-
ing the conclusion that language is important in social cog-
nitive development.
Another source of evidence that social interaction is im-
portant for the development of a mentalistic understanding
comes from research with deaf children. A number of stud-
ies have shown that deaf children with hearing parents are
delayed in the development of false belief understanding,
whereas deaf children with deaf parents are not delayed
(Peterson & Siegal 2000; Woolfe et al. 2002). This seems to
be because deaf parents are native users of sign language
and thus their children are exposed to normal conversation,
but hearing parents are less fluent in sign language and
therefore their children are not exposed to complex con-
versation about everyday events involving people’s actions,
beliefs, and emotions. Conversation about the mental world
may well be essential for the development of social under-
standing.
This accumulating evidence that aspects of social inter-
action are correlated with social understanding must be ex-
plained by a complete account of social cognitive develop-
ment. The contemporary body of research in this area
derives from one of the dominant theories according to
which children come to understand their own and others’
minds by formulating an implicit “theory” of the mind (Ast-
ington et al. 1988). In this article we will, in general, use the
broader phrase, social understanding (Dunn 1988) as we
present an alternative position. All theories of the develop-
ment of social understanding have had to recognize the in-
fluence of social interaction on social understanding, but
they do so in very different ways and most accounts still be-
gin from an individualistic perspective. It has seemed that
the only possible alternative is to contrast individualistic ac-
counts with unspecified statements about the “encultura-
tion” of the child. In this article we argue for an alternative
account of the development of mental state understanding
that integrates the social and individual dimensions of de-
velopment. We contend that the child does not merely
adopt socially available knowledge, but rather, within social
interactions an understanding of mental states develops
and is constituted. Our approach is based on Chapman’s
(1991; 1999) reformulation of Piagetian theory, drawing on
Vygotsky and Wittgenstein, and it is also consistent in some
ways with other contemporary approaches (Hobson 1993;
2002; Montgomery 1997).
To introduce our alternative theory, we set it in the con-
text of continuing debates and competing theories within
the “theory of mind” tradition (sect. 2). We first discuss the
more general issue concerning the relative contributions of
social versus individual processes in development (sect.
2.1), and then turn to attempts by competing theories to ex-
plain the role of social interaction in the development of
children’s social understanding (sect. 2.2). In the third sec-
tion, we introduce our alternative constructivist approach
in which we argue that social interaction is essential in the
development of cognitive, social, and moral knowledge. We
briefly discuss the development of infants’ ability to engage
in triadic interaction involving the self, others, and the
physical world (sect. 3.1). This basic yet essential level of 
social understanding allows children to engage actively in
social interaction and to acquire language, and thereby
gradually to develop a more sophisticated mentalistic un-
derstanding by learning the criteria for the use of words re-
ferring to the mental world (sect. 3.2). In the fourth section,
we address two important issues that distinguish our ac-
count from those we criticize. We explore what has been
taken as the crucial evidence for the dominant theoretical
approach and suggest that the explanatory framework pre-
sented here explains the data more completely (sect. 4.1).
Not only does the constructivist perspective better account
for the range of experimental evidence, it can also explain
the role of relationships in social development, like the sib-
ling effect and the influence of attachment patterns (sect.
4.2). We conclude (sect. 5) by making some suggestions for
future directions in research that follow from our theoreti-
cal perspective.
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2. The problem with the “theory of mind” tradition
The problem with the “theory of mind” literature is that the
majority of approaches to the issue are individualistic. This
is usually contrasted with a straw person, referred to as en-
culturation. In the two parts of this section we first describe
a solution to the individual/social dichotomy before articu-
lating how the problem of individualism manifests itself in
contemporary theories.
2.1. Theory construction versus social construction:
Individualism, collectivism, and relationalism
At the broadest level, debate regarding the development of
children’s social understanding concerns the relative con-
tributions of social and individual processes. This is the is-
sue of whether theories start with the individual or focus on
the influence of the social group on development. We first
illustrate how this issue has emerged in research on the de-
velopment of children’s social understanding, and then set
this debate in the context of the more general issue in or-
der to derive an approach to resolve this problem.
In the context of social cognitive development, the de-
velopmental question, according to Raver and Leadbeater
(1993), is “whether the true starting point is to be located
in the single, isolated, free mind of the individual or in a so-
cial, communal world of shared experience or language”
(p. 355). Raver and Leadbeater contrasted the “theory of
mind” and social development research programs and sug-
gested that
Theory-of-mind research focuses on the single mind of the indi-
vidual child as a rational empiricist, processing incoming percep-
tual data and reporting the results of those observations. In con-
trast, social developmentalists focus on the interaction of at least
dyads, and the development of social minds of children commu-
nicating in a peopled world. (Raver & Leadbeater 1993, p. 355)
This tension has also been articulated by Astington and
Olson (1995) as occurring between theory construction and
social construction. They suggested that an alternative to
theory construction in which “children construct a theory
about human talk and action” (p. 185) is a process of en-
culturation in which “children internalize the folk psychol-
ogy of their particular culture” (p. 184), and, therefore, an
understanding of mind acquired in such a fashion is “a set
of cultural norms” (p. 185). In this view, social construction
is equivalent to enculturation and the ability to “participate
in a kind of interpretive discourse. . . . In the one case the
child is seen as constructing concepts, in the other as inter-
nalizing social understanding” (p. 185). Internalization, in
this socialization approach, involves making external social
norms internal. This enculturation approach, which has
been attributed to Wittgenstein, was clearly stated by Ast-
ington and Gopnik (1991, pp. 19–20):
On this view folk psychology is . . . what Wittgenstein would call
a “form of life,” a set of social and cultural practices and con-
ventions. The mechanism for development, on this view, would
be socialization or enculturation – children would learn how to
psychologize appropriately in the way that they learn to dress
properly or eat politely,
or learn that “forks go on the left” (Gopnik 1993, p. 3). Ast-
ington and Gopnik (1991, p. 20) further specified the dif-
ference between the view they attributed to Wittgenstein
and the “theory formation” view, by stating that
theories always develop with reference to the outside world;
put very simply, a theory former wants to get closer to the truth.
Cultural practices, on the other hand, are, at least largely, self-
constitutive: they make themselves the case. Theories are true
or false, cultural practices are right or wrong.1
The implication of this interpretation of Wittgenstein is
that social cognition is relativistic and therefore forms of so-
cial understanding are culture-specific and free to vary
across cultures, just as ways to dress properly or eat politely
vary. We, however, argue in section 3.2 for a different in-
terpretation of Wittgenstein. Briefly, although we acknowl-
edge cultural variation (Lillard 1998; Vinden 1996; 1999),
the basic forms of understanding of self and others that we
are concerned with in this target article are built onto forms
of shared practice or everyday activities that are necessarily
part of human interaction, such as adults caring for infants,
and are therefore likely to be common across cultures (Can-
field 1993).
Astington and Olson (1995), as well as Raver and Lead-
beater (1993), suggested the need for an integration of the
two perspectives – that is, the isolated individual formulat-
ing a theory of social behavior versus the child passively
adopting concepts available from the culture. The conflict
between these two contrasting positions, often referred to
as individualism and collectivism, is a general issue con-
cerning the role of social interaction in the development of
knowledge that arises in many areas of development
(Carpendale & Müller 2004). Given that he is often misla-
beled as the archetypal “individualist” developmental the-
oretician, it might seem surprising that it was this “peren-
nial problem” that Piaget (1977/1995, p. 184) grappled with
in a series of essays published as the Sociological Studies
(Chapman 1986; Kitchener 1986; Smith 1995). The ques-
tion for Piaget was “Do the operations by means of which
we attain what rational consciousness calls truth depend on
society and, if so, in what sense?” (p. 184). He criticized in-
dividualism for neglecting the role of social life in trans-
forming the individual’s cognitive structures; in Piaget’s
words, “human knowledge is essentially collective, and so-
cial life constitutes an essential factor in the creation and
growth of knowledge, both pre-scientific and scientific” (Pi-
aget 1977/1995, p. 30).
On the other hand, collectivism is also problematic for a
number of reasons. One difficulty is that if knowledge is
simply passed on from the collective to the individual, how
is it that individuals can question and criticize collective be-
liefs? “If truth is something social, how can one distinguish
legitimate common representations from collective beliefs
not based on reason?” (Piaget 1977/1995, p. 197). Piaget
also criticized collectivism for not considering the influence
of different types of social relationships on development
(Carpendale & Müller 2004; Duveen 1997).
As an alternative to individualism or collectivism, Piaget
argued for a third possibility, according to which it is rela-
tions between individuals that are primary (Kitchener 1986,
Ch. 4; Smith 1995; see also Bunge 2000; Elias 1978): “The
primary fact, from this point of view, is neither the individ-
ual nor the set of individuals but the relationships among
individuals, a relationship constantly modifying individual
consciousnesses themselves” (Piaget 1977/1995, p. 136).
This position leads to a consideration of different types of
relationships and their influence on development: “One
will no longer be content to say that ‘society’ is the basis of
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logic but will ask exactly what social relationships are in-
volved” (p. 136). The two types of relationships that Piaget
(1932/1965b) described, forming the extremes of a contin-
uum, were constraint and cooperation. Constraint involves
inequality and views being imposed by authority, whereas
cooperation involves interaction among equals.
Our approach to the development of children’s social un-
derstanding focuses on the relations between people. From
a relational, action-based perspective the developing child is
embedded in social interaction, and an involvement in social
activity itself is an integral part of constructing knowledge of
this activity. This activity simultaneously involves operative
interaction with the world as well as communicative interac-
tion with other people (Chapman 1991; 1999). It is the mu-
tuality of operative and communicative interaction that
forms the basis of the constructivist position proposed here.
Although we have focused on Piaget, a relational, em-
bodied, constructivist approach to development could also
be based on other theorists (Bunge 2000; Elias 1978; Over-
ton 1998b). A number of approaches recognize the impor-
tance of social interaction in development (e.g., Cole 1992;
Rogoff 1997; 1998), but this is not the place to exhaustively
review and critique them.2 The perspective we take is on
the psychological development of infants and children with
the assumption that such development occurs within the 
infant’s or child’s activity – an activity matrix made up of 
biological, social/cultural, and psychological dimensions
(Overton 1994). From this perspective, development be-
gins from a point of relative lack of differentiation, and the
child’s distinctions between self, other, and the world of ob-
jects emerge through activity in such a matrix.3
An issue that arises in regard to constructivism is that
such approaches may appear to imply relativism. That is, if
knowledge is constructed within social interaction, then,
because social interaction may vary across cultures, it would
appear that such knowledge would be specific to particular
cultural groups. Moreover, there would be no way to eval-
uate different forms of knowledge; all forms would be
equally valid. That is, there are just different forms of
knowledge and there is no way to be able to say one is bet-
ter than another. This “constructionist” position (Gergen
1994), therefore, collapses the distinction between devel-
opment and mere change and amounts to relativism (for
further discussion, see Chandler 1997). However, although
the constructivist position we endorse accepts that knowl-
edge is constructed within interaction, there is still devel-
opment in the sense that one form of knowledge is better,
more complete, or more adequate than other forms of
knowledge (Chapman 1988b).
As a way to resolve this difficulty with relativism, Chap-
man (1988b) distinguished progressivity in development
from directionality toward a predetermined end point. Ac-
cording to Chapman’s (1988b) reading of Piaget’s equili-
bration theory, this theory was meant to address the ques-
tion of “how one form of thinking or knowing might be
judged more or less ‘advanced’ than another” (p. 97). After
the necessary first step of describing forms or stages of
thinking, the next step for Piaget was to explain the process
of development from one form of knowledge to another.
Development from this approach is progressive in the sense
that partial and incomplete perspectives are coordinated,
resulting in more coherent and complete forms of knowl-
edge. The process of equilibration is assumed to be univer-
sal and progressive, but this does not imply a particular pre-
determined end-state. Rather, development involves move-
ment away from an initial starting point of lack of knowl-
edge (Chapman 1988b).
In the next subsection we discuss attempts to account for
the influence of social interaction on the development of
children’s social understanding at the level of particular the-
ories of children’s social cognitive development.
2.2. Accounting for the influence of interaction on
children’s social understanding
The issue of how to address the social dimension in devel-
opment is of importance within debates over which is the
best theoretical account of children’s understanding of
mind, because each of the competing accounts must ex-
plain the recent evidence suggesting that social interaction
influences such development. Until recently, the discussion
concerning theories of children’s “theories of mind” pri-
marily consisted of debate among three dominant theories:
theory-theory, modularity theory, and simulation theory.
The pace and excitement of debate among these factions
over the past decade has been frantic (for reviews see, e.g.,
Flavell & Miller 1998; Hala & Carpendale 1997; Lewis &
Carpendale 2002). However, because recent analyses have
witnessed much cross-fertilization between perspectives
(see Carruthers & Smith 1996) the aim of this section is to
highlight common stress points within these positions. This
section briefly describes how the dominant theoretical per-
spectives are still highly controversial. There are sufficient
critiques of each perspective for us not to dwell on individ-
ual theories. Instead, the focus will be on a fundamental
flaw shared by all, thereby justifying the need for the alter-
native put forward in section 3.
The phrase “theories of mind” signals the fact that the
dominant theoretical position in research on mental state
understanding has been that children construct theories of
mental states which are similar to theories or paradigms in
science. Change occurs either because children acquire a
more sophisticated capability to represent mental state
phenomena (Perner 1991), or because they modify their
theories in light of evidence that is not compatible with
their current framework of understanding (Gopnik 1993;
Gopnik & Wellman 1992; 1994; Wellman 1990). Theory-
theorists claim that the child’s understanding of mental
states is theory-like because this knowledge is coherent and
domain-specific, it shows a complex relation with the avail-
able evidence, postulates unobservable entities, and, most
important, undergoes “paradigm shifts” when the child
abandons one set of principles for another in the face of suf-
ficient disconfirming evidence.
Stich and Nichols (1992) characterized a theory as a
“body of rules or principles or propositions . . . which serve
to guide the execution of the capacity to be explained”
(p. 35). Similarly, Gopnik and Wellman (1992; 1994) stated
that a theory is a system of interrelated laws or rules that
can be used to derive or infer predictions or explanations.
In other words, understanding a particular action requires
applying the theory’s laws and deriving a solution. The edi-
tors of the special issue of Mind and Language (1992) in
which two of these articles appeared suggested that such an
approach is the most common strategy in cognitive science
for explaining the ability to negotiate a particular psycho-
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logical domain. For example, this is the dominant approach
in the area of language, but even here it has been severely
criticized (e.g., Baker & Hacker 1984; Tomasello 1995b).
Critics have long argued about whether the child’s un-
derstanding can be equated with theoretical postulates
within scientific movements (e.g., Feldman 1992; German
& Leslie 2000; Harris 1994a; Hobson 1991; Nelson et al.
1998; Scholl & Leslie 2001). Russell (1992) argued that de-
scribing children’s understanding of mind in terms of a se-
ries of theories does not provide an account of develop-
ment. Gellatly (1997) claimed that drawing an analogy
between cognitive development and historical change in
theories conflates different levels of discourse and neglects
the social dimension to child development and theory
change in science. Campbell and Bickhard (1993, p. 33)
suggested that if the term “theory” is used loosely it is gen-
eral enough to include any form of human knowledge.
The view that children’s understanding of mind is best
explained in terms of one or more innate modules resulting
in a “hard-wired” theory draws on arguments that the de-
velopment of such social understanding is simply too im-
portant to be left to chance and that this understanding is
acquired by children very early and without apparent effort
or explicit teaching (e.g., Baron-Cohen 1995; German &
Leslie 2000). The position that an innately given module or
set of modules is triggered at some point in development
would seem to be the least consistent with developmental
changes in children’s understanding of mind (Gopnik &
Wellman 1994). It lives uneasily with the accumulating ev-
idence, such as the sibling effect described above, showing
that the nature of the social interaction children experience
is closely related to the development of their social under-
standing. A further example is that secure attachment is as-
sociated with early false belief understanding (Fonagy et al.
1997; Meins 1997; Symons & Clark 2000). This might be
accounted for from the innate perspective by assuming that
attachment depends on innate temperament, but this ex-
planation is ruled out because the same infant can form dif-
ferent attachments with different adults (Meins et al. 1998).
In addition, Tomasello (1999b) has argued that there has
not been enough evolutionary time for the series of four
mechanisms proposed by Baron-Cohen to have evolved.
Further, Moore (1996) has pointed out difficulties with
each of the sources of evidence (i.e., animal lesion studies,
a study of neuroimaging, and studies of patients with brain
damage) advanced by Baron-Cohen (1995) for the exis-
tence of modules or mechanisms. As in the debate over lan-
guage development, we assume that there is agreement
that children must be biologically prepared to develop an
understanding of mind. The debate concerns whether the
solution to this problem of understanding the mind is in-
nately given or whether it is the capacity to develop such a
solution that has evolved.
According to simulation theory, children develop an un-
derstanding of mental states through introspection, and use
their imagination to reason about psychological matters
(Harris 1991; 2000). We agree that imagination must play
an important role in children’s reasoning about the mind,
but the introspective aspect of this approach is problematic
for a number of reasons. Simulation theory faces the prob-
lem of how we can ever be confident that we can general-
ize our introspection to others (see Russell 1996, for a dis-
cussion). A more important difficulty for simulation theory
is that the assumption that children learn the meanings of
mental state terms through introspection is vulnerable to
Wittgenstein’s (1953/1968) private language argument
(Chapman 1987a; Montgomery 1997; Russell 1996). Witt-
genstein’s argument – actually an anti-private language ar-
gument or arguments (Russell 1996) – seems to establish
that children cannot learn the meanings of mental state
terms just by introspection of their own inner experience.
In reviewing Wittgenstein’s arguments we now move
from the problems of the individual theories to a critique of
a fundamental assumption shared by all theories discussed
so far. The assumption in these theories is that the problem
the child must overcome, through inference or introspec-
tion, is to figure out what is going on in the private and hid-
den realms of other minds. German and Leslie (2000,
p. 230) set up the “fundamental problem of theory of mind”
as follows: “[G]iven that beliefs, desires and pretends can
be neither seen, heard nor felt, how does the young brain
succeed in learning about them?” It is just this causal psy-
chological view of the mind that Wittgenstein rejected.
Wittgenstein (1953/1968) argued that our language “be-
witches” people into thinking of psychological matters as in-
ner objects, and his aim was to dispel misconceptions that
our language leads one into. People assume that language
refers to things, and in the case of beliefs, desires, and in-
tentions we assume inner objects, or representations, that
are causally related to behavior. We contend that this as-
sumption is common to most theories of children’s “theo-
ries of mind” and, that Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be ap-
plied as a general critique of many current theories of social
cognitive development (Racine 2004). Wittgenstein’s goal,
especially his private language argument, was therapeutic
because his intent was to clear the ground of misconcep-
tions, and we aim to use his remedy to propose a construc-
tivist cure for the currently ailing approaches to mental
state understanding.
Although there is general agreement about the impor-
tance of Wittgenstein’s private language argument, there is
considerable controversy regarding the meaning and im-
plications, and even the location of the argument or ar-
guments, in Wittgenstein’s (1953/1968) Philosophical In-
vestigations (cf. ter Hark 1990).4 By a “private language,”
Wittgenstein did not mean a new language that has not yet
been taught to anyone else, or a dying language only spo-
ken by one last speaker. Rather, a private language is radi-
cally private in the sense that it is not possible to teach it to
others because it is based on private ostensive definition.
Wittgenstein’s rejection of the idea that one could define
words privately is part of his critique of what he referred to
as Augustine’s view of language, according to which osten-
sive definition is the foundation for language because “it
correlates words with things” (Hacker 1990, p. 99). Among
the problems with this view of language, Wittgenstein
(1953/1968) showed, is that “an ostensive definition can be
variously interpreted in every case” (para. 28; emphasis in
the original). An Augustinian might argue that the word-
thing connection in language can be saved by the fact that
one can “mentally point” – that is, when it comes to inner
sensations we simply direct our attention. Thus, privately or
mentally pointing would be unambiguous. However, this
too would not work because it would require a person to
“individuate a particular mental activity – sensation or im-
pression – concentrate his attention on it, and label it”
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(Williams 1999, p. 19). Hacker (1996, p. 132) argued that
there is nothing like mental pointing that could be similar
to public pointing. One cannot concentrate one’s attention
inwardly and label a sensation. Thus, with regard to inter-
nal private states, nothing “could logically count as remem-
bering correctly or incorrectly” (Hacker 1990, p. 108). This
is just one aspect of Wittgenstein’s general rejection of the
whole view of beliefs, desires, and intentions as inner ob-
jects that one could introspect on and label.
Perhaps a more fundamental reason that words cannot
be defined privately is that meaning is not attached to
words, utterances, or representations in a mechanistic or
dyadic manner (Goldberg 1991). Instead, meaning is based
on use, on shared practices with others. Wittgenstein
(1953/1968, para. 580) argued that “an ‘inner process’
stands in need of outward criteria.”
According to Wittgenstein, the way to find out the meaning of
psychological expressions is not to look inside the self, but to
look at the function that the respective words and concepts play
in our language. This is because the meaning of such expres-
sions is determined by the ways in which they are typically used,
not by the particular subjective impressions that we happen to
have in these situations. (Chapman 1987a, p. 107)
It is important to emphasize that the Wittgensteinian view
of beliefs is very different from that assumed by most work
in the “theory of mind” tradition. In Racine’s words (per-
sonal communication, November 2002),
when people in the field speak of beliefs as mental contents,
they reify belief into a new form of mental content that is in-
dependent of activity but yet causes activity. There are no such
contents. Belief exists and is created in action, not in the head.
We should not take the development of an ability to re-present
activities off line to be the development of an ability to experi-
ence inner states of belief. (see also Racine 2004)
It is this Wittgensteinian view of beliefs and intentions that
we assume in the alternative theory we propose in this tar-
get article.
We should be clear that Wittgenstein was arguing against
the idea that introspection could be the way one learns the
meaning of psychological terms. But he did not rule out in-
trospection in some cases once someone has learned to talk
about the psychological world, such as in the following ex-
ample: “Does it make sense to ask: ‘Do I really love her, or
am I only pretending to myself?’ and the process of intro-
spection is the calling up of memories; of imagined possi-
ble situations, and of the feelings that one would have if . . .”
(Wittgenstein 1953/1968, para. 587; see also Hacker 1996,
p. 133). We should also emphasize that Wittgenstein was
not denying that one experiences sensations privately. This
was not the target of his private language argument. Rather,
he rejected the idea that it would be possible to learn the
meaning of psychological words through introspection.
We have pointed out some difficulties with the dominant
theoretical accounts of children’s mentalistic understand-
ing (for further criticism see, e.g., Gellatly 1997; Hobson
1991; Nelson et al. 1998; Russell 1996). There are, however,
different versions of these positions and we lack the space
to do justice to the complexity of these theoretical ap-
proaches. We also recognize that criticisms may be coun-
tered with auxiliary hypotheses. These theoretical positions
converge on some points. That is, most theorists would
agree that infants must be innately prepared to learn about
the social world, that their own inner experience must play
some role in the development of this understanding, that
such knowledge is interconnected and changes with devel-
opment, and that imagination is important in the process of
social reasoning. Within such general agreement, however,
there is still much controversy, and there is an urgent need
for an alternative theoretical account that is more consis-
tent with the accumulating evidence of the important role
of social interaction in the development of children’s social
understanding.
To summarize our argument thus far, a common problem
with the dominant perspectives in the field is that each fo-
cuses on the cognitive architecture of mental state reason-
ing, without reflecting on the social landscape in which such
reasoning is constructed (Astington 1996; Lewis et al.
1996). It is not by coincidence that recent discussion has be-
gun to consider this social dimension as more central to de-
velopment (Astington & Baird, in press). Astington’s (1996)
Vygotskian approach more explicitly includes such a social
dimension. However, as we discussed in section 2.1, we
must carefully distinguish social constructionist approaches
that are equivalent to passive enculturation from social con-
structivist positions that also recognize the social dimension
as essential but claim that passive adoption of cultural
norms cannot account for all development. So far, Asting-
ton (1996) has not been explicit on this issue, and the re-
sulting ambiguity tends to lead to the enculturation inter-
pretation. Although Vygotsky’s approach could be read as
an enculturation theory, more complex readings are possi-
ble and more plausible (e.g., Fernyhough 1996). In section
3 we construct an account that is in keeping with such a
reading.
3. A solution: Constructing an understanding 
of mind
In the preceding sections we contrasted approaches based
on the assumption that the development of an understand-
ing of mind is an individual process of introspection, matu-
ration, or the formation of a theory, with the contrasting po-
sition that children acquire culture-specific concepts
regarding the mind which are passed on from the social
group. Instead of choosing between these two contrasting
positions, we begin from a different starting point and en-
dorse an alternative perspective emphasizing the relations
between people (Piaget 1977/1995). Concepts about the
mind are not just passed on from the social group, nor are
they completely formed by individual child-theorists. In-
stead, children gradually construct social understanding
through the regularities they experience in interacting with
others.
Our approach to the development of children’s social un-
derstanding is based on Chapman’s (1991; 1999) reformu-
lation of Piagetian theory emphasizing the social dimension
in development. Piaget is now known for his emphasis on
subject-object interaction, even though in his early work
(e.g., Piaget 1924/1928), and continuing throughout his ca-
reer (Piaget 1977/1995) he was also concerned with the so-
cial dimension of development (Chapman 1988a; Lourenço
& Machado 1996). Vygotsky (1978; 1934/1986), on the
other hand, is known for his concern with the role of social
interaction in the development of higher mental functions.
An integration of subject-object interaction and social in-
teraction results in a triangle “consisting of an active sub-
ject, the object of knowledge, and a (real or implicit) inter-
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locutor, together with their mutual relations,” which Chap-
man (1991, p. 211) termed the “epistemic triangle.” Chap-
man argued that “although Piaget recognized the impor-
tance of both operative and communicative forms of
interaction in various phases of his work, he never inte-
grated those components in a single model” (p. 212). This
epistemic, or “knowing,” triangle preserves the insights of
Piaget and Vygotsky and facilitates thinking about how so-
cial interaction and subject-object experience can be rec-
onciled in development. The epistemic triangle has much
in common with Hobson’s (1994; 2002) notion of a “relat-
edness triangle,” except that the latter focuses almost ex-
clusively on affective engagement, particularly in infancy.
Chapman employed the notion of the epistemic triangle
to describe the role of social interaction in the development
of knowledge in the area of children’s reasoning on concrete
operational tasks (Carpendale 1999a; Carpendale et al.
1996; Chapman & Lindenberger 1992). We take it to be the
lowest common denominator for understanding develop-
ment in general and it is equally applicable to children’s rea-
soning regarding social matters. The fundamental point is
that social interaction is essential in the development of
cognitive, social, and moral knowledge. Children “construct
a new conception of reality by coordinating their object-ori-
ented operative interactions with those of other people, by
means of their communicative interactions with the indi-
viduals in question” (Chapman 1999, p. 34; emphasis in the
original). At the same time that children are constructing
knowledge of the physical world they are also constructing
knowledge of other people. It is through communicative in-
teraction that children discover that others sometimes have
different beliefs about the world. We take it that children
assume a stable external world that remains the same for
themselves and other people. In order to maintain this 
assumption when they encounter others who may have dif-
ferent beliefs about aspects of the world, such as the loca-
tion or identity of objects, children change their expecta-
tions or their understanding of mind and of how beliefs are
formed. At some point children realize that access to infor-
mation, for example through seeing, is essential in the for-
mation of beliefs. That is, children construct an under-
standing of how they and other people acquire knowledge
of the world and they may achieve comparable levels of de-
velopment at similar ages because of commonalities in their
experience.
From this perspective, knowledge is gradually con-
structed within social interaction. Children’s social knowl-
edge is based on action; it is not theoretical in the sense of
a set of laws formed on the basis of observation to explain
the doings of other people. Understanding others is at first
practical. It is gradually constructed through regularities in
interaction with others. At first the interaction between in-
fant and other (e.g., the caregiver or sibling) is dyadic and
not yet referential, but by the latter part of the first year this
interaction becomes triadic, between the infant, the care-
giver, and objects.5 That is, aspects of the world become in-
creasingly included in the interaction between infant and
caregiver. The infant is embedded in this triadic interaction
but only gradually differentiates the self, other people, and
the world of objects. In keeping with this gradual view of
development, we expect to see children exhibit early forms
of knowledge about the mind first in interaction; only later
will children become able to reflect on such knowledge.
In the following subsections we flesh out this view of de-
velopment in more detail, first briefly in development dur-
ing infancy and next when children begin to learn words.
3.1. The development of the epistemic triangle: 
Social understanding in infancy
Triadic interaction between the child, another person, and
the world is essential in the development of knowledge in
general, and here we focus on social knowledge. This leads
to the question of how and when the capacity for triadic in-
teraction develops from an infant’s dyadic interaction with
either a parent or the world of objects. There is much de-
bate and discussion concerning how and when infants
achieve the capacity for triadic interaction – or move from
“primary intersubjectivity” to “secondary intersubjectivity”
(Trevarthen 1979; Trevarthen & Hubley 1978).6 Examples
of behavior involving triadic interaction begin toward the
end of the first year of life and include social referencing,
gaze following, and different forms of pointing. One of the
early manifestations of triadic interaction between the in-
fant, an adult, and objects during infancy occurs at about 12
months of age when infants start to point to objects (Schaf-
fer 1977). Bates et al. (1976) distinguished between infants’
use of pointing gestures in order to make requests (“proto-
imperatives”) and pointing to direct adults’ attention to ob-
jects (“proto-declaratives”). At this age, infants appear to be
actively directing an adult’s attention. These are two forms
of behavior that at least appear to involve joint visual atten-
tion. This capacity for joint attention plays an essential role
in word learning during the second year (e.g., Baldwin
1995; Lock 1980). The triangle between the infant, the par-
ent, and the world in action can be observed even earlier,
at about 9 months of age, in the phenomenon of social ref-
erencing, in which an infant apparently refers to a parent’s
facial expression to determine their evaluation of an am-
biguous situation (e.g., Walden & Ogan 1988).
Any claim about the age at which joint attention behav-
iors such as pointing, gaze following, and social referencing
develop will be controversial. Different forms of these be-
haviors develop at different ages and, because there is
much debate about what these behaviors may reveal con-
cerning infants’ social understanding, both rich and lean in-
terpretations of this apparent evidence of early social un-
derstanding in infancy are possible (Baldwin & Moses 1996;
Moore & Corkum 1994). Richly interpreted, those behav-
iors involving joint visual attention seem to be evidence of
infants’ understanding that other people have intentions
and attention that can be directed to various aspects of the
world (Carpenter et al. 1998; Tomasello 1995a). The be-
haviors mentioned above have been interpreted as evi-
dence that infants at this age already have an “implicit”
“theory of mind” (Bretherton 1991; Bretherton et al. 1981).
From the perspective of this rich interpretation, infants re-
quire a mentalistic understanding of attention in order to
engage in joint attention with adults and, therefore, this be-
havior reveals such an insight.
Theorists taking a rich view of joint attention can be seen
as falling within an individualist framework. According to
that framework, social development begins with the first
person perspective and the individual’s own self-knowledge
which then must be extended to others; that is, “knowledge
of other minds is parasitic on our knowledge of our own
mind” (Jopling 1993, p. 291). With this starting point for
self-knowledge, the route to an explanation of understand-
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ing other minds is usually through the analogical argument.
This argument has an extensive history. A current use of it
by Meltzoff et al. (1999) is the following: “(a) When I per-
form that bodily act I have such and such a phenomenal ex-
perience, (b) I recognize that others perform the same type
of bodily act as me, (c) the other is sharing my behavioral
state; ergo, perhaps the other is having the same phenom-
enal experience” (p. 35). Tomasello (1999b, pp. 70–76;
1999a, p. 68) also relied on the analogical argument in his
theorizing about infancy (although his theorizing concern-
ing language is consistent with ours).
The analogical argument relied on by the individualist
framework is problematic for a number of reasons (e.g., ter
Hark 1990). For example, it seems to attribute too much to
the infant in counterfactual reasoning and the ability to take
an external perspective on their own experience (Soffer
1999). Analogical reasoning is possible once children have
the concept of self and other, but the argument already pre-
supposes this distinction and on that ground cannot logi-
cally be its source (Scheler 1954, pp. 240–41). (For further
criticism of the analogical argument see Müller & Carpen-
dale 2004.)
More recent accounts of joint attention support a leaner
interpretation. For example, Baldwin and Moses (1996) ex-
plored development in triadic interaction in the context of
social referencing and found that infants look at their moth-
ers under conditions of stress but not to gather information.
This suggests that triadic interaction may be important in
further development of infants’ social understanding, but at
9–12 months of age it is only very rudimentary and is more
likely to be a manifestation of the attachment system than
social understanding.
The most well-known lean account is that of Moore and
Corkum (1994; Corkum & Moore 1995; 1998), who showed
that infants engage in joint visual attention, or end up in sit-
uations in which their attention is coordinated with adults,
through processes such as conditioning, without having yet
developed an understanding of attention (for a similar argu-
ment, see Kaye 1982). Rather than joint attention necessar-
ily revealing infants’ understanding of other people’s atten-
tion, Moore and Corkum (1994) suggested that there are
developmental changes in infants’ understanding of joint vi-
sual attention. They provided evidence that around the end
of the first year infants rely primarily on observing the adult’s
head turn without apparently understanding the importance
of eye direction. This appears to call into question the com-
monsense view that infants of this age understand that the
other person is paying attention to the object. Later, during
the first half of the second year, infants begin to use eye di-
rection information as well as the head turn to achieve joint
visual attention. This suggests that experience in which in-
fants’ attention is coordinated with adults’ attention occurs
before infants understand much about attention (Moore
1999). The infant becomes embedded in interaction with
some success and only through the experience of that inter-
action later develops a more complete understanding:
Once the infant is reliably engaging in joint attention, the ex-
periences offered by this new triadic interactive form of be-
havior will afford progress in the infant’s conceptualization of
attention and set the child on the road to the discovery of all
forms of social life that rest on sharing attention with others.
(Corkum & Moore 1995, pp. 81–82)
This position is also supported by research on infants’
pointing (following Murphy & Messer 1977). Desrochers et
al. (1995) reported that in a longitudinal study the majority
of infants began to use noncommunicative pointing (i.e.,
pointing without looking at their mother) at 12 months of
age. However, only beginning at 15 months did these same
infants begin to use pointing that seemed communicative
in intent – for example, by simultaneously looking at their
mothers to ensure they were successfully communicating.
Desrochers et al. documented the development of increas-
ingly sophisticated forms of pointing between the ages of 12
months and 18 months. Here again the evidence suggests
that infants engage in action such as pointing, which may
result in achieving joint visual attention or the coordination
of attention with an adult, because the parent may attend
to the object to which the infant is pointing. However, these
young infants do not as yet appear to understand what they
are doing because they do not look at the parent’s face. In
further exploring the development of pointing, Moore and
D’Entremont (2001) found that infants at age 1 year are
more likely to point when their parent is looking at them,
whereas at age 2 years they tend to point when their parent
had not seen an interesting sight. This suggests that young
infants point to enhance interaction, but older infants un-
derstand pointing as directing others’ attention.
Another reason for caution concerning the acceptance of
overly rich interpretations of the meaning of early joint at-
tention comes from research with nonhuman primates.
Chimpanzees can follow gaze, and on the surface their be-
havior looks surprisingly similar to that of infants, but
Povinelli (1999) showed through a series of experiments
that chimpanzees do not appear to understand the psycho-
logical significance of gaze direction. For example, chim-
panzees trained to beg with a hand-out gesture and given
the opportunity to beg for food from one of two experi-
menters sitting side-by-side are initially just as likely to beg
from someone with her eyes closed, with her head turned
away, or even with her head covered by a bucket as they are
to beg from someone with her eyes open. It takes many tri-
als for the chimpanzee to learn to beg from the person who
can actually see their begging gesture (Povinelli 1999).
Proponents of the lean interpretation of joint attention
have much in common with our position on infant social un-
derstanding. In particular, Moore (1999) set the origins of
infant social understanding within triadic interaction
(equivalent to subject, interlocutor, and object):
One might say that the 12-month-old recognizes intentional re-
lations but only to the extent that she can share such a relation
with an interactive partner. For the 1-year-old, intentional re-
lations exist in the interaction and are not a property of, or de-
scriptive of, individuals. (Moore 1999, p. 48)
However, Barresi and Moore’s (1996) more detailed ac-
count starts from an individualistic perspective in which in-
fants have different information about self and other and
the integration of these two sources of information leads to
the development of an understanding of self-other equiva-
lence:
An individual organism’s information about intentional rela-
tions is available from two different sources. An organism has
direct first person information about its own intentional rela-
tions and direct third person information about the intentional
relations of other agents. (Barresi & Moore 1996, p. 108)
This implies that a self-other distinction is already in place,
whereas from our perspective it is this distinction that re-
quires an explanation.
An alternative approach that avoids these problems
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within an individualist framework is the relational frame-
work (Jopling 1993), according to which the development
of social understanding begins from relations between peo-
ple rather than from individual self-knowledge. The start-
ing point in development is a position of relative nondiffer-
entiation between self, other, and the world (Baldwin 1906;
Hobson 1993; Merleau-Ponty 1964; Piaget 1936/1963,
1937/1971; Vygotsky 1998; Werner & Kaplan 1963). From
an observer’s point of view one sees the infant interacting
with others and the world, but at first the infant has not con-
structed these distinctions. The differentiations between
inner and outer, subject and object, and self and other oc-
cur gradually within interaction (Müller & Runions 2003).
The process by which the infant shifts from participating in
triadic interactions to an understanding of the distinction
between her own and others’ intentions remains a holy grail
within this area of theorization. However, only the con-
structivist perspective starts from a point where this prob-
lem is not already “solved” – as stated above, accounts
within the “theory of mind” tradition assume self-other dif-
ferentiation from the outset.
A central assumption from a constructivist perspective is
that knowledge originates in activity. Infants interact dyad-
ically with the world of objects as well as with people, and
through this activity they develop sensorimotor action
schemes. Such schemes embody knowledge because they
are modified as a function of the differences between what
is anticipated and what the infant actually experiences
(Chapman 1999). With further development, two or more
action schemes may be combined, resulting in more objec-
tivity or separateness from the infant’s own action. The in-
fant develops expectations about what can be done with ob-
jects as well as expectations about their interactions and
routines with people. And infants begin to regard people as
independent “centers of causality” (Piaget 1937/1971); that
is, people do not always do what the infant expects or wants
(Baldwin 1906). Different patterns of activity are possible
with people as compared to with objects. There has been a
great deal of research attention devoted to the study of face-
to-face dyadic interaction between infant and parent. In
such interaction infant and parent respond to each other
and this could be described as a form of communication but
it does not yet refer to anything outside of this dyadic in-
teraction (Chapman 1991). Objects may begin to be in-
cluded in this interaction in routines such as giving and tak-
ing. From this perspective, infants first experience triadic
interaction that is supported by the parent or through
processes such as infants learning to associate head turns
with interesting sights (Corkum & Moore 1998). At this
point infants still do not have a clear understanding of oth-
ers’ attention; but over time they will construct such an un-
derstanding through interaction (Müller & Runions 2003).
Development involves a process of gradually constructing
action schemes and combining them. Infants slowly differ-
entiate and coordinate their attentional directedness to-
ward objects with others’ directedness toward objects
(Müller & Carpendale 2004).
Hobson’s (2002) relatedness triangle is a similar ap-
proach that emphasizes the importance of the infant’s emo-
tional engagement. To this important insight, we add that
the infant’s understanding of causality and spatial relations
is also critical in the infant’s ability to engage in joint atten-
tion. This point is reflected in the various forms of gaze-fol-
lowing that are observable from about age 3 months to age
18 months. More complex forms of this social behavior,
such as following an adult’s gaze to an object behind the in-
fant, require the infant to have an understanding of herself
as an object within a world of other objects (Müller &
Carpendale 2004).
When infants have developed the capacity to coordinate
attention with others they can refer to aspects of the world
by directing others’ attention, and they can understand
other people’s referential intent. Reference involves more
than just forming an association between a sign, usually ver-
bal, and an action, as is the case in the few triadic chim-
panzee gestures (Tomasello & Camaioni 1997). Instead,
signs can be used flexibly to convey different meaning in
different contexts, and this requires the ability to infer oth-
ers’ referential intent.7 Recent “theory of mind” research
on infancy has worked with inventive experimental proce-
dures, but neglects an older tradition (e.g., Lock 1978;
Schaffer 1984b) that attempted to chart the development
of such signs within the richness of the infant’s daily inter-
action rituals and experiences. Our position is in keeping
with this tradition and the more recent view of Reddy
(1991) that the rituals preverbal children engage in during
“teasing” and “mucking about” show the beginnings of the
process by which children come to share attention and to
construct a practical or lived form of social understanding
or knowledge of other people.
The ability to achieve joint attention and to understand
other people’s referential intent is the foundational insight
on which language is based (e.g., Baldwin 1995; Sinha
1999). Tomasello (1999b; Tomasello et al. 1993) argued that
it is this uniquely human ability that allows people to make
use of culture to a far greater extent than can other animals.
This ability is based on an initial level of social understand-
ing that gives infants the capacity to engage in triadic inter-
action, and such interaction then provides a context for fur-
ther social cognitive development. Infants now start to use
actions and words to refer to other things. Their communi-
cation at this point becomes referential; that is, infants in-
dicate what they want the adult to attend to and also are
able to determine adults’ referential intent. At this point,
“words begin to mediate children’s sensorimotor acquain-
tance with reality. Children no longer know reality solely in
terms of what they could do with it, but also in terms of what
they could potentially say (or hear) about it” (Chapman
1999, p. 34; emphasis in the original). All of the components
of the epistemic triangle are now in place. In the next sec-
tion we discuss how this new level of knowing provides a
context for further development in children’s understand-
ing of the social world.
3.2. Outer criteria for inner processes: Talking about the
psychological world
As infants develop the capacity to coordinate attention with
others, they begin to learn language. Children’s word use is
built onto the shared practices they have already developed,
such as following or directing another’s attention, making
requests, and conveying their intentions or goals. Learning
to talk is grafted onto prior ways of acting and interacting
with others. This is a view of language as activity, not just as
information exchange. In this section we are concerned
with the development of children’s ability to talk about the
psychological world. This raises the issue of the relations
between language and thinking. A common assumption is
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that concepts are acquired first and then the words for such
concepts. In contrast, from a Wittgensteinian perspective,
language and thinking are much more tightly intertwined.
Wittgenstein (1981a, para. 324) asked, “Does a child learn
only to talk, or also to think? Does it learn the sense of mul-
tiplication before or after it learns multiplication?” We as-
sume that the child learns about the concepts and the words
at the same time. That is, learning the meaning of words to
do with multiplication involves learning the operations that
are criterial for those words.
The research on children’s language and their social un-
derstanding initially used language as a window on chil-
dren’s understanding and tended to focus on words that
seem most obviously to be mental state terms such as
“think” and “know.” Other words, however, that are not ob-
viously mental state terms at all (e.g., “hide”) involve some
understanding of how people know things and of how peo-
ple can be prevented from knowing things (Turnbull &
Carpendale 1999a; for similar discussion see Russell 1992).
In fact, it would be difficult to draw a clear line between
words that do or do not turn on some understanding of the
psychological world. Hacker (1991) pointed out that saying
a robot or an automatic door opener “sees” something is
parasitic on the primary use of such a verb. With reference
to human agents, simple words such as “look” and “see”
seem to refer to perception, but their correct use is tied to
an understanding of the perceiver’s psychological attributes
when they attend to something. Learning the use of such
words is rooted in children’s everyday experiences of coor-
dinating attention with others. Children can be asked the
false belief test question by referring only to where Maxi
would look (the “look question”) without use of the word
“think.” In fact, in some research young 3-year-olds seem to
pass this form of the test question before the “think” ver-
sion of the question (Chandler & Hala 1994; Hala & Chan-
dler 1996). Similarly, 3-year-olds pass a false belief question
phrased with “say” before a similar question phrased with
“think” (Nelson et al. 2003). The general point is that a great
deal of talk that is based on an understanding of knowledge
acquisition and the mental world may not, in fact, involve
what we would usually consider to be mental state terms
(Turnbull & Carpendale 1999a).
In describing how children learn to talk about the psy-
chological world it is necessary to draw on Wittgenstein’s
notion of criteria. According to Chapman’s operational se-
mantic theory (Chapman 1999; Carpendale et al. 1996),
children learn about the meaning of relational words such
as “longer” through learning the operations that are criter-
ial for the use of such words. Children may come to under-
stand that the meaning of “longer” in the case of length in-
volves the operation of checking to see which of two sticks
protrudes farther. Only through elaboration do children
learn the additional criterion of first lining up the ends of
the sticks. Terms like “longer” are also involved in other lan-
guage games referring to time. In the present case of learn-
ing how to talk about the psychological world the criteria
for the use of such words are embedded within social in-
teraction. As discussed above, Wittgenstein’s (1953/1968)
private language argument stressed that it is not possible to
learn through introspection the meanings of words refer-
ring to inner processes (Chapman 1987a; Montgomery
1997; Russell 1996). It follows from this that children learn
about inner processes (their own and other people’s)
through public criteria, not only through their subjective
experience; that is, they learn the appropriate contexts for
the use of various words referring to the psychological
world. Children learn the pattern of interaction for which
it is appropriate to use a particular term, for example, men-
tal or emotional, or dealing with pain, and so forth. Wittgen-
stein’s (1953/1968) view of how children learn the meaning
of sensation terms is that
words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expres-
sions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt
himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him
exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new
pain-behavior. (para. 244)
Wittgenstein’s argument regarding sensation words also
applies to psychological words (Chapman 1987a). Children
learn to talk about the psychological world in a variety of
ways including discussions about themselves and other peo-
ple. That children appear to develop the ability to under-
stand another’s belief at the same time as their own (Gop-
nik 1993) would suggest that they learn the criteria for each
at about the same time. Criteria for talk about the mental
world are behavioral evidence for inner experiences such as
sensations, emotions, thinking, remembering, imagining,
and so forth: “Criteria are those publicly observable cir-
cumstances which might be used in teaching the correct
use of the expression to a child or someone else learning our
language” (Chapman 1987a, p. 105).
From a Wittgensteinian perspective, the use of psycho-
logical terms becomes part of earlier, or more “primitive,”
prelinguistic behavior (Hacker 1997). Words such as “see”
and “look” may be grafted onto earlier joint attention be-
haviors. These words can then be used as new ways to di-
rect and follow attention. Similarly, emotion words may be
grafted onto the child’s prior reactions or behaviors. The
circumstances surrounding the use of psychological words
become the criteria for their use. Talk about the mental
world is built onto prior activities as a refinement (Canfield
1993; 1999; Malcolm 1991; Turnbull & Carpendale 2001).
It might seem that if we endorse the Wittgensteinian idea
that children learn about the mental world through learn-
ing how to express in language their feelings, plans, goals,
and so forth and through learning the criteria for the third
person use of various psychological terms, then we must en-
dorse an enculturation position in which mentalistic con-
cepts are imported from the social world to the individual.
As mentioned in section 2.1, this is one interpretation of
Wittgenstein and it implies a cultural relativism by which
children would just learn the mental concepts used in their
particular culture. However, we do not endorse this inter-
pretation for two reasons. First, at the basic level of social
understanding (e.g., seeing, looking, intentions, desires,
and beliefs), children’s understanding is built onto shared
practices that we expect would be common across cultures
because these are common aspects of human experience
(for a parallel argument within the theory view, see Well-
man 1998). This does not rule out that there may be cross-
cultural variability, such as in complex emotions (Lillard
1998).
Second, and central to our argument, children’s devel-
opment is constructive. This involves combining the epis-
temic triangle approach to development with Wittgen-
stein’s concept of criteria. That is, children do not acquire
an understanding of talk about the psychological world in
an all-or-nothing fashion. Concepts are not passed on,
ready-made, through language. Criteria are multiple and
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children may initially acquire a subset, which enables them
to use words apparently correctly in supportive contexts. It
is only through communicative interaction with others
about beliefs (sometimes differing, sometimes concordant)
about the world, that children gradually construct an un-
derstanding of belief. In other words, although young chil-
dren often use and seem to understand words based on an
understanding of the process of knowledge acquisition
(e.g., “see,” “remember,” and “guess”), their understanding
is as yet incomplete and is based on a partial set of the cri-
teria for the correct use of such words (Montgomery 1997).
For example, Lillard (1993b) showed that when young chil-
dren first begin to use the word “pretend” they focus on the
more obvious criterion of the action being performed
rather than on the individual’s knowledge or intentions.
This view is consistent with the generally protracted nature
of language development (e.g., Nelson 1997).
We now turn to a consideration of other accounts of the
relation between language and social understanding. The
finding that various aspects of children’s linguistic ability
are associated with false belief performance has already
been mentioned (e.g., Cutting & Dunn 1999; de Villiers
2000; de Villiers & de Villiers 2000; Happé 1995; Jenkins &
Astington 1996). One approach is that language can be used
as a window to reveal the child’s social understanding.
Bartsch and Wellman’s (1995; see also Sabbagh & Callanan
1998) work exemplifies the usefulness of such research in
that it shows that children produce terms referring to de-
sires before they refer to beliefs. However, one should be
careful of the assumption that mental terms refer to men-
tal states. Even the simple word “want,” which would be
coded as a desire term, can be used in many ways, such as
to make requests or to make offers. Budwig (2002) found
that mothers and their children used the word “want” in dif-
ferent ways. Regarding syntax, the de Villiers studies (e.g.,
de Villiers & de Villiers 2000) showed that the child’s grasp
of the syntax of complementation (i.e., the fact that mental
state verbs necessarily take complementary clauses when
they refer to mental states, like other non-mental state
verbs; e.g., He thinks that he had eggs for breakfast; He said
that he had eggs for breakfast) is correlated with false be-
lief test performance. Such analyses suggest important con-
nections between mental state understanding and the abil-
ity to parse statements about mental states. Longitudinal
evidence indicates that language competence, as measured
in standardized tests, appears to predate the development
of false belief understanding (Astington & Jenkins 1999).
Each piece of research shows how children’s under-
standing of mental states is likely to be related to their gen-
eral proficiency in understanding and producing words and
sentences. However, such correlations raise the issue of
causal direction, third factors, and the nature of any influ-
ence. Indeed, they are somewhat antithetical to our ap-
proach because language and social understanding are so
intertwined that it is somewhat artificial to separate human
activity into parts and call one part language and the other
social understanding. This position follows, in part, from
viewing language as activity (Turnbull 2003; Turnbull &
Carpendale 1999a). However, if we do talk in terms of lan-
guage and social understanding, then, from the perspective
of the epistemic triangle, language is important for two rea-
sons. Astington (2001, p. 686) has described these two roles,
and the need for a resolution, as “a means for representing
false belief in contradistinction to the evidence given in re-
ality and it is also the means by which children become
aware of beliefs, both content and attitude. . . . What is
needed is a new conceptualization that reconciles and com-
bines insights from both views.” Although we may differ
from Astington in what we mean by representation – from
our perspective, language mediates children’s knowledge of
reality – children learn the criteria for words to talk about
human activity and then can reflect on the psychological
world. Language, or communicative interaction, is the
means through which children learn about other people’s
experience and so develop a more complete set of criteria.
Parallel arguments have been made within more tradi-
tional accounts. Harris (1996), in particular, had the insight
that conversation is important. Rather than mere exposure
to mental state terms, Harris argued that conversation is
important because it is a constant reminder that other peo-
ple have different perspectives. We agree that this is one
role conversation plays, but we contend that this is not suf-
ficient. Communicative interaction helps children realize
when they only have a partial set of the criteria for using
words such as “‘look,” “see,” “think,” and “know” correctly,
and when their understanding of the patterns of interaction
in which these words are used is incomplete. Conversation
has a pivotal role within the epistemic triangle, but as part
of an integrated system not as an independent factor. To
maintain the assumption that one lives in a common, stable,
external world that is the same for the self and others – one
of the basic presuppositions required in any attempt at
communication – children must develop an increasingly so-
phisticated understanding of the nature of the mind. Main-
taining the assumption of an independent external world in
the face of evidence of other people’s differing experience
of the world requires that children modify their under-
standing of the relations between their own and others’ be-
liefs about the world to include the notion that one’s beliefs
about the world depend on the information to which one is
exposed.
Once children can talk about the social, emotional, and
psychological world, they can begin to reflect on or think
about people’s activity in psychological terms (Chapman
1991; Piaget 1945/1962; Vygotsky 1934/1986). This raises
the issue of how we view the process of reasoning. In the
theories we reviewed earlier in this target article, the
process of reasoning involves simulation or the application
of rules that are either innate or formulated by the child on
the basis of observation. In contrast, we suggest that chil-
dren understand talk about the psychological world in
terms of the patterns of activity that are criterial for the use
of such mental state terms – that is, the pattern of interac-
tion for which we use these words. Reasoning, then, in-
volves the coordination of these activities. Thus, as well as
understanding questions in terms of human interaction,
children also require the ability to imagine and coordinate
activities that may not be immediately present. From this
perspective, reasoning is not based on the application of
rules, but particular instances of rules would be manifest in
the process of reasoning (Carpendale et al. 1996).
4. Using the epistemic triangle to explain the
“core findings” in “theory of mind” and the 
influence of relationships
In this section we address the “So what?” questions that nec-
essarily follow in response to the proposed position in sec-
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tion 3. In section 4.1 we take the paradigm that appears to
show most clearly that a clear conceptual shift takes place
– the false belief test – and compare a traditional theory-
theory account with the one offered here. In section 4.2 we
explore whether the theory presented here can go further
than previous ones in accounting for the correlations be-
tween a range of social relationships, like the sibling effect,
and mental state understanding. We suggest that it can do
so more convincingly than any other account.
4.1. The gradual acquisition of criteria within
conversation
We are not the first to criticize the dominant accounts of
“theory of mind” development by suggesting that such skills
are acquired gradually. Such gradualism has been explained
within a framework of other arguments, like the protracted
development of language (Nelson 1997), and from within a
philosophical critique of the theory-theory approach (Wood-
field 1996; see also Russell 1996). It is therefore important
to outline how gradualism follows from our theoretical per-
spective. Theory-theorists might depict a series of theories,
“rudimentary prototheories” (Ruffman 2000, p. 263) like
“preliefs” (Perner et al. 1994), or processing demands in
different procedures. This account can go only so far. How-
ever, an argument based on gradualism cannot be an excuse
for fuzzy thinking. It needs a theoretical foundation and it
needs to provide an explanation of the data.
The notion of gradualism underlies the type of develop-
mental approach taken by Piaget, and also Vygotsky. For ex-
ample, as Chandler (2001) has pointed out, in Piaget and
Inhelder’s (1948/1967) research on the development of
children’s understanding of visual perspective-taking they
described a sequence of different forms of understanding.
This developmental approach has often been lost in the
subsequent role-taking literature and the current “theory of
mind” research. The strong tendency has been to collapse
this protracted development into a single transition point
(Chandler 2001; Chandler & Carpendale 1998).
The view that an understanding of mind unfolds gradu-
ally may appear to be a nonstarter when the collected data
on the false belief test are examined. The recent meta-
analysis conducted by Wellman et al. (2001) attempted to
identify the factors that reliably facilitate performance in
the false belief test. In an analysis of 178 experiments with
591 conditions, Wellman and colleagues found that factors
like the type of task used, or whether the target question fo-
cused on the protagonist’s thoughts or his or her actions,
were stable across studies. There seemed to be a clear con-
ceptual shift in children’s performance at around age 4, and
this is consistent with the theory-theory account of devel-
opmental change. However, consistent patterns of perfor-
mance on one procedure do not necessarily inform us about
the nature of change – from our theoretical perspective
they may simply show that four-year-old children across the
many studies engage in sufficient interaction with others
about the veracity of beliefs to pass this test. As Scholl and
Leslie (2001) noted, the meta-analysis might only show the
sorts of improvement with age seen on most developmen-
tal tasks.
Indeed, proponents of the theory-theory perspective
have long warned us about the problem of “neurotic task
fixation” (Gopnik et al. 1994, p. 157), and there are dangers
in relying on only one task, particularly those versions of
that task which do not test the variations in performance. In
Wellman et al.’s (2001) meta-analysis some types of studies
were not considered. Moses (2001) pointed out that among
the types of studies not included are studies involving ex-
planations of false beliefs, deceptive behavior, and eye
movements rather than verbal responses. Even within the
homogeneity of tests that were likely to lead to homogenous
results, there was still considerable variation among sam-
ples, and the authors found that
several task manipulations do increase young children’s perfor-
mance: framing the task in terms of explicit deception or trick-
ery, involving the child in actively making the key transforma-
tions, and high-lighting the salience of the protagonist’s mental
state or reducing the salience of the contrasting real-world state
of affairs, all help young children to perform better. (Wellman
et al. 2001, p. 672)
Two issues emerge from Wellman et al.’s interpretation of
the collected false belief data, which are typical of the “the-
ory-theory” approach to the literature: the extent of task
variation and its implications.
In contrast to the theory-theory, the constructivist view
actually predicts that there will be variations in the child’s
acquisition of knowledge within a domain. For example,
when exploring the development of children’s social un-
derstanding, Selman et al. (1983) found different levels of
perspective taking when the child was involved in an activ-
ity than when the child was reflecting on it. The same analy-
sis can be applied to the types of data reported by Wellman
et al. (2001) and the findings, listed above, which they chose
to omit from their analysis. For example, Wellman et al.
found that if the protagonist’s motive is made explicit or if
the child actively participates in the procedure (e.g., Chan-
dler & Hala 1994; Hala & Chandler 1996) then preschool-
ers pass the test in greater numbers. Similar results are
found when child participants act out the answer by demon-
strating with a doll (Freeman et al. 1991). We propose that
children do better on false belief tasks when they are ac-
tively involved, because their understanding of the events
is supported by the social interaction. Not only is their at-
tention directed by the experimenter (within the epistemic
triangle, the subject-interlocutor interaction), but also their
involvement in important aspects of the events commits
them to acting on the object of knowledge (the subject-ob-
ject of knowledge part of the triangle). Thus, children’s
thinking is supported by their practical activity within a dy-
namic triadic process. With further development in their
ability to hold different aspects of events in mind and coor-
dinate them, children will be able to deal with false belief
situations at a more abstract level. This type of research pro-
vides a snapshot of mental state understanding in the mak-
ing. It reveals a microcosm of relationships, which current
studies are showing to be vital and which explain patterns
of findings to be revisited in section 4.2.
A constructivist perspective would predict that the per-
formance of children who are within the process of devel-
oping these insights would be influenced by many aspects
of social interaction. Such gradualism is highlighted by re-
cent research showing that there are other influences of the
context of the assessment procedure. For example, there is
inconsistency between laboratory-based assessment proce-
dures – standard false belief tests – and naturalistic obser-
vation of young children. Children typically pass standard
false belief tests only by the age of approximately 4 years,
whereas in the home parents report observing their 2!s or
Carpendale & Lewis: Constructing an understanding of mind
90 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2004) 27:1
young 3-year-olds apparently demonstrating an under-
standing of false belief (Astington 2000; Newton et al.
2000). In a diary study, Newton et al. (2000) found that par-
ents reported many incidents in which their young children
were involved in deception even though these children
were known to have failed false belief tasks. In agreement
with our position, Newton et al. suggested that rather than
early deception-reflecting insight, young children engage in
deceptive acts with only partial understanding and such ex-
perience is the context for learning about deception.
Wellman et al. (2001) claimed that although factors such
as the child’s active involvement improved performance on
false belief tasks, this evidence “failed to fit an early com-
petence model” (p. 674) because those factors “do not raise
the youngest children’s performance to systematically
above-chance performance” (p. 674) and there were no in-
teractions between these task manipulations and age. Well-
man et al. derived “the essential claim that such task factors
mask early competence” (p. 672). The difficulty with this in-
terpretation is that Wellman et al. appear to have inter-
preted arguments for gradualism within their own way of
thinking about competence, resulting in the straw person
they term the “early competence model.” Wellman et al.’s
inference is based on a prediction that the child either has
or does not have false belief understanding, which may be
hidden by performance factors. This is based on the as-
sumption that competence is a hidden underlying factor
that causes performance (Chandler 1991). However, there
are sufficient data showing how children are able to under-
stand false beliefs at different times to support the claim
presented here that we need to explore the process of
change in greater detail. The general problem is that if an
individual has developed a particular competence, why
does he demonstrate it in some situations but not in others?
Is this variability measurement error or evidence of gradual
development?8
Variability in performance across different tests is usually
explained in terms of performance factors masking the
child’s competence. But, as Chapman (1987a) pointed out,
it is not always possible to separate performance factors
clearly from the underlying competence. The assumption
that there is one competence that is presumed to arrive all
in one piece, like a theory or a set of rules, is what Chap-
man (1987a) referred to as the “measurement model.” As
an alternative approach he proposed the “membership
model,” according to which there are varying degrees of un-
derstanding that are assessed with different procedures.
Here we could say that degrees of membership, or compe-
tence with mental state concepts, are related to children’s
increasing grasp of the multiple criteria for words referring
to the mental world and their ability to understand events
outside of supported social contexts in their immediate
practical activity.
The perspective we apply draws on Vygotskian (1978;
1934/1986) ideas according to which children’s initial, frag-
ile social understanding, or “understanding-in-action”
(Dunn 1996a), is at first evident when supported by social
interaction. Instead of naturalistic observation of early com-
petence (e.g., Newton et al. 2000) being the application of
a theory, this type of experience is necessary to gradually
construct social understanding. This claim that children
begin talking about the mental world with only a partial un-
derstanding is consistent with work on language learning in
general (Nelson 1997). This is not, however, a simple adop-
tion of culturally available concepts concerning the mental
world; rather, children must come to understand these con-
cepts through becoming competent in using such words in
their practical activity. Children’s correct use of psycholog-
ical words is tied to their understanding of social situations
and human activity. This understanding is facilitated by re-
lationships that help the child understand other points of
view. With experience in such social interaction concerning
the mental world, children’s understanding becomes pro-
gressively consolidated. That is, children are able to think
about situations abstracted from their practical context of
interaction and are able to anticipate and reason about sit-
uations such as the false belief task. The ability to talk about
the mental world gives children a resource with which to re-
flect on and understand others as well as themselves.
The fixation on false belief understanding has prevented
us from examining the longer view of development. As
Chandler (1988) pointed out long ago, this initial under-
standing of the nature of beliefs and mind is not yet equiv-
alent to a mature adult understanding of the mind. An un-
derstanding of the possibility of false beliefs will not allow
children to make sense of situations in which people with
access to exactly the same information still arrive at differ-
ent, but equally legitimate, interpretations of the same in-
formation. A child with only an understanding of false be-
liefs would assume that only one interpretation could
possibly be right, and others must therefore be wrong. To
accommodate the experience of interpretive diversity given
the same information, while maintaining the assumption of
a stable, independently existing external world, children
slowly modify their understanding of the process of knowl-
edge acquisition to achieve an understanding of the inter-
pretive nature of knowledge. So when children encounter
situations in which different beliefs are apparently based on
the very same information, they must revise their earlier
understanding that beliefs depend on the information one
is exposed to (i.e., false belief understanding) and develop
an interpretive understanding of the mind (Carpendale &
Chandler 1996; Chandler & Lalonde 1996; Lalonde &
Chandler 2002). This early insight into the interpretive na-
ture of knowledge is a step toward a more mature under-
standing of mind, but there is still further development in
understanding how knowledge is acquired during adoles-
cence and adulthood (Carpendale & Chandler 1996; Chan-
dler et al. 2001). Proponents of the dominant theories have
been notably quiet about what happens in development af-
ter the child’s fifth birthday. However, research that ex-
plores whether 5-year-olds can use simple false belief
knowledge to make inferences about their own and others’
perspectives finds that they singularly fail to do so (Varoux-
aki et al. 1999).
In addition to the content of talk about the mental world,
the approach we are proposing also implies that the nature
of the parent-child relationship should be important in the
development of children’s social understanding through fa-
cilitating children’s understanding of the events and human
activities being talked about. We turn to this implication of
our approach in the next subsection.
4.2. The role of relationships in the construction 
of social understanding
In this section we return to the issues illustrated by the sib-
ling effect discussed earlier in this article (see sect. 1 and
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sect. 2.2). Any account of how the child comes to under-
stand the psychological world must be able to explain a
range of other sources of evidence showing that mental
state understanding is significantly correlated with factors
in the child’s social environment, such as attachments, par-
enting styles, and parent-child communication. In this sec-
tion we argue that the importance of communication in ei-
ther facilitating or hindering the understanding of other
perspectives directs our attention to the nature of commu-
nication within different relationships. The sibling effect is
important because it is a marker of the types of process hy-
pothesized here, but it is only one such marker. Dunn
(1996a) has repeatedly reminded us of the important role
of relationships in social cognitive development. What is
needed is a theoretical explanation of how relationships op-
erate as a vehicle for the child’s construction of the mind.
The idea of the epistemic triangle is useful in explaining this
development because it is through becoming aware of other
people’s beliefs, and coordinating these often differing per-
spectives with their own beliefs, that children develop an
understanding of mind. Through such interaction and by
confronting others’ often differing beliefs about the world,
children gradually construct a more complete understand-
ing that increasingly coordinates their own experience with
that of other people. It is partially the resistance or refrac-
toriness of social interaction that stimulates the develop-
ment of knowledge. Thus, we would expect that differences
in the amount and nature of the social interaction experi-
enced would be related to individual differences in infants’
early social understanding, and to young children’s further
developing mentalistic understanding. We will discuss two
ways of describing parent-child relationships: attachment
and cooperation.
4.2.1. Affective engagement and mental state under-
standing. A body of research in which social relationships
are shown to correlate with social understanding has been
influenced by attachment and psychodynamic theories
(Fonagy & Target 1997; Hobson 1993; 2002; Meins 1997;
1999). Fonagy et al. (1997) found that securely attached
children, as measured with the Separation Anxiety Test, a
projective measure of attachment security, were more com-
petent on theory of mind tasks than insecurely attached
children. This positive relation between attachment secu-
rity and false belief understanding has also been found with
a Q-sort measure of attachment (Symons & Clark 2000). In
a longitudinal study, Meins (1997) found that children who
were classified as securely attached at age 11 to 13 months
were more likely than insecurely attached children to pass
a false belief task at age 4 years, and more complex men-
talizing tasks at age 5 years (Meins et al. 1998). A relation
between attachment and early social understanding in in-
fancy was also reported by Bretherton et al. (1979). These
researchers found that children who were securely attached
at age 12 months had used more protodeclarative pointing
at age 11 months than other infants.
There have been a number of potentially compatible ex-
planations proposed for this positive relation between se-
cure attachment and social understanding. Meins (1999;
Meins et al. 2001) suggested that security of attachment
and social cognitive development are positively associated
because parents of children who develop secure attach-
ments respond sensitively and appropriately. To do this they
need to think of their children as persons with thoughts and
feelings and treat them in this way. That is, parents whose
children develop secure attachments are “mindminded”;
they tend to “treat their infants as individuals with minds,
rather than merely entities with needs that must be met”
(Meins 1999, p. 332). This way of interacting develops se-
cure attachment, and it also exposes young children to talk
about the psychological world. Meins’s explanation for the
connection between attachment security and social cogni-
tive development is that the same parental characteristic
that results in secure attachment also results in the “expo-
sure of the infant to mental state language” (p. 337). She
found that maternal child-centered (mindminded) lan-
guage (but not mindminded language about other people)
to 6-month-olds predicted children’s false belief perfor-
mance at age 4 (Meins et al. 2002). This evidence requires
an explanation of how exposure to mental state language in-
fluences social development, which is what we have pro-
vided here.
At a level at which theories of affect and cognition are in-
tegrated, it is not too difficult to show how analyses of in-
fant-caregiver affect are wholly compatible with data on
parent-infant shared attention. Indeed, Hobson (2002,
p. 147) argued that security of attachment, which is based
on the mother’s way of relating to the infant, may influence
the infant’s ability to engage with others, and it is this 
engagement that is essential in interaction in the “related-
ness triangle” and in the development of thinking, espe-
cially thinking about the social world. From the vantage
point of observations of interactions, Baldwin and Moses
(1996) pointed out that internal working models consist of
knowledge of other people and relationships. That is, in-
fants develop expectations about other people based on pri-
mary relationships. Such views echo one another and fit
into the framework of our general developmental theory,
which extends beyond infancy. Perhaps we should not be
surprised that such a way of viewing internal working mod-
els converges with Piagetian ideas about development be-
ing rooted in interaction because one likely source of
Bowlby’s ideas was Piaget’s notion of schemes. Piaget
(1945/1962, pp. 188–89, 206–207) wrote about the “affec-
tive schemes” or “personal schemes” that infants develop as
“modes of feeling and reacting” to people in ways that
sound like internal working models – the set of expectations
infants build up about other people and how they will act.
This is early sensorimotor, lived, practical knowledge about
people based on expectations acquired through experience
of how parents respond.
Research on the development of affective exchange in in-
fancy has greatly illuminated key issues in infant develop-
ment. The correlations between such exchanges and tests
of later mental state understanding suggest a need for a
broader explanatory framework. One possibility is that se-
cure attachment is an indicator of a relatively cooperative
parent-child relationship, and, as we will argue in the next
section, this is the type of relationship that, according to
constructivist theory, facilitates the development of knowl-
edge.
4.2.2. Cooperation versus constraint. Exploration of the
nature of parent-child relationships has led to interest in the
influence of parenting style on social cognitive develop-
ment (Astington 1996; Vinden 2001). Ruffman et al.’s
(1999) data show that parents who reported that they dealt
with disciplinary situations by asking their child to “reflect
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on the victim’s feelings” (p. 406) had children who were
more advanced in false belief understanding. In addition,
cooperative interaction is related to and may facilitate the
development of children’s social understanding. Dunn and
colleagues (1991) found that cooperative sibling interaction
was related to successful false belief explanations. Also,
Brown et al. (1996) reported that cooperative interactions
with friends and siblings were related to children’s frequent
use of mental state terms. Such evidence needs a theoreti-
cal explanation.
If, as Chapman (1991; 1999) argued, knowledge of the
world develops through coordinating other people’s per-
spectives with one’s own within the epistemic triangle, then
aspects of relationships and communication that facilitate
our understanding of other people’s perspectives should
have a positive effect on development. An aspect of rela-
tionships that was important in Piaget’s (1932/1965b; 1977/
1995) work on moral judgment is the degree of constraint
versus cooperation present in relationships. This analysis is
relevant for our discussion because development, accord-
ing to Piaget (1932/1965b), is facilitated by relationships of
cooperation and mutual respect and hindered by relation-
ships of constraint and unilateral respect; cooperation fa-
cilitates understanding. Cooperative relationships have the
potential of approaching Habermas’s (1983/1990) concep-
tion of the ideal conditions of unrestrained communication,
allowing all participants to understand each other’s posi-
tions fully and arrive at solutions to conflicts that everyone
can agree with. In our terms, if understanding is gradually
constructed by the child within triadic interaction, then it
follows that the extent and nature of cooperation between
the child and others are important.
It follows from a constructivist perspective that coopera-
tive relationships, allowing free communication between
parents and children, should facilitate the development of
an understanding of mind. Parents differ in how much they
feel obliged to justify their positions and listen to their chil-
dren’s perspective and, thus, in how much cooperation they
allow or encourage in their relationships with their chil-
dren. Relationships among parents and children that are
more cooperative than constraining should facilitate chil-
dren’s understanding of other people’s points of view. This
interpretation is consistent with research showing that
parental styles (Baumrind 1991) differing in the extent to
which parents reason with their children differentially af-
fect child development. Cooperative relationships are the
ideal context for the development of knowledge, but this
alone is not sufficient. Talk about a substantive connection
to the world is also required (Döbert 2004) – in this case
talk about people’s activity in terms of their goals, beliefs,
and desires. Various experiences such as cooperative peer
interaction in the context of role enactment and shared pre-
tense may contribute to the development of mental state
understanding largely due to the stimulation of interaction
and conversation.9
Of course, these correlations do not allow us to draw
causal conclusions. The parent-child relationship is a sys-
tem that is influenced by characteristics of both the child
and the parents. It is important to acknowledge that rela-
tionships involve the child as well as the parent, and, al-
though the influence of parents tends to be emphasized,
that characteristics of the child also influence the nature of
the parent-child relationship (Bell 1968; Symons & Clark
2000). Parents’ ability to engage with their child may be in-
fluenced by their beliefs about parenting (e.g., Baumrind
1991; Ruffman et al. 1999; Vinden 2001) and emotions
(Hooven et al. 1995), as well as by the parents’ level of
stress, depression and psychiatric disorders, patience, social
support, socioeconomic circumstances, and education.
On the other hand, the extent to which parents can be
cooperative and can support the child’s reasoning will partly
depend on, and interact with, the child’s abilities and char-
acteristics. The child’s developmental level may influence
the nature of the relationship because children who are
more advanced in language and social cognitive develop-
ment may be easier to interact with in a cooperative man-
ner.10 Individual differences on the child’s part may vary
from extremes such as autism,11 which severely restricts the
child’s ability to engage in triadic interaction as evidenced
by the lack of protodeclaritives at 18 months of age (Hob-
son 1993), to differences in ability to focus and maintain at-
tention (e.g., hyperactivity, impulsiveness, distractability).
Blindness also makes joint attention more difficult to
achieve and for that reason seems to hinder the develop-
ment of social understanding (Minter et al. 1998; Peterson
et al. 2000). We agree with Hobson (1993; 2002) that such
factors on the child’s part influence the ability to engage in
interpersonal relatedness, as well as the nature of that in-
teraction, and it is such interaction that is essential in social
cognitive development. In this target article we have re-
stricted our analysis to the study of human development,
but the same principles could be extended to nonhuman
primates.12
5. Conclusion and future directions
What benefits can be gained by adopting a constructivist
approach to the development of children’s social under-
standing? For a start we have summarized examples of a vo-
luminous literature that relates an understanding of mental
states to a range of social experiences. Traditional accounts
of “theory of mind” can only go so far in adding to the list
of social influences on the child simulator/theoretician be-
fore coming to realize that a social dimension has to be in-
corporated into such theories. The theory presented here
sets out to do two things. First, it attempts to establish from
the start that social processes are a necessary part of any ac-
count of how children come to construct an understanding
of their social world: from infant dyadic interaction through
to complex social skills beyond simple false belief under-
standing. Second, it has revisited and reworked the con-
structivist account of development and used this to reassert
its central focus on action and the potential for examining
knowledge acquisition as a social process. For us, a con-
structivist approach to understanding the child’s grasp of
the social world is the only possible solution to the impasse
between individual and social perspectives on social under-
standing and the problem this reveals in the assumption
that the “theory of mind” metaphor makes about the de-
velopment of knowledge and meaning: that the child has to
learn about the workings of the mind through inference or
introspection. For us, following Wittgenstein, “as a human
activity ‘meaning’ is best thought of as a verb, not a noun”
(Shotter 1978, p. 46).
By providing a framework that integrates social and cog-
nitive processes, the analysis presented here calls for new
directions in research based on the relations between par-
ticular forms of interaction and the development of social
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knowledge. Here we suggest some required shifts in the re-
search agenda, as a means of illustrating how the implica-
tions of our position are very different from those offered
by theorists within the “theory of mind” tradition. We refer
to five areas of urgently needed research.
This research agenda begins in infancy with the study of
the development of “shared meaning” (Chapman 1999,
p. 34). This is one of the most difficult and important prob-
lems in developmental psychology. We have pointed out
flaws in other approaches and provided a firm foundation
and the tools with which to build an account of the devel-
opment of infants’ ability to grasp others’ referential intent
(see also Müller & Carpendale 2004). But we acknowledge
that the sketch we have provided is, as yet, partial. Re-
searchers must begin by addressing the process by which
the infant engages in interaction and joint attention. In do-
ing so, we suggest that longitudinal naturalistic observation
of infant-parent interaction and infants’ joint attention
would complement the current experimental research
(e.g., Moore & D’Entremont 2001). Ironically, such natu-
ralistic research was more common 25 years ago (e.g., Bates
et al. 1976; Lock 1978; Schaffer 1977). What is needed is a
detailed analysis of infants’ interaction and the emergence
of social referencing, gaze following, and pointing, as well
as a study of the context of the ongoing sequence of inter-
action in which the act is embedded. Some contemporary
research of this sort does already exist (Reddy 1991) and we
suggest that such work may help solve the riddle of how
self-other differentiation and coordination emerge during
infancy. According to the view adopted here, and in contrast
to the position held in the “theory of mind” accounts of in-
fancy, “the child’s understanding is not just a matter of rec-
ognizing a correspondence between the mother’s words
and reality, but of grasping her referential intent in that sit-
uation – knowing what one is meant to attend to in response
to her words and gestures” (Chapman 1999, p 34; empha-
sis in the original).
Second, we need to move from the intriguing findings re-
lating individual differences in the social experiences of in-
fants and their social understanding to research that ex-
plores the processes involved. For example, the findings of
Meins et al. (2002) are intriguing, but how is it that moth-
ers’ tendency to talk about their infants in psychological
terms is positively associated with their child’s understand-
ing of false beliefs almost four years later? What is it about
the nature of these parents’ interactions with their infants
that correlates with the development of social understand-
ing? Such research turns our attention to the nature of par-
ent-child interaction and developing talk about the psycho-
logical world, and our theory provides a framework for this
research. For example, such studies should examine how
the criteria for the use of mental state terms are displayed
(Turnbull & Carpendale 1999a; 2001). Differences be-
tween families in the ways in which criteria are made evi-
dent could also be studied. It is important to remember that
researchers studying talk about the psychological world
should be concerned not just with mental state terms but
more broadly with talk about human activity (see sect. 4.1).
Third, and related to the points above, the gradual view
of development implied in an activity-based theory such as
ours means that researchers need to study forms of under-
standing even before children are able to explicitly explain
false beliefs. One way to approach this issue is by manipu-
lating the tasks to discover what factors facilitate young chil-
dren’s reasoning within the context of the assessment pro-
cedure. This type of research – and a considerable amount
of such research has been conducted (e.g., Lewis &
Mitchell 1994) – should be used to think about the nature
of development, not merely to search for “early compe-
tence.” This would involve an extension of research using
novel approaches to assess children’s grasp of an actor’s be-
liefs. For example, Call and Tomasello’s (1999) nonverbal
false belief procedure could well be used to tap early forms
of understanding, just as it has been used to reveal a com-
petence in deaf children (Figueras-Costa & Harris 2001;
see also Carpenter et al. 2002). There is still scope to make
a closer inspection of how children respond during tradi-
tional tests of false belief. For example, an interesting
source of evidence of an early form of understanding comes
from within the theory-theory and is referred to as “implicit
knowledge” of false belief (Clements & Perner 1994; Cle-
ments et al. 2000; Garnham & Ruffman 2001). This work
seems to demonstrate that young children, even slightly be-
fore their third birthday, respond to a prompt in a false be-
lief test by looking in the direction of the correct container,
even though these same children then go on to fail a more
standard verbal question. Clements and Perner (1994) de-
scribe this knowledge as implicit because it cannot be ver-
balized. It has more recently been referred to as “nonver-
bal theory of mind” (Ruffman 2000), but we point out that
although the child’s response is not verbalized it is in re-
sponse to a verbal prompt. Not only might research on this
effect illuminate potentially interesting processes by which
children come to construct an understanding of the false
belief task (e.g., the nature of the criteria they use), it would
also free theory-theory from the contortions it has to make
to incorporate such evidence into its developmental ac-
count.
Fourth, we need to explore more closely just what it
means for a child to “have” an understanding of belief, in
order to move beyond overly simple accounts of theoretical
transitions at age 4 years. As well as expecting gradual de-
velopment in different forms of understanding, we also 
predict and would investigate unevenness in development
between different areas of children’s experience. Some
children may have more experience and therefore more un-
derstanding of particular aspects of social understanding.
For example, in a recent study, Peskin and Ardino (2003)
found that children’s performance on a false belief task in
which an object is moved to a new location without the
knowledge of the protagonist (“unexpected transfer task”)
is positively associated with success in a hide-and-seek
game, whereas children’s performance on a false belief task
in which a container has unexpected contents (“unexpected
contents task”) is positively associated with success in keep-
ing a secret from one of the experimenters about a birthday
cake wrapped in a bag. Such data are clearly compatible
with a constructivist account.
Fifth and finally, and as stated above, researchers need to
move away from age/stage fixation to explore what happens
to children after age 4 years. For a start, children cannot
necessarily use the knowledge they demonstrate in the
standard false belief test. A recent study by Maridaki-Kas-
sotaki et al. (2003) found that in Greek, in which two terms
are used synonymously to mean “to look for,” a version of
the false belief test with one verb appeared to facilitate 3-
year-olds’ performance, whereas its synonym hampered
performance in 5-year-olds. Such data reveal that children’s
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understanding of questions about beliefs is mediated by
their understanding of verbs referring to mental states.
Further work along these lines would reveal more about the
process by which children come to acquire the subtleties of
a mature understanding of mind – particularly knowledge
and skills that make up the complexity of a culture’s psy-
chology (Lillard 1998). The approach put forward here
stresses the need to explore the matrix of social relation-
ships involving transactions between the child and others
and in which the child constructs social understanding.
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NOTES
1. It is not clear that an enculturation approach is directly
championed by any theorist within the “theories of mind” litera-
ture, but such an approach is discussed by many (e.g., Astington
1996; Astington & Olson 1995) and sometimes attributed to
Wittgenstein or Bruner (1990).
2. Rogoff (1997, p. 266) criticized internalization approaches
and argued instead for “development as a process of transforma-
tion of participation.” Although there is much that we agree with
in Rogoff ’s approach, her view of internalization involves either
the transmission or acquisition of information (corresponding to
collectivism or individualism, respectively) – both being examples
of what Overton (1994; 1998b) termed a “splitting” or “isolation”
strategy. Rogoff (see also Matusov 1998) critiqued a particular
view of the nature of internalization. We agree with the critique.
However, there is a second view of internalization (Lawrence &
Valsiner 1993), according to which internalization involves the
child’s reconstruction of knowledge rather than transmission. In-
teraction is internalized (or “interiorized,” in Piaget’s terminology)
to the extent that the child can implicitly perform the act and does
not actually have to enact the activity (Carpendale et al. 1996;
Chapman 1991; 1999).
3. There are other positions such as Thelen and Smith’s (1994;
Thelen et al. 2001) dynamic systems approach that are consistent
in many ways with the approach we take. Thelen and Smith’s ac-
count is similar to Piaget’s theory in emphasizing the practical and
embodied nature of cognition. And Chapman (1992; see also
Boom 2004) suggested that Piaget’s theory was an early theory of
self-organization. However, there may also be important differ-
ences. In Thelen and colleagues’ (2001) explanation of the A not
B error they appear to assume objectivity, whereas that is what Pi-
aget tried to explain (Müller & Carpendale 2001). This suggests
that they started from a different beginning point in development.
4. We cannot survey here the extensive literature on Wittgen-
stein’s private language argument, but we do need to at least re-
spond to Kripke’s (1982) interpretation. Kripke began from
Wittgenstein’s claim that all rules are up for interpretation. This is
the paradox that “no course of action could be determined by a
rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord
with the rule” (Wittgenstein 1953/1968, para. 201). From this,
Kripke derived the radically skeptical position that there can be
no such thing as rule following, and this also applies to language
since word use is rule following. This implies that the apparent
meaningfulness of language must be an illusion and language must
be meaningless. Kripke ended up in this radically skeptical posi-
tion because he refused to give up the idea that rules are inter-
preted. But Wittgenstein was, in fact, arguing against this external
explanation that there is a middle step of interpretation in apply-
ing a rule. Ironically, Wittgenstein was setting up the paradox that
the range of interpretation is infinite to show that rule following
cannot consist of interpretation – that “interpretations by them-
selves do not determine meaning” (para. 198). In the same section
that Kripke focused on, Wittgenstein went on to write, “It can be
seen that there is a misunderstanding here. . . . What this shows is
that there is a way of grasping a rule that is not an interpretation”
( para. 201). Then, in paragraph 202, “And hence also ‘obeying a
rule’ is a practice” (McDowell 1984; Russell 1987). Wittgenstein’s
position is internalist: that is, it is not possible to separate the rule
and the application (ter Hark 1990, Chap. 3).
5. Triadic interaction here refers to interaction involving self,
other, and the world, not to interaction among three people.
6. However, Trevarthen took an innatist approach to explain-
ing this development, whereas we do not.
7. We recognize that reference is a controversial issue (Putnam
1988). To be clear about our position, we do not consider refer-
ence to involve a dyadic relation between a sign and the thing re-
ferred to. This would seem to require a mechanistic view of mean-
ing in which meaning is assumed to be attached to representations
(Goldberg 1991). Instead, we consider reference to involve a tri-
adic relation between the self, others, and an aspect of the world
(Carpendale 1999b; Chapman 1991; 1999; Sinha 1999). Thus,
meaning is not fixed to signs, but signs are used to direct others’
attention and shared meaning is achieved through ongoing social
interaction (Turnbull 2003; Turnbull & Carpendale 1999b).
8. Variability in children’s performance on false belief tasks is
reminiscent of similar debates in other areas of research. The most
well-known example is criticism of Piaget’s theory concerning
“horizontal decalage.” The standard interpretation of Piaget’s the-
ory was as a theory of mental logic, according to which reasoning
involves the application of a logical rule. A prediction derived from
this interpretation is that, once a child has developed such a rule,
he or she should be able to solve all problems based on the same
underlying logical rule. It is well known, of course, that there is
considerable evidence of variability in children’s performance on
tasks that are all apparently based on the same logical principle.
The research literature provides other examples of similar diffi-
culties in explaining evidence of variability in performance on dif-
ferent tasks that apparently should all be assessing the same com-
petence. For example, in research on Kohlberg’s theory of moral
development, much more variability in the stage of moral reason-
ing employed was found than had been predicted by Kohlberg
(e.g., Carpendale 2000). A particularly good example of the same
sort of issue arose in the role-taking literature (e.g., Chandler
2001).
As argued elsewhere (Carpendale et al. 1996; Chapman 1987b),
horizontal decalage is only problematic when it is assumed that Pi-
aget’s theory is a theory of mental logic. From the perspective of
an interpretation of Piagetian theory emphasizing the origin of
knowledge in action, horizontal decalage is not a problem (Chap-
man 1987b; 1988; Lourenço & Machado 1996). Instead, it should
be expected. Similarly, variability in performance on different
false belief tasks is only a problem because it clashes with a com-
mon and implicit assumption about the nature of reasoning – that
is, the view of reasoning as being based on the development of
rules or principles which are then applied to problems to gener-
ate solutions (in domains such as moral reasoning or reasoning
about the physical world, and now the social world).
9. Pretend play has been considered as a possible facilitating
context for the development of social understanding, that is, as a
“zone of proximal development” (Lillard 1993a; Youngblade &
Dunn 1995). The overall amount of pretend play has not been
found to be associated with false belief understanding, but false
belief understanding is associated with specific types of pretend
play: when children make joint proposals in their pretend play and
when they explicitly make role assignments to themselves and
their partners in play (Astington & Jenkins 1995). Also, young chil-
dren’s tendency to role enact is associated with belief under-
standing seven months later (Youngblade & Dunn 1995). From
our perspective, we would expect that increased social under-
standing would facilitate children’s ability to engage in coopera-
tive pretend play, and that this social interaction could also serve
as one context, among others, for further social development. We
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would not expect that any facilitative effect would depend only on
the fact that pretense is involved, but rather also on the fact that
such situations would require cooperative interaction in which
children must coordinate their activity toward shared goals. This
would require talking about human activity and the need to reach
mutual understanding because the children are enacting some
event together.
10. In considering the role of the child’s abilities we recognize
that our approach needs to be integrated with domain general ap-
proaches to children’s reasoning about the mind (e.g., Frye et al.
1995a; Gordon & Olson 1998; Mitchell & Riggs 2000). The child
must have an ability to pay attention to important aspects of social
interaction and must be capable of achieving some distance be-
tween himself and the situation so he can reflect on it rather than
act impulsively (Moses 2001). Furthermore, reasoning about sit-
uations that are not immediately present would require the abil-
ity hold in mind and to imagine aspects of situations (Harris 2000).
Clearly, there is some distance to go in developing this aspect of
our approach, but we suggest that a likely candidate for further
study would be attentional capacity, which in Chapman’s (1987b)
approach has a role in understanding and reasoning.
11. Concerning autism, our position is consistent with Hob-
son’s (1993; 2002) view of autism as due to a disruption in the
child’s ability to engage in affective interaction. In this article we
have spelled out in further detail the nature of this interaction be-
yond infancy and the role of language in social cognitive develop-
ment. However, we have not applied the issue of autism to our an-
alytic framework because it is associated with so many other social
and cognitive problems and differences from the typically devel-
oping population that no conclusive statement can be made here.
12. This focus on the role of relationships in development, as
well as what the child brings to the relationship, allows us to think
about both atypical development and research with nonhuman
primates. Here our approach is consistent with Tomasello’s
(1999b) position that what is required in typical social cognitive
development is both normal neurological development as well as
the right social and cultural conditions. In children with autism we
see biological abnormalities hindering the children’s ability to en-
gage with others in ways that are essential to normal social cogni-
tive development, even though they have access to normal human
social interaction (Hobson 1993). “Enculturated” apes – that is,
chimpanzees and bonobos raised in a human linguistic environ-
ment – do develop more social cognitive and language skills than
wild chimpanzees, but they can only go so far – not much beyond
the level of a 2-year-old human child (Savage-Rumbaugh et al.
1993).
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Abstract: Carpendale & Lewis’s (C&L’s) theory falls in with an existing set
of theories that children’s understanding of mind is collaboratively con-
structed in linguistically mediated social interaction. This social construc-
tivist view needs to be clear about the complementary contributions of the
child and of the social environment. I distinguish between the child’s in-
dividual linguistic ability and the dyad’s social communication, proposing
that each makes a contribution to theory-of-mind development, differ-
ently balanced in different individuals.
Rejecting two contrasting paradigms, Carpendale & Lewis (C&L)
offer their explanation of children’s theory-of-mind development
as a supposedly new alternative to existing theories. On one hand,
they reject explanations that posit theory development, simula-
tion, or innate modules because these are too focused on au-
tonomous individual development. On the other hand, they reject
enculturation explanations because, in their view, such explana-
tions allow the child no active role. The internalist theories that
they reject are well described and supported in the literature,
whereas, as they concede, the externalist view is hard to find (per-
haps it is best, if briefly, exemplified in Rogoff et al. 1993).
Social construction. I agree with C&L that we need an expla-
nation integrating the individual and social aspects of develop-
ment; and I am sympathetic to their account, accepting it as an al-
ternative to the internalist, individualistic explanations and the
externalist, passive enculturation explanation, all of which the au-
thors explicitly reject. I find it harder, however, to regard theirs as
a particularly novel approach. Although some terms and details
may differ, it is best located within an existing group of social con-
structivist explanations of children’s developing understanding of
mind (e.g., Boyes et al. 1997; Dunn 1996b; Fernyhough 1996;
Garfield et al. 2001; Harris 1999; Montgomery 2002; Nelson 1996;
Shatz 1994). I would also place my own views here – let me re-
solve, in passing, the ambiguity that C&L detect in my earlier writ-
ing (e.g., Astington 1996; Astington & Olson 1995). I do not be-
lieve that children’s theory of mind develops by a process of
passive enculturation. In my view, it is an error to assume that “cul-
tural concepts can be acquired from participation in a social con-
text simply because they are manifest there” (Astington & Olson
1995, p. 186).
Although I accept that there is need for “an alternative theoret-
ical account that is more consistent with the accumulating evidence
of the important role of social interaction in the development of
children’s social understanding” (target article, sect. 2.2, penulti-
mate para.), I would argue that a number of such alternative ac-
counts already exist in the literature. C&L share with Nelson
(1996) and Montgomery (2002) the Wittgensteinian idea of ac-
quiring meaning from use; they share with Harris (1999) and Fer-
nyhough (1996) the idea that children are exposed to variation in
belief as they enter into conversation with others; they share with
Dunn (1996b) a focus on the relations between people; and so on.
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Hence, C&L’s proposal falls in with an existing set of theories
that children’s understanding of mind is collaboratively con-
structed in linguistically mediated social interaction. Their account
accords a central role to triadic interaction involving a dyad – the
child and another person – communicating about some object or
aspect of the world. What is needed is a more detailed and precise
account of the mechanism whereby this leads to an understanding
of mind. From a social constructivist perspective, it is important to
be precise about those abilities of the child that allow for partici-
pation in the constructive activity, lest we slip back into passive en-
culturation. Perhaps by distinguishing between children’s individ-
ual linguistic ability and their participation in dyadic linguistic
interactions (although obviously these two are related), we will be
able to formulate a social constructivist view that recognizes the
contribution both of the child and of the social environment.
Language and communication. It is problematic that C&L use
three terms somewhat interchangeably: social interaction, com-
municative interaction, and language. In my view, it is important
to distinguish clearly among these. One could use the term 
“language” to refer to the child’s individual linguistic ability and
“social interaction” to refer to the joint activity within triadic in-
teraction, reserving the term “communicative interaction” for dis-
course-based social interaction (although this last may be less than
satisfactory because it obscures the importance of nonverbal com-
munication). My point is that, defined in this way, language and
social interaction/communication may play different and comple-
mentary roles in theory-of-mind development and, further, that
there may be both individual and developmental differences in
their relative importance. Some evidence exists in support of this
suggestion.
First, deaf children with deaf parents develop false-belief un-
derstanding within the typical time frame, whereas deaf children
with hearing parents do not do so (Peterson & Siegal 2000). Both
sets of children engage in triadic social interaction, which is com-
municative even if nonverbal. However, only the children with
deaf parents develop language – sign language – within the typi-
cal time frame. This suggests that the child’s individual linguistic
ability plays a role in the development of theory of mind inde-
pendent of that played by social communication.
Second, children with autism have deficits in theory of mind
and in the development of communication and language skills.
High-functioning children with autism do develop false-belief un-
derstanding, but later than typically developing children do.
Moreover, those who do pass false-belief tasks have a higher level
of general language ability than that of typically developing chil-
dren who can pass false-belief tests (Happé 1995). This suggests
that the autistic children are using their individual language skills
to compensate for their lack of social communicative interaction
(Tager-Flusberg 2002).
Third, there is evidence for the interaction of family size (in-
dicative of the amount of child-child social activity) and individual
language ability in theory-of-mind development (Jenkins & Ast-
ington 1996). We showed that the false-belief test performance of
children with lower language ability and two siblings was equal to
that of children with higher language ability and no siblings,
whereas children with lower language abilities and no siblings per-
formed more poorly. This suggests that individual language skills
and social interaction both contribute to theory-of mind develop-
ment and that either one of these can compensate for a deficit in
the other.
Fourth, in a training study designed to develop false-belief un-
derstanding (Lohmann & Tomasello 2003), positive effects were
found in two conditions: conversation about deceptive objects (us-
ing no mental terms and no syntactic complementation in the dis-
course) and specific training on the syntax of complementation (in
the absence of deceptive objects). Moreover, the largest effect was
found in a condition where these two were combined (conversa-
tion and complements). Again, this suggests that social interactive
discourse and individual language abilities make somewhat inde-
pendent contributions to theory-of-mind development.
Different routes to common outcomes. In conclusion, I would
argue that theory of mind is a fundamentally important aspect of
human development which is likely to be overdetermined. That
is, it is likely that there is more than one cause of its development
– individual linguistic ability and social interaction are two dis-
cussed here – with different balances in different individuals, and
perhaps with the balance shifting over developmental time, as
Hughes et al. (2002) suggest.
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Abstract: Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) rightly emphasise the central role
of social interaction in the development of children’s understanding of
mind. Further support and justification for their theoretical focus are pro-
vided by research on advanced reasoning about socio-emotional and so-
cio-motivational processes. Variability in social experience can explain
both developmental change and within-age-group differences in such so-
cial understanding.
In the constructivist framework presented by Carpendale & Lewis
(C&L), a central role is assigned to children’s social experience as
an essential foundation for gradual social-cognitive development.
The authors indicate the potential significance of findings regard-
ing relatively advanced (beyond five years of age) reasoning about
the psychological and social worlds, especially in view of evidence
that simple false-belief measures have only limited value for pre-
dicting variability in children’s everyday social behaviour. Brief
reference is made to children’s understanding of the interpretive
nature of knowledge (e.g., Carpendale & Chandler 1996), but the
analysis would be strengthened by considering additional evi-
dence regarding primary schoolchildren’s cognition about the
emotional and motivational processes involved in everyday social
interaction. Both developmental change and within-age-group
differences in this social understanding reflect children’s experi-
ences of social interaction. Indeed, Dunn’s (1996a) insightful 
reminder to address the role of social relationships in social un-
derstanding should hold through the course of childhood social-
cognitive development.
Research on social cognition has demonstrated many develop-
mental changes beyond the age of five years. Taking emotion un-
derstanding as an example, we see primary school children learn-
ing about self-regulation (in terms of both private coping and
public display), about emotional ambivalence, and about complex
emotions involving reflections on the self, on others, and on social
standards (e.g., Meerum Terwogt & Stegge 1996). Similarly, re-
searchers have developed a range of advanced theory-of-mind
tasks covering, for example, children’s reasoning about second-or-
der false beliefs (e.g., Sullivan et al. 1994), about faux pas (Baron-
Cohen et al. 1999), and about irony, sarcasm, and double bluff
(Happé 1994). There is also evidence of change in children’s
broader understanding of people, such as in their conception of
dispositions or traits (e.g., Yuill & Pearson 1998). Research on
these topics may provide strong evidence concerning the role of
social interaction in children’s social understanding.
One feature of advanced social understanding emphasised by
Carpendale and Chandler (1996) concerns the fact that different
people may hold varying beliefs about the same perceptual stim-
uli. In that paper, the authors found that only from around seven
or eight years of age did children appreciate the validity of mul-
tiple interpretations of a range of stimuli (e.g., in the domains 
of lexical ambiguity, ambiguous line drawings, and ambiguous
referential communication). It is reasonable to suppose that this 
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development must at least in part reflect children’s growing expe-
rience of situations that lend themselves to varying interpretations
and evaluations. In particular, peer interactions are likely to en-
courage children to gain the mature insight that exposure to the
same information can lead to varying beliefs about the world.
Recent theoretical and empirical work on children’s use and un-
derstanding of self-presentation is consistent with this emphasis
on peer interactions. Self-presentational behaviour involves an at-
tempt to control the way one is evaluated by others, and success
in this goal depends largely on an appreciation of how character-
istics and events are represented by others. Hence, as children
grow older and peer-group acceptance becomes an increasingly
important goal (e.g., Parker & Gottman 1989), others’ beliefs must
be judged with regard not just to their informational content but
also to their evaluative content. Consistent with this evidence,
Banerjee and Yuill (1999) found that children’s spontaneous iden-
tification of self-presentational motives for deceptive emotional
displays (e.g., not wanting to appear babyish or stupid) emerged
at around eight years of age, lagging behind their identification of
prosocial motives. Furthermore, such identification of self-pre-
sentational motives was found in a separate study to be associated
with the attribution of embarrassment (Banerjee 2002a). In a sim-
ilar vein, children’s tendency to make appropriate use of informa-
tion about an audience’s preferences when choosing between self-
descriptive options also increased at eight years. Importantly,
within-age-group variability in this tendency was positively asso-
ciated with a sociometric measure of reciprocated peer nomina-
tions (Banerjee 2002b). Although work on this topic is in its early
stages, there is good reason to suppose that children’s reasoning
about self-presentational motives and related social emotions,
such as embarrassment, depends on their experience of specific
types of social interaction. Indeed, this argument is consistent
with Higgins and Parsons’s (1985) broader discussion of how
changes in children’s social lives – including the increasing expo-
sure to social agents with different dispositions, intentions, and
preferences – are likely to play a critical role in shaping their cog-
nition about the social world.
The appreciation of evaluative beliefs is just one of many as-
pects of social understanding that continue to develop in middle
childhood and beyond. Researchers have already begun to iden-
tify social experience – involving various social agents (e.g., par-
ents, siblings, and peers) – as playing a significant role in this de-
velopmental process. Two important related issues should be
considered in any examination of this area. First, with respect to
ambiguities about causal direction, we must recognise that chil-
dren’s social understanding necessarily develops in the context of
their social experience. Even if we were able to specify context-
general prerequisites (e.g., understanding recursive mental repre-
sentations), it simply does not make sense to talk about children’s
reasoning about self-presentation, or faux pas, or embarrassment
without emphasising the social dimension. In these and other in-
stances of reasoning about socio-emotional and socio-motivational
processes, social understanding has to develop out of, and feed
back into, children’s social experience. Second, a major strength
of the theoretical orientation presented by C&L lies in its poten-
tial ability to explain both between- and within-age-group vari-
ability. Such variability has been observed in early mental-state
reasoning, and researchers have found predictive value in chil-
dren’s interactions with parents, siblings, and peers. Now we are
beginning to identify substantial variability in responses to more
advanced tasks, not just between younger and older primary
school children, but also within any given classroom of children.
C&L’s framework provides further impetus to investigate the so-
cial experiences that give rise to these differences. Such work will
help us meet the further challenge of predicting and intervening
in the development of problems in social understanding.
Even an “epistemic triangle” has three sides
John Barresi and Chris Moore
Department of Psychology, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia B3H
4J1, Canada. jbarresi@dal.ca moorec@dal.ca
http://jbarresi.psychology.dal.ca
Abstract: By focusing primarily on communication between adult and
child and on adult-set criteria for appropriate action, Carpendale & Lewis’s
(C&L’s) account of the development of social understanding in the epis-
temic triangle tends toward an enculturation view, while diminishing the
role of individuals. What their proposed mechanism fails to acknowledge
is that the two agents in the epistemic triangle necessarily have indepen-
dent perspectives of the object and of each other.
We strongly agree with Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) that the child
develops social understanding primarily through engagement
with other individuals in what Chapman (1991) called the “epis-
temic triangle.” But we fail to see how their use of this triangle
provides them with a way to chart a middle course between the
Scylla of individualism and the Charybdis of enculturation. When
it comes to describing actual mechanisms of development in the
epistemic triangle, we find their account both incomplete and po-
tentially biased in the direction of enculturation.
C&L’s discussion of mechanisms involved in the development
of social understanding tends to use a particular interpretation of
Wittgenstein’s views on language learning. According to this ac-
count, it is socially implemented feedback involving behavioral
“criteria” that shapes the child’s use and understanding of lan-
guage in general and mental language in particular. But if this is
the primary mechanism for the development of social under-
standing of mental life, it fails to satisfy. Despite the authors’
claims to the contrary, it does not differentiate their account from
a general model of learning based on enculturation. For, even if
particular triadic interactions are the locus of language and other
learning, this mechanism appears to use teachers as carriers of lin-
guistic and other social or cultural knowledge. Hence, the partic-
ular agents in the interaction, with their individual uniqueness,
play an unclear role in the acquisition of language, and, presum-
ably, in the development of social understanding in general.
The authors claim that their view is not an enculturation view
because it allows for certain basic-level “shared practices” in so-
cial understanding of “seeing, looking, intentions, desires, and be-
liefs” that are fundamentally universal, hence not culture-relative.
How this could save them from the socially constituted pole of en-
culturation is not obvious, unless it implies that the learning of
such practices does not depend on language learning. But then,
what does it depend on? One is tempted to answer: “a theory of
mind”; but obviously this is not their answer. They also argue that
they have a constructive account of development because the
epistemic triangle is combined with the concept of criteria. Again
their description here fails to explain adequately how the epis-
temic triangle plays a role different from that of criteria. This is
apparent in their final summation: “We suggest that children un-
derstand talk about the psychological world in terms of the pat-
terns of activity that are criterial for the use of such mental state
terms – that is, the pattern of interaction for which we use these
words” (sect. 3.2, last para.). Nothing is stated here about univer-
sal practices or of the role of epistemic states – just culturally de-
fined criteria. It may be that a richer interpretation of Wittgen-
stein could save this account, one which recognizes first-person
criteria for mental meanings to go along with public third-person
criteria, but this is not the Wittgenstein that C&L provide.
The nub of the problem is that C&L fail to take seriously the
triadic structure of the epistemic triangle. This structure involves
three vertices (i.e., the infant, the adult, and the object) as well as
three sides (i.e., the dyadic communicative relation between in-
fant and adult, the infant’s relation to the object, and the adult’s
relation to the object). By focusing on the communication be-
tween adult and infant and on adult-set criteria for appropriate ac-
tion toward the object, they fail to recognize that the two agents
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in the epistemic triangle necessarily have independent perspec-
tives of the object, and of each other.
The same problem arises elsewhere in their account, particu-
larly in the section dealing with the infant’s initial entry into the
epistemic triangle toward the end of the first year of life. In this
section they briefly describe our own theory of social understand-
ing (Barresi & Moore 1996). Because we talk of “first-person in-
formation” as one component entering into the epistemic triangle,
C&L claim that our model, despite pretensions otherwise, must
be individualistic. But this claim both misrepresents our model
and refuses to recognize an essentially individualistic aspect of the
epistemic triangle – the two agents who, even in shared activity,
necessarily have distinct intentions, goals, and perspectives in
their relations with each other and to the object.
We believe that the account in Barresi and Moore (1996) is
more sensitive to the structure of the epistemic triangle and to the
mechanisms involved in social understanding than that given by
C&L. We argue that the infant first comes to understand mental
phenomena by sharing with another individual an activity toward
an object, whether that activity involves actions, emotional or mo-
tivational relations, or epistemic relations, all of which we treat as
various forms of what we call “intentional relations.” This sharing,
whether initially achieved through behavioral or emotional conta-
gion, conditioning, imitation, or any other means, provides the
ground for developing a reflective representation of that form of
intentional activity. The key point is that such a representation in-
volves the joining together of both first-person information and
third-person information about the common intentional relations
involved in such triadic interactions.
We further suggest that in integrating information about two
sides of the epistemic triangle (i.e., each agent’s intentional rela-
tion to the object), in the context of an interaction about this com-
mon activity, the infant does not initially represent this activity as
involving independent actions of self and other. Instead, at this
early phase in development, the sources of information are not yet
distinguished as originating from distinct individuals, and the un-
derstanding of the intentional relation is best described as one of
understanding what “we” are doing. So, on our account, it is fun-
damentally an understanding of a shared activity, not one of un-
derstanding that self and other, as distinct agents, share in an ac-
tivity. Nevertheless, it is from such initial understanding of
common activities in triadic situations that the infant eventually
develops an understanding of self and other as distinct agents with
their own individual intentional relations. Moreover, it is always
out of shared activity with others that advances in understanding
of mental phenomena are first made (see Barresi & Moore 1993).
This is because it is only in such shared activities that the first- and
third-person aspects of such mental phenomena may be recog-
nized as belonging together, thus laying a foundation for eventu-
ally using either the first- or third-person aspect alone to recog-
nize the mental state of self or other.
Articulating the role of experience in mental
state understanding: A challenge for
theory-theory and other theories
Karen Bartsch and David Estes
Psychology Department, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82071.
bartsch@uwyo.edu estes@uwyo.edu
Abstract: Carpendale & Lewis’s (C&L’s) proposal of a social interaction
account makes clear the need for researchers of all theoretical orientations
to get specific about how social experience influences children’s develop-
ing understanding of mind, but it is premature to reject other theories,
such as theory-theory, which also attribute a major role to experience.
Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) make clear that researchers, regard-
less of theoretical orientation, need to get specific about how chil-
dren’s social experiences affect mental state understanding. Draw-
ing on an impressive array of studies showing that social experi-
ences and social factors play a role in this important area of psy-
chological development, C&L argue that a new explanation of
development is needed to account for these observations. Yet, few
extant theories reject the descriptive claim that social experience
and context matter. Theory-theory (Gopnik 1993; Gopnik & Well-
man 1992; 1994; Wellman 1990), for example, contends that chil-
dren’s experience in the relevant domain (presumably including
people’s psychological states and actions as revealed in social in-
teractions) is the primary instigator of development, chiefly when
children encounter phenomena that do not fit their current ex-
planatory framework and must reconstruct that framework. It may
be premature to reject current theories (and specifically theory-
theory) without examining closely the implications of existing the-
ories for the data.
We have previously noted that an understanding of some men-
tal states seems directly dependent on observing what people say
and do (Bartsch & Estes 1993). False belief, the “neurotic” focus
of theory of mind (TOM) researchers, can be recognized in real
time only through such observation. I cannot recognize my own
current belief as false, but I can witness someone else proclaim a
belief I know to be false and then act on it. Perhaps one could
eventually comprehend the representational (and thus imperfect)
nature of beliefs merely by reflecting on one’s own past false be-
liefs, but it seems likely that talking with others and watching their
goofy actions based on erroneous convictions contributes to this
recognition. Children’s earliest talk about beliefs supports this
supposition. For example, Adam (age four years, two months) ex-
plained that the dog barked on hearing footsteps because “She
thought that was a tiger” (Bartsch & Wellman 1995, p. 114). Ac-
cording to theory-theory, experience drives conceptual develop-
ment; if experience concerning false belief occurs (in this impor-
tant sense) only in social encounters, then it seems to us that
theory-theory necessarily accords an important role to such en-
counters. Perhaps theory-theorists have not yet offered suffi-
ciently extensive analyses of how experience (social or otherwise)
translates into conceptual development, but that does not mean
that such experience is any less than the primary engine of devel-
opment on this account (see Bartsch 2002, for further discussion
of the role of experience in theory-theory).
C&L argue that the nature, as well as the fact, of the effects of
social factors on mental state understanding mandates a new ex-
planatory account. They point to murkiness across research results
from studies employing different tasks and contexts: On some
tasks, two-year-olds appear to engage in belief reasoning, whereas
on others, only much older children do. We have encountered
such findings in our own research. To examine children’s use of
belief understanding in persuasion, we administered hypothetical
story tasks requiring them to select an argument that would per-
suade a story character (e.g., a child’s parent) to do something, such
as permit a child to get a puppy (Bartsch & London 2000). Only
children over seven consistently chose arguments relevant to the
character’s belief, such as “the puppy is quiet” in response to a par-
ent’s stated belief that puppies are noisy. However, in comparable
tasks involving interactive dialogue with puppets, even four-year-
olds consistently chose belief-relevant arguments (Bartsch et al.
2003). The interactive format not only increased children’s atten-
tion to belief information, it seemed to squeeze belief reasoning
even out of children who did not pass a “gold-standard” false-
belief task. This is precisely the sort of finding that C&L regard as
evidence that there is a gradual development of understanding
that is dependent on social factors and social contexts.
Our interpretation is different. Despite the messiness of the
empirical data, we think that it is true and useful to characterize
the older children in our studies as having a concept of belief and
the youngest children as not having the concept, consistent with a
theory-theory perspective. We agree with C&L that the variation
observed across methodologies deserves close examination. The
fact that young children sometimes succeed on tasks and older
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children sometimes fail is important and might hold clues about
how development occurs. For instance, we suspect that the
youngest children’s performance on our interactive persuasion
tasks is indeed socially scaffolded through the child’s engagement
in dialogue. The social context of persuasion, in which two agents
are initially at odds, together with the proclamation of a belief in
back-and-forth dialogue (e.g., “I think puppies are noisy!”), may
be sufficient to allow the child to respond reflexively with the ar-
gument that “this puppy is quiet.” But our suspicion is that the
child responds to this situation without having much of a concept
of belief, perhaps without any. However, such interchanges may
provide important experience to children so that they eventually
notice that responding to someone’s stated belief with an argu-
ment relevant to that belief is more effective than when they re-
spond with an irrelevant comment. This experience cannot be ex-
plained without an understanding of beliefs and their sources, so
eventually the child adopts the more comprehensive theory. In
this sense, we certainly agree with C&L that close inspection of
the social facilitators of development is essential for explaining the
development of mental state understanding. But social facilitation
effects are not necessarily at odds with theory-theory.
C&L complain that theory-theory and other existing theories
focus on cognitive architecture without reflecting on the social
landscape. But surely any adequate constructivist account must
address conceptual change in individuals and its implications for
developments in social understanding and reasoning, even when
all the scaffolding provided by the social landscape has been ac-
knowledged. Theory-theory offers exactly what C&L (target arti-
cle, Abstract) say is needed, “a theory of development . . . that ac-
cords a fundamental role to social interaction, yet does not assume
that children simply adopt socially available knowledge but rather
that children construct an understanding of mind within social in-
teraction.”
Why believe in beliefs?
Mark H. Bickhard
Department of Cognitive Science, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA 18015.
mark@bickhard.name http://www.bickhard.ws/
Abstract: A central pillar of Carpendale & Lewis’s (C&L’s) argument is
Wittgenstein’s later work on language. I suggest that this support is not as
strong as might be wished, and offer an alternative approach to their con-
clusion that language learning, especially of folk psychology, involves a so-
cially embedded constructivism.
Two intertwined issues are the focus here: What is the status of
belief talk? And how do children learn this “folk psychology” way
of talking and functioning in the world? I would like to suggest
some problems with a core set of arguments in Carpendale &
Lewis’s (C&L’s) target article, and offer an alternative but conver-
gent perspective on children’s learning of folk psychology.
C&L’s discussion turns on Wittgenstein’s later discussions and
arguments concerning language and language learning, and is
therefore only as strong as those discussions and arguments. But
there are reasons for concern here. First, Wittgenstein was ap-
propriately concerned with the normativities of language, with the
“grammar” of language.1 However, his account of that normativ-
ity fails. His discussions in Philosophical Investigations (Wittgen-
stein 1958) and previous works regarding ever more complex lan-
guage games and the forms of life that these might participate in,
do not provide an account of normative emergence – complexity
per se does not generate normativity – and leave readers with a
“brute” normativity (Bickhard 2003; Shankar 1996; Summerfield
1996). This is not an adequate account of normativity, and that
casts doubt on other aspects of Wittgenstein’s account of language.
The private language argument, in particular, turns precisely on
normativity as emerging only in the realm of the social. But this
ignores, for example, the normativities of individuals’ epistemo-
logical and representational relations with the world, including the
social world, and including, in particular, the language games in-
dividuals are involved in. Wittgenstein slighted issues of episte-
mology until his last work, On Certainty (1969), and even then ap-
proached it solely from within a language framework. His failure
to account for prelanguage normativities (and the normativities of
prelinguistic animals, including human infants) constitutes a ma-
jor deficiency.
An additional problem with Wittgenstein’s approach, at least as
generally interpreted, lies in his account of the learning of words
for mental phenomena, such as belief. “Inner processes require
outer criteria” is an oft-repeated slogan. There is clearly a sense in
which this is correct: Something in the social interaction must be
involved in the learning of any word. But what is the (normative)
epistemological relationship between the individual (toddler) and
those criteria? What is it that is being learned regarding, say, “be-
lief”? A standard interpretation is that a complex nonmonotonic
language game of criteria is being learned, one in which some cri-
teria support the use of the term, while others, if present, may de-
feat that use, as when noticing that someone engaged in street the-
ater defeats the primary criteria that they seem to be in pain. As
this illustrates, however, that such learning must take place in
terms of such criteria, slides into the assumption that what is
learned must be constituted out of such criteria (however complex
that constitution may be). This is not valid: If some internal con-
structive process is ongoing, and external (social) criteria serve as
selections on that process, then what is learned – constructed –
need not be constituted out of those criteria at all. That we must
learn from criteria, does not entail that criteria are what we must
learn.2 The knowledge of how to “make it” as a frog is not consti-
tuted out of the survivals, deaths, and reproductions that were se-
lected among the evolutionary constructions involved.
“Learning language as learning names,” which C&L (not to
mention Wittgenstein) so rightly criticize, is in even worse condi-
tion, however: There is nothing unitary, no coherent kind of mat-
ter of fact, for belief talk to refer to. The argument here is the (ex-
tended) frame problem. I believe that large trucks can hurt me; I
believe that trucks with stripes can hurt me; so can trucks with
polka dots; and so on. There is an unbounded number of “beliefs”
that I have, that anyone has, about trucks and their capacity to
harm, as well as about almost everything else. Many of these be-
liefs are ones that I may have never thought of before, and yet they
describe accurately what I believe. But there are too many of them
to “fit” into a bounded skull, and too many of them to be learned
by a toddler in a bounded time span (Bickhard 2001). Whatever
else it does, belief talk cannot always or primarily refer to individ-
uated beliefs. This I take to be convergent with C&L’s arguments.
Note that the point holds regardless of the role of external crite-
ria in the learning process.
What is belief talk, then? The central suggestion is that folk psy-
chology, belief talk especially, is involved in making, breaking, dis-
cussing, evaluating, and so on, the epistemic claims and commit-
ments that people make with each other, including those that
others make with third parties, as well as those that each individ-
ual may be involved in directly (Bickhard 1998). Hence, if I claim,
or if I behave in a way that presupposes, something to be true in
the world, then I have a commitment to answer challenges to that
presuppositional belief, perhaps by supporting the belief involved,
or by supporting my legitimacy in that belief even if it turns out to
be false, and so on. Most importantly, I do not have to have any
explicit representational belief that the world is not made of Brie
cheese in order to presuppose it, and, hence, to “believe” it.
Therefore, I do not have to have any individuated inner process
nor any individuated criterial learning in order to have such a be-
lief. This belief is not likely to encounter challenges, but my gen-
eral belief that “figures of authority are malevolent” might, and yet
it too need not involve individuated processes or learning. It too
can have the ontology solely of a presupposition of the way I live
in the world.
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In this view, belief talk and, by extension, folk psychology talk
in general cannot be learned as a naming game or as a mere in-
ternalization of social practices. It must be constructively learned
as a form of coordination of modes of commitment and modes of
explanation for the presuppositions of our interactions with each
other and with the world.
NOTES
1. “Normativity” is used here in the philosophical sense of involving the
possibility of being bad or wrong. It includes such oppositions as func-
tional-dysfunctional, true-false, correct-incorrect, and so on. Regarding
Wittgenstein and language, see, for example, Glock (1996) and Shankar
(1996).
2. It is an empiricist assumption that it must be so constituted. In con-
trast, any action-based model of representation forces learning to be a con-
structivist process: The environment cannot impress successful action sys-
tems into an otherwise passive mind (Bickhard & Campbell 1989).
The contributions of the interdisciplinary
study of language to an understanding
of mind
Nancy Budwig
Department of Psychology, Clark University, Worcester, MA 01610.
nbudwig@clarku.edu http://www.clarku.edu
Abstract: Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) emphasize the importance of view-
ing language as activity. In this commentary I push further their claim by
highlighting how constructions, rather than words, are the appropriate
unit of analysis. In addition, I suggest how a discussion of indexicality paves
the way for a better understanding of how language provides a powerful
tool for children’s construction of mind.
Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) offer a provocative argument con-
cerning children’s construction of knowledge in and through so-
cial interaction. Although I am in large agreement with the gen-
eral claims C&L make, I aim to clarify their argument concerning
the dynamic interplay between language and the development of
an understanding of mind by touching on two inter-related issues:
first, how functional linguistics can contribute to a better way to
conceive of language, and second, how work from linguistic an-
thropology can contribute to an account of how language plays a
guiding role in children’s construction of an understanding of
mind.
Beyond words: Constructions as the unit of linguistic analy-
sis. One of the strengths of the target article concerns its emanci-
pated conception of language as activity. Rather than buying into
the tendency to view language solely in terms of its representa-
tional function, C&L stress the centrality – borrowed from
Wittgenstein – of viewing language as action. Nevertheless, the
authors sometimes slip back into adopting jargon typically associ-
ated with the strictly representational view of language and could
be encouraged to move beyond the focus on “words” by beginning
to think of meaning in terms of the more dynamic notion of con-
structions (see Budwig 1998; Goldberg 1995; Tomasello 1998).
Constructions are the typical unit of analysis for functional lin-
guists, rather than the distinction between words and syntactic
rules, because of their focus on patterns of usage. Simply put, con-
structions are best viewed as usage-based patterns and can be
units of meaning that involve, for instance, bound morphemes
(e.g., past tense-ed), words (e.g., doggie), or more abstract con-
structions such as “Animate Actor Xed the Y.”
The relevance of looking at constructions for understanding
children’s construction of mind can be illustrated by some cross-
linguistic work I have conducted examining children’s early use of
transitive and intransitive utterances. For example, American two-
year-olds have been noted to reserve, early on, transitive con-
structions to scenes describing their own (and sometimes others’)
intentional actions that bring about change (e.g., My build a
tower). These same children switch to intransitive constructions
to describe a scene involving goal-blocking, as, for example, when
they intend to place a block on a tower they are building, but be-
cause the block is too large, the structure tumbles (It doesn’t
build). Careful analyses of such constructions offer insight into
children’s construction of mind, although mental state vocabulary
has not been the focus of analysis (see Budwig 2002; Budwig et al.
2001).
The idea emphasized by functional linguists who use construc-
tions as the unit of analysis is that linguistic forms themselves do
not carry meaning in terms of re-presenting reality but rather,
when fixed in particular scenes or symbolic fields, such forms gain
a more dynamic meaning and thereby play a central role in struc-
turing experience. To this extent, constructions as embodied units
of meaning that link sign and symbolic field play a central role in
mediating the interpretation of reality.
Indexicality and children’s construction of mind. Although
there is growing agreement that social interaction is an arena
within which the unfolding of an understanding of mind occurs,
little is known about the particulars of this process. C&L begin to
shed light on this issue by suggesting that relationships and talk it-
self provide fundamental resources for children. Further insight
into how we might better understand the role of symbolic behav-
ior in constructing culturally appropriate ways of understanding
mental life could stem from current work in linguistic anthropol-
ogy. Linguistic anthropologists start from the assumption that talk
is a highly organized activity in which conversation unfolds in
terms of highly structured units that universally segment the on-
going stream of action into orderly sequences related to culturally
sanctioned ways of organizing social life (see Budwig 2003;
Duranti 1997). Central here is the discussion of indexicality. As
Ochs (1996) argues, linguistic constructions come to be habitually
used in such ways that they come to index larger meaning units.
The indexical use of language constructions provides commu-
nicative partners with signposts for how each partner grounds the
interaction and thereby allows for the dynamic unfolding of mean-
ing. Use of the particular construction comes to stand for a larger
meaning unit.
Consider, for example, the use of desire talk in a crosslinguistic
study of German and American caregiver-child dyads when the
children were two years of age (see Moissinac & Budwig 2000).
The American caregivers were noted to use desire verbs in con-
structions either to inquire about their children’s ongoing states
(Do you want a tea cup?) or to access permission from their chil-
dren to act in particular ways (Do you want me to pour tea?). In
contrast, the German caregivers rarely grounded desire talk in
terms of individuals’ desires and, rather, used desire talk to con-
struct joint activities and otherwise relate the children’s actions to
normative frames. For instance, one mother appealed to joint de-
sire as she realized it was time to clean up the blocks, saying to her
child: “Wollen wir die mal einsammeln (Do we want to collect
them)?” The claim here is that the regular use of desire construc-
tions, and more specifically, the way in which particular desire
constructions linked up in patterned ways with larger meaning
units, provides a powerful point of entry for children to tacitly be-
gin to work on ways of seeing that are culturally sanctioned. It is
important to note, consistent with the point made by C&L, that
children do not accept ready-made the units as organized by care-
givers, but rather, that children’s linguistic usage of desire con-
structions is indeed sensitive to the language patternings available
in their caregivers’ discourse. Rather than emphasizing that care-
givers or children talk about desire, the notion of indexicality con-
tributes by providing a suggestion for how children can grab onto
culturally relevant aspects of an understanding of mind by at-
tending to the patterned uses of particular linguistic constructions
(see Budwig 2003).
Around the turn of the twentieth century, the study of human
development often included close discussion between psycholo-
gists, linguists, and anthropologists. C&L’s article brings us back
to such a time and encourages developmental psychologists to not
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be limited by current blinders in how to conceive of the relation-
ship between language and thought.
In this commentary I have suggested two ways in which their
argument can be strengthened, namely, by moving beyond an
analysis of words and by picking up on the notion of indexicality.
Grounding discussion of children’s construction of mind in the in-
terdisciplinary study of language, thought, and culture will ulti-
mately provide fruitful new avenues for future analyses.
Agency mediation and an understanding 
of the mind
Olga Chesnokova
Department of Psychology, Moscow State University, Moscow 103 009,
Russia. olches@olches.ps.msu.su
Abstract: This commentary is an attempt to give a Vygotskian perspective
on Carpendale’s & Lewis’s (C&L’s) target article. The article uses ideas that
are well familiar to Vygotsky’s scholars. However, it develops these ideas
further and raises important empirical questions about the role of social
interaction in the development of social cognition. The article provides 
a fresh view on the old problems and frames themes traditional for the
English-speaking developmental psychology into a broader international
perspective.
Paradoxically, Carpendale & Lewis’s (C&L’s) article is probably
the first serious attempt to frame the discussion on the develop-
ment of social understanding in a social context. The main point
of C&L is close to the one targeted by Lev Vygotsky, who raises
the question of whether children create their theories of the so-
cial world on the basis of their innate modules and independent
life experiences or they create those theories within a social inter-
action (1999). Having reviewed a vast number of sources, the au-
thors come to the conclusion that social understanding is “the
emergent product of social interaction” (Gibbs 2001). Within a
Vygotskian social-constructivist perspective, the idea seems quite
mundane. However, though implanted in the context of ongoing
discussions about innate “modules,” “implicit knowledge,” and in-
herent understanding of “affordances” – concepts that have long
dominated developmental psychology in English-speaking na-
tions – the ideas proposed in the target article are actually fresher
than they might seem at first glance.
Having discussed the ample empirical evidence demonstrating
that a higher level of social understanding is more evident in chil-
dren who have closer positive relationships with significant others
than in those who have less close relationships, C&L use this evi-
dence to outline directions for future research that could bring
this relatively stale area of studies out of the deadlock of the “the-
ories of mind.” One of these directions might be studying multi-
ple nonverbal interactions that occur in the natural social setting
and play a major role in promoting social understanding, espe-
cially at the early, prelanguage stages of development. The central
claim of C&L is that the focus of research should be shifted from
investigating mental states and mentalist concepts as the out-
comes of children’s understanding of others’ minds to the careful
analysis of social interactions and cultural contexts that shape the
content of children’s social knowledge. In fact, the authors resur-
rect the old but fundamental question of how social interaction
should be understood. Is social interaction “based on the interac-
tion of minds which can be properly understood only when one
takes into account what people think about other people’s
thoughts” (Perner & Wimmer 1985, p. 438), or is the mind itself
“ the product of social life and . . . activity which was earlier shared
by two people” (Luria 1969, p. 143)? I am sympathetic with the
authors’ adoption of Chapman’s (and Luria’s) view on this point:
that social interaction is at the base of mental and social under-
standing.
But do social interactions directly shape children’s growing un-
derstanding of mental states? Or is there a mechanism that medi-
ates the link between social interactions and children’s social un-
derstanding? Closely following Wittgenstein’s view of the “socially
projected” nature of mental activity, the authors at the same time
strongly emphasize that a child is an active agent within social in-
teraction, and not a passive recipient of socially induced knowl-
edge. In this, C&L closely approach the “activity principle” in the
understanding of cognitive development that has long been em-
ployed by the Vygotskian tradition (see El’konin 1969). The “ac-
tivity principle” suggests that the simple fact of a child’s involve-
ment in social interaction is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition of the child’s improvement of his or her social under-
standing (as well as his or her understanding of other people’s
mental states). It is important to analyze what position (active or
passive) the child, as an agent, takes in this social interaction.
One striking example of the role of agency in social interaction
can be found in studies on children’s moral understanding. In one
of these studies, preschool children who had previously trans-
gressed on moral tasks (such as deliberate cheating) were asked to
instruct other transgressors to observe the same moral rules (Sub-
botsky 1993). Although in the post-tests all the “instructors” re-
vealed an equal degree of understanding of what was right or
wrong to do in social interactions with a “moral underpinning,”
only those children who had actively accepted the position of a
moral instructor did not repeatedly transgress if given a chance to
do so. This example empirically illustrates a circularity puzzle (a
circle) that is inherent in the claim that children are agents within
a social interaction: that is, whereas interactions can facilitate chil-
dren’s understanding of other people’s (and their own) mental
states, it is the child him- or herself who ascribes value to the ac-
quired knowledge. On this ground, the claim promoted by C&L,
that children’s social understanding is shaped while they interact
with others, should be supplemented by the principle of “agency
mediation.” This means that social interaction can elicit a proper
(and not only formal or verbal) social understanding in a child only
when the child takes an active position within the interaction and
implants the acquired social knowledge with personal (and emo-
tional) meaning. In fact, this provides an answer to the question
formulated by Astington and Olson (1995): Does a child passively
adopt mentalist concepts available from cultural social surround-
ings, or does the child actively construct these concepts within the
interactions?
The principle of “agency mediation” also gives us a chance to
integrate a vast body of fascinating studies of the social context of
problem-solving interactions and “theory of mind” into the stud-
ies on social intelligence and personality (Cantor & Kihlstrom
1989; Dunbar 1996; Garton 2004; Gauvain 2001). The context of
an individual’s social life shapes his or her understanding of men-
talist states (such as beliefs, desires, intentions, attitudes) only
when this context is filtered through the individual’s integrated
“self” (personal identity). The “self” (agent) exercises control over
the person’s immediate actions and also sets up the individual’s ul-
timate life goals. In light of the “agency mediation” principle, we
can now reformulate the final “developmental goal” of social cog-
nition and social understanding: to achieve an understanding of
other people’s minds for the purpose of using this knowledge for
building stable and happy personal (moral, social, business, and
other) relationships.
To conclude, C&L’s paper utilizes ideas that have been around
for a considerable period of time. Nevertheless, the paper does
raise interesting and intellectually challenging theoretical and em-
pirical questions about the role of social interaction for the devel-
opment of social cognition. It stimulates a refreshing way of think-
ing and gives a good stir to the problem that has been boiling for
a long time within the encapsulated circle of English-speaking de-
velopmental psychology.
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I ain’t got no body: Developmental
psychology must be embodied and enactive,
as well as “social”
A. P. Craiga and L. Barrettb
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Abstract: Although we agree with the authors’ criticism of the reigning
approach to children’s sociocognitive development, we raise three further
issues. First, “mind talk” is not, in fact, any different from the other aspects
of the social world about which children learn. Second, there is no choice
between either the “single mind” or the “social context.” Finally, there is
a spurious separation between organism and environment.
In this target article, the authors take issue with the reigning “in-
dividualistic” approach in theories of children’s development of
social understanding. In what follows, we want to support their
criticism of this approach, but in somewhat different terms. We
therefore raise three questions for the authors to consider.
1. What if we were “Antipodeans”? Richard Rorty’s (1980) in-
teresting thought experiment regarding persons without minds,
the Antipodeans, has something to teach us as far as “constructing
an understanding of mind” goes. Among these people, according
to Rorty, “neurology and biochemistry had been the first disci-
plines in which technological breakthroughs had been achieved,
and a large part of the conversation of these people concerned the
state of their nerves.” Also, given the state of their knowledge of
physiology, “each well-formed sentence in the language which
anybody bothered to form could easily be correlated with a read-
ily identifiable neural state” (p. 71). Using this device, Rorty
wanted to show that nothing “hangs on the distinction between
mind and body,” that the “mind” is not something about which we
have to have knowledge, and that “No predictive or explanatory or
descriptive power would be lost if we had spoken Antipodean all
our lives” (p. 120). We introduce Rorty’s story here to undermine
any attachment to learning mind-talk as special, as somehow re-
quiring answers different in kind (i.e., more focused on the inner
experiences or the “free mind” of the developing organism) from
those answers dealing with the norms, habits, rituals, beliefs, and
practices of the social group to which the child belongs. In these
terms, therefore, we want to rule out “theories of mind” on two
counts: (1) as theories of anything, and (2) as theories (for the lat-
ter, cf. Millikan 1995, pp. 51–82).
In addition, we want to cast aside “simulation theory” and espe-
cially its focus on “introspection,” and propose that children are
most likely to be genetically endowed with strong pattern recogni-
tion abilities and the tendency to establish correlations between, in
“our” case, mind talk and various associated behaviours, first in oth-
ers and later in themselves, after the onset of language. This fol-
lows from Millikan’s (1995) views that folk psychology merely de-
scribes “the competence” of “certain devices inside us” and that it
is properly the job of the neuroscientist to look for the devices that
show particular kinds of competence. Concerning ourselves thus
with “certain devices inside us” places our position alongside those
favouring attention to our genetic endowments regarding learning.
2. Does gradual learning necessarily imply constructivism?
The fact that learning is gradual does not seem to favour one or
another theory on the relationship between “the social” and the
tools or resources with which the child becomes proficient. That
is, the connective changes made during learning and the synaptic
adjustments the brain undergoes (as change is steered by both
one’s genetic heritage and culturally specific, unique experiences),
all take time (cf. Churchland 1996). Phrased differently, gradual
change alone does not privilege a more social or constructive fo-
cus on things.
In order to support their view, the authors must do more than
provide evidence to show that social history shapes individual dif-
ferences in time and space. In other words, what remains empir-
ically open has to do with the mechanisms of transmission be-
tween social history and individual knowledge acquisition –
specifically, how this transmission occurs from case to case or task
to task (through internalisation, in Vygotsky’s terms, or gradual
construction, in the terms of the authors, or the twin mechanisms
of assimilation and accommodation, in Piaget’s model of knowl-
edge development).
The only thing that seems certain is that one’s knowledge of the
world, or “that small part of it that is relevant to one’s own practi-
cal concerns . . . is embodied in the peculiar configuration of one’s
1014 individual synaptic connections . . . which are set to pro-
gressively more useful values during learning and development”
(Churchland 1996, p. 5), and that these configurations are the re-
sult of a “merging” of organism and environment (in Millikan’s
[1995] terms); there is therefore no choice between “the single
mind” and the “social context,” contrary to Raver and Leadbeater’s
(1993) assertion; it is a bewitchment precisely of the kind that Wit-
tengenstein warned against.
3. Is there any such thing as a “single mind”? To expand on
this point, it seems to us that, once we move away from such mis-
leading distinctions, labels (“theory-of-mind”), and other be-
witchments and from our tendency to utter inarticulate sounds
(another Wittgensteinian jab at bad thinking), we are probably in
a better position to come up with answers to why-questions; for
example, why “aspects of social interaction are correlated with so-
cial understanding.” As Millikan (1995) states: “There is no clear
line but only the most arbitrary demarcation between the organ-
ism considered as process and its environment. The organismic
process has no skin.” (pp. 179–80). Hence merely adding – in
some or other old or new configuration – “the social,” as the au-
thors suggest, does not clarify the relationships between learning
and maturity/development, nor its other or related side, organism
and environment.
What has to be worked out are the modes of connection be-
tween these processes and factors, and these probably differ from
case to case. That is, we suspect that the gap between, for exam-
ple, “initial knowledge” in the domains of “physics, psychology,
number, and geometry” (cf. Spelke 1994, p. 433) and “our mature
knowledge,” which, as Spelke tell us, “does not appear to be
shared by infants” (p. 435), will be filled in through the bits and
pieces of time- and place-appropriate features which are medi-
ated to the developing organism by its caregiver(s) (cf. Feuer-
stein’s description of “mediated learning experience” [Feuerstein
1980, p. 15], which is a clinical elaboration of Vygotsky’s Zone of
Proximal Development [Vygotsky 1978, p. 86]). It is these changes
over time, whereby “initial” infant knowledge is displaced, re-
vised, and overturned on its route to becoming adult knowledge,
that seem to us to offer empirical possibilities for examining the
interaction between development and learning and organisms and
environment. That a refocus on embedded cognition occasions
methodological adjustments is also recognised (cf. Craig 2003).
Thus, once we slough off any lingering attachment to an isolated
“mind,” our theories of learning will automatically bring brain into
world (and vice versa) and will consider cognition in context (Clark
1999; Hutchins 1995; Rowlands 1999).
Children, chimpanzees, and social
understanding: Inter- or intra-specific?
Timothy J. Eddy
Psychology Department, Salem State College, Salem, MA 01945.
timothy.eddy@salemstate.edu
Abstract: Theories of children’s understanding of mind benefit from rig-
orous interpretations of demonstrations of similar understandings in closely
related species. This commentary describes how Carpendale & Lewis’s
(C&L’s) argument could be made more persuasive with a more rigorous in-
terpretation of the studies of chimpanzees’ understanding of mind.
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Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) provide a long-overdue treatment of
the development of social understanding as influenced by social
interactions. As such, their target article goes a long way in rec-
onciling the ideas of Wittgenstein, Piaget, and Vygotsky. When re-
moved from evolutionary considerations, C&L’s arguments might
lose considerable appeal. In an effort to place their work in a larger
evolutionary context, and in the context of what the authors call
the “lean interpretation” of joint attention, they cite some work
suggesting that chimpanzees “do not appear to understand the
psychological significance of gaze direction” (sect. 3.1, para. 8).
Curiously, considering the authors’ thesis that social interaction
plays a major role in constructing understandings of mind, they
fail to discuss the social matrix of the chimpanzees so referenced.
Povinelli and Eddy (1996) carried out a series of studies that ap-
pear very similar to the ones that C&L cite from Povinelli (1999).
That is, the 1996 work included findings that, to quote C&L (sect.
3.1, para. 8),
chimpanzees trained to beg with a hand-out gesture and given the op-
portunity to beg for food from one of two experimenters sitting side-by-
side are initially just as likely to beg from someone with her eyes closed,
with her head turned away, or even with her head covered by a bucket
as they are to beg from someone with her eyes open.
These are some of the exact findings of Povinelli and Eddy (1996).
Unfortunately, I have been unable to obtain reprints of the
Povinelli (1999) report from his lab, so it is unclear whether he has
replicated nearly our entire series of experiments (14 studies with
chimpanzees and one with young children) or whether C&L are
actually referring to Povinelli and Eddy (1996). Regardless of the
answer to that question, the 1996 report brings to the fore an ad-
ditional interpretation of the chimpanzee findings distinct from
C&L’s “lean interpretation,” which has a direct bearing on one of
the central ideas they raise.
Specifically, in the 1996 work, one of the interpretations of the
chimpanzees’ failure to take into the account the visual perception
of others concerned the interspecific nature of the tasks. That is,
the chimpanzees in those studies were required to reason about
the visual perception of members of a different species (human
experimenters). According to this interpretation, the chimpanzees
in these studies might in fact show very different results if re-
quired to reason about the visual perception of other chimpanzees
(rather than humans).
Because these studies have not actually been carried out, it is
unclear whether the failure of the chimpanzees under these cir-
cumstances is because they lack the capacity to make attributions
of visual perception to others (C&L’s “lean interpretation”) or be-
cause they have simply been asked to make attributions to mem-
ber(s) of the wrong species. Given the human tendency to at-
tribute mental states to some (but not all) animals (see Eddy et al.
1993), this becomes a distinct possibility when applied to chim-
panzees.
Where would an acceptance of the “chimpanzees’ failure due
to the interspecific nature of the tasks” interpretation leave C&L’s
ideas concerning the development of children’s social under-
standing? Probably not in a fundamentally different place from
where it is now. Having said that, if explicit linkages between the
development of differing (or similar) abilities in members of dif-
ferent species can be made with data that have singular (rather
than multiple) interpretations, then such ideas could be placed
squarely and firmly in our growing understanding of the relation
between psychological phenomenon and evolutionary facts.
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More than a context for learning? The
epistemic triangle and the dialogic mind
Charles Fernyhough
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Abstract: Theory-of-mind (TOM) competence is under-specified in
Carpendale & Lewis’s (C&L’s) account. In the neo-Vygotskian alternative
outlined below, TOM development is driven by the internalisation of dia-
logic exchanges which preserve the triadic intentional relations of interac-
tions within the epistemic triangle. On this view, TOM competence stems
from children’s ability to operate flexibly with the multiple perspectives
manifested in internalised dialogue.
Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) pull together an impressive range of
findings on social-environmental influences on theory-of-mind
(TOM) development, and set out a welcome new theoretical
framework for understanding how such capacities might emerge
within interpersonal interaction. Where their article is less satis-
fying is in specifying those cognitive mechanisms that might result
from such developmental processes. That is, the authors give an
interesting and plausible account of how TOM competence de-
velops, but they never really say what it is. In particular, the au-
thors are unclear about whether the epistemic triangle serves pri-
marily as a context for learning the criteria for the correct
application of mental state terms, or whether it goes on to play a
role in children’s subsequent solo reasoning about the mind. The
authors hint that they have the latter in mind when they note that
children’s facility with mental state language, developing hand-in-
hand with their understanding of the social contexts within which
such language use is appropriate, allows them to become “able to
think about situations abstracted from their practical context of in-
teraction and . . . to anticipate and reason about situations such as
the false belief task” (target article, sect. 4.1, para. 9). At the same
time, this account leaves it unclear whether the end product of de-
velopment, namely TOM competence, amounts to much more
than the correct application of mental state terms and concepts in
accordance with externally derived criteria for their use. In this
case, an unsatisfactorily individualistic account of TOM compe-
tence appears to have slipped in through the back door, and one
is left wondering what the C&L account can offer that the con-
ventional theory-theory cannot.
It is here that the authors could have gone further with their in-
terest in the work of Vygotsky. Although Vygotsky did not directly
address the problem of TOM development as it has been charac-
terised by researchers in this area, several aspects of his writings
are potentially relevant here. First, Vygotskian ideas can be useful
in an enculturation account of the sort that C&L discuss in section
2.1. Second, the idea of naïve participation, which sees infants be-
ing drawn into practices that they will only later come to under-
stand (Vygotsky 1934/1987, Ch. 4), is central to C&L’s conception
of how an “initial, fragile social understanding” (sect. 4.1, para. 9)
can become transformed into a fully fledged TOM. Third, Vygot-
sky’s concept of the zone of proximal development (Vygotsky 1934/
1987, Ch. 6) provides a framework for understanding how sensi-
tive input from caregivers can “scaffold” children’s acquisition of
mental state terms and concepts (Meins et al. 2002). Fourth, Vy-
gotsky’s idea that language can be used as a psychological tool (Vy-
gotsky 1930/1978) in augmenting pre-existing cognitive capacities
suggests that private and inner speech may play important roles in
mediating children’s own reflections on the nature of mental states
and processes (Meins et al. 2003). Finally, the Vygotskian notion
of internalisation of semiotically mediated interpersonal activity
(Vygotsky 1931/1997) may prove useful for our theorising about
how children’s developing TOM abilities are rooted in their expe-
rience of social exchanges.
I suggest that it is this latter aspect of Vygotsky’s theory that can
make the difference between an essentially individualistic account
of TOM development based primarily on the learning of terms for
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mental state concepts, and an account that sees social under-
standing as genuinely and profoundly rooted in social experience.
In a now-familiar set of arguments, Vygotsky proposed that higher
mental functions such as mediated memory and self-regulatory in-
ner speech are formed through the progressive internalisation and
transformation of semiotically mediated interpersonal exchanges
(Vygotsky 1934/1987, Ch. 4). In internalising dialogue with oth-
ers, the child internally reconstructs the dynamics of that dialogue
with, crucially, all of its triadic intentional relations intact. The es-
sential thing about dialogue, for our purposes, is that it involves a
simultaneous unity of different perspectives (Holquist 1990) on
the element of reality to which the dialogue is intentionally re-
lated. The internalisation of dialogue, for which normal children
are pre-linguistically prepared by the socio-affective responsivities
and joint attentional capacities described in section 3.1, therefore
involves children taking on a semiotic (usually natural-language)
representation of the alternative perspective manifested in that di-
alogue (Fernyhough 1996; 1997).
It is this permeation of children’s thinking by the different per-
spectives encountered within the epistemic triangle that forms the
basis of their developing ability to operate with these perspectives,
first in naturalistic social-cognitive reasoning contexts, and later in
more formalised tests of TOM. The end result of internalisation is
thus an ongoing interplay between different, simultaneously held
perspectives on reality, represented first in private speech and ul-
timately in dialogic inner speech. To the extent that it requires the
flexible and simultaneous co-ordination of multiple perspectives
on an aspect of a task situation – such as the location of an unex-
pectedly transferred object or the phenomenal qualities of an item
in the appearance-reality task (Fernyhough 1996) – TOM rea-
soning represents the pre-eminent example of dialogic thinking.
Allowing the epistemic triangle to become internalised would
therefore provide C&L with a specific cognitive mechanism
through which children could operate with the mental states of
others and “coordinat[e] these often differing perspectives with
their own beliefs” (sect. 4.2, para. 1). It would also provide a
framework for making sense of the social-influences findings that
went beyond the (admittedly important) issue of learning the cor-
rect use of mental state terms. For example, by focusing on how
caregivers differ in their ability to construct dialogues with their
children in which the intentional stance is taken (Garfield et al.
2001), the neo-Vygotskian approach is better placed to account for
the evidence that very early differences in maternal mind-mind-
edness relate to individual differences in TOM several years later
(Meins et al. 2002; 2003). Much more than a mere context for
learning, the internalised epistemic triangle becomes an essential
part of the child’s solution to the moment-by-moment challenge
of engaging with other minds.
The roots of social understanding in the
attachment relationship: An elaboration 
on the constructionist theory
Peter Fonagy
Sub-Department of Clinical Health Psychology, University College London,
London WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom. p.fonagy@ucl.ac.uk
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Abstract: It is argued that constructionist theory provides only a partial
account of how secure attachment leads to better social understanding. In
addition to cooperative parent-child relations, the more efficient arousal
and affect regulation system of secure infants, and developmental moder-
ators of the processes of imitation, may play a part in explaining the asso-
ciation and offer clues as to how effective social understanding is gener-
ally acquired.
Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) make a strong case that past attempts
at accounting for the influence of social interaction on the devel-
opment of children’s social understanding1 within the confines of
the three prominent models of theory of mind acquisition have
been at best partial. They reject both the enculturation and the ex-
tant developmental propositions (maturation, theory-theory, and
simulation) in favour of a model that assumes that social under-
standing is an emergent property of the child’s experience of cer-
tain regularities in interaction with others. The “epistemic trian-
gle” (i.e., referential interactions between infant and caregiver
about the object) is assumed inevitably to generate the discovery
that others sometimes have different beliefs about the world from
one’s own. If we, taking the point of view of the infant, assume the
existence of a stable external world, the actions of others in com-
municative interactions can only be understood given the suppo-
sition that they have different beliefs about aspects of the world.
Children achieve comparable levels of development at similar
ages simply because of the commonalities of their experience. The
corollary of this is that differences in the acquisition of social un-
derstanding are to be understood in terms of crucial differences
in their experience of triadic interactions. For example, our results
from the London Parent-Child Project (Fonagy et al. 1997) that
children securely attached at one year were significantly more
likely to pass the Belief-Desire reasoning test at five and a half
years (n 5 90, p , .005, OR 5 3.8, CI: 1.5–9.9) may be under-
stood in terms of attachment being a good marker for a coopera-
tive parent-child relationship, which, according to constructivist
theory, is the ideal context for the development of knowledge.
Although I do not fundamentally disagree with either the spirit
or the details of the case advanced in the target article, there are
important gaps in the model advanced by the authors. The target
article is helpful in drawing attention to the common ground be-
tween Bowlby’s (1980) and Piaget’s (1945/1962) thinking, partic-
ularly in relation to Piaget’s notion of schemes and Bowlby’s as-
sumptions concerning internal working models. However, how do
secure-autonomous internal working models in the parent lead to
the kinds of cooperative relationships “that might permit unre-
strained communication, that allows participants to understand
each other fully” (Habermas 1983/1990)? We have to assume a di-
alectic model of self-development (Hegel 1807) where the child’s
capacity to create a coherent image of mind is critically dependent
on an experience of being clearly perceived as a mind by the at-
tachment figure. The now overwhelming evidence for the trans-
generational transmission of attachment security is consistent with
this (van IJzendoorn 1995), and this may link to the emergence of
mentalisation in the child (for a review, see Fonagy et al. 2002).
Accumulating transgenerational evidence suggests that mothers
who conceive of their own childhoods largely in mental state terms
are more likely to go on to develop secure attachments with their
children (Fonagy et al. 1991; Target et al., in press) and to have a
more differentiated mentalised picture of their infant (Muzik &
Rosenblum 2003; Slade et al. 2001), which in turn is associated
with more mind-minded comments (Muzik & Rosenblum 2003)
and infant security (Slade et al. 2001). As the work of Elizabeth
Meins and colleagues (2001) suggests, mothers whose state of
mind with respect to attachment may be described as secure
(Main 2000) expose the infant to more mental state language,
which in turn advances the child’s social understanding.
Yet, more than mental state language, the coherence with which
the child’s mental state is perceived may be the critical variable.
In a study by David Oppenheim (Koren-Karie et al. 2002; Op-
penheim & Koren-Karie 2002), mothers were asked to narrate a
videotaped playful interaction that they had just had with their in-
fant. Mothers who were reflective in their narratives, able to see
various experiences through the child’s eyes and gain new insights
as they talked, were far more likely to have securely attached in-
fants than mothers who either had preset conceptions of the child
which they appeared to impose, or disengaged from trying to un-
derstand what was on the child’s mind. Most pertinent was the ob-
servation that disorganised attachment classification was associ-
ated with mothers who were incoherent, switching between the
above categories and not fitting well into any of them. Thus,
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“mind-mindedness” and security of attachment in the caregiver
appear to go together and are associated with a coherent working
model of the child that is richly imbued with representations of in-
ternal states. This is the substance of the collaboration and coop-
erativeness at the heart of constructionist theory.
Cooperative relationship rooted in the coherence of the per-
ception of the child’s mental state may not be the only factor. The
development of the key psychological capacities that underpin
theory of mind may be grounded in the attachment relationship
(Fonagy & Target 2002; Fonagy et al. 2002). It is quite probable
that an important mediator of the association of secure attachment
and theory-of-mind development lies in the regulation of physio-
logical arousal. Secure attachment may be conducive to mentalis-
ing because it facilitates an optimal level of arousal (Field 1985;
Kraemer 1999; Panksepp et al. 1999). Mentalising depends sub-
stantially on optimal prefrontal cortex functioning (Adolphs 2003;
Blair & Cipolotti 2000; Rowe et al. 2001; Siegal & Varley 2002;
Stuss et al. 2001). Medial and orbital prefrontal cortices have been
linked to the regulation of interpersonal relationships, social co-
operativity, moral behaviour, and social aggression (Damasio
2003; Davidson et al. 2000; Greene & Haidt 2002; Kelley et al.
2002; Schore 2003). The optimal functioning of the prefrontal cor-
tex in turn depends on optimal arousal. Neurochemical regulation
of the prefrontal cortex is complementary to that of posterior cor-
tex and subcortical structures2 (Arnsten 1998; Arnsten et al. 1999).
Arnsten and Mayes (Arnsten 1998; Arnsten et al. 1999; Mayes
2000) have argued that when arousal exceeds a certain threshold,
it is as if a neurochemical switch is thrown. This switch shifts us
out of the executive mode of flexible reflective responding into the
fight-or-flight mode of action-centred responding. Those with in-
secure or disorganised attachment relationships are sensitised to
intimate interpersonal encounters and experience higher arousal,
and the relative level of arousal in the frontal or posterior part of
the cortex readily shifts posteriorly.
Similar arguments could be mounted in relation to effortful
control. The capacity to inhibit a dominant response in place of a
subdominant one is a key achievement of early development
(Kochanska et al. 2000; Rothbart et al. 2000). It also appears to be
powerfully predicted by security of attachment at one year
(Kochanska 2001; Kochanska et al. 2000; Kreppner et al. 2001).
Mentalising involves setting aside immediate physical reality in
favour of a less compelling reality of the other’s internal state. Pre-
vious studies have linked the acquisition of effortful control to per-
formance on the false belief tasks as they follow a common devel-
opmental timetable and share a common brain region and yield
common types of pathology (Carlson & Moses 2001). Hence, we
would argue that children with a background of secure attachment
are more rapid in their acquisition of mentalisation in the context
of social relationships because secure attachment has equipped
them with the capacity appropriately to attend selectively to crit-
ical aspects of such interactions.
More recently one of the most creative writers in this field,
George Gergely (2003), has identified two strategies of imitation
in 14- to 18-month-old infants; 14-month-olds use an observa-
tional learning strategy based on an active process of evaluation of
situational constraints using the principle of rational action
(Gergely & Csibra 1997; 2003), imitating only when the other’s ac-
tion is not explained by situational constraints and therefore points
to the affordance property of the object (Gergely et al. 2002). (In
a modified replication of Meltzoff ’s famous study of the infant im-
itating the experimenter switching a light on in a box by touching
it with his head, Gergely et al. [2002] showed that imitation does
not occur when the hands of the actor are visibly constrained, and
when the infant interprets the use of the head as a rational action
justified by the actor’s immobilisation and not relevant to the in-
fant because the infant’s hands are free.) Four months later, the
physical constraints appear irrelevant (Gergely 2003), as the infant
imitates regardless of the observed physical constraints; it is as-
sumed that this is because the infant presumes a cooperative in-
tention to teach on the part of the actor. Thus, by 18 months the
infant presumes that the actor as a rational mental agent has al-
ready tested the rationality of the novel action him- or herself.
Gergely’s work has an important qualification for constructivist
theory insofar as that the gradual emergence of mentalisation ap-
pears to change the experience of the “epistemic triangle” for the
infant. The experience of interchange evolves from a teleological
experience at 14 months to the beginning of a mentalistic one by
18 months.3 Gergely (2003) argues that one of the central envi-
ronmental factors that contributes to the shift from teleological
emulation to the assumption of a cooperative intention to teach,
is previous experience of “benevolent teaching” interactions initi-
ated by the caregiver. It is likely that in dysfunctional attachment
contexts, the infant learns to interpret parental initiation of eye
contact and other communicative attention-directing behaviours
as cues signalling that potentially harmful interactions are likely to
follow. The infant may develop the defensive coping strategy of 
inhibiting the mentalistic interpretation of such communicative
behavioural cues. Hence, in severely dysfunctional attachment
contexts, infants are likely to fail to interpret mentalistically the
communicative referential cues of the demonstrator as indicating
a benevolent and cooperative intention to teach.
In brief, while broadly accepting the constructivist model, we
suggest (1) that specific capacities (arousal regulation, effortful
control) link the secure base that generates secure attachment
with evolving symbolic function; (2) that the link of the secure
base phenomenon to the development of mentalisation will be in-
creasingly understood to be causal rather than correlational, in
that the group of capacities that underpin adequate social under-
standing (what Bogdan [1997] called interpretation) are evolu-
tionarily tied to it; in other words, that the evolutionary function
of the attachment relationship in humans goes beyond the pro-
tection of the vulnerable infant to providing an environment
within which social understanding may be acquired; and there-
fore, finally (3) that deficits in attachment create a vulnerability in
the child to later environmental challenges.
NOTES
1. Our preferred term for social understanding has been “mentalisa-
tion” (see Morton 1989).
2. As the level of cortical activation increases through mutually inter-
active norepinephrine alpha 2 and dopamine D1 systems, prefrontal cor-
tical function improves on capacities such as anticipation (shifting of at-
tention), planning/organisation, and working memory. With excessive
stimulation, norepinephrine alpha 1 and dopamine D1 inhibitory activity
increases; the prefrontal cortex goes “off-line,” and posterior cortical and
subcortical functions (e.g., more automatic functions) take over. Increas-
ing levels of norepinephrine and dopamine interact such that above
threshold, the balance shifts from prefrontal executive functioning to
amygdala-mediated memory encoding and posterior-subcortical auto-
matic responding (fight-flight-freeze).
3. In this sense, of course, the constructivist account skirts circularity
but gets round it by the assumption of the gradual emergence of the men-
talising capacity.
No (social) construction without
(meta-)representation: Modular mechanisms
as a basis for the capacity to acquire an
understanding of mind
Tim P. Germana and Alan M. Leslieb
aDepartment of Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA
93106-9660; bCenter for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University, Piscataway,
NJ 08854. german@psych.ucsb.edu aleslie@ruccs.rutgers.edu
Abstract: Theories that propose a modular basis for developing a “theory
of mind” have no problem accommodating social interaction or social en-
vironment factors into either the learning process, or into the genotypes
underlying the growth of the neurocognitive modules. Instead, they can
offer models which constrain and hence explain the mechanisms through
which variations in social interaction affect development. Cognitive mod-
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els of both competence and performance are critical to evaluating the ba-
sis of correlations between variations in social interaction and performance
on mental state reasoning tasks.
Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) offer a theory of the acquisition of an
understanding of mind where varieties in the structure, amount,
and types of social interaction play a pivotal role. Part of their 
argument is that other theoretical accounts underestimate, and 
indeed are inconsistent with, evidence for correlations between 
indexes of social interaction and the development of an under-
standing of mind. The authors single out theories that posit an in-
nate modular basis to the capacity to acquire a “theory of mind,”
saying that such theories “[live] uneasily with the accumulating ev-
idence, such as the sibling effect . . ., showing that the nature of
the social interaction children experience is closely related to the
development of their social understanding” (target article, sect.
2.2, para. 5).
Though common, the authors’ view misrepresents the modular
theory as claiming that “the solution to this problem of under-
standing the mind” is somehow “innately given” (sect. 2.2, para.
5). The authors even contrast the modular view with the view that
the capacity to acquire an understanding of mind is innate. But it
is precisely this latter claim that is endorsed in the modular frame-
work: “theory of mind” is described as having an innate and pos-
sibly modular basis, not as consisting in its entirety as either innate
or as a module (Leslie 2000; Scholl & Leslie 1999; 2001). The
modular view is also commonly accused – and the target article is
no exception – of being inconsistent with demonstrations that
there is “development” in the domain of understanding mind. Yet,
roles for both known developmental mechanisms, namely, matu-
ration and learning, are described in the modular theory that the
authors attack: Maturation of hardwired mechanisms enables the
child to make appropriate sense of social inputs and hence to learn
about the social and mental worlds (see German & Leslie 2000).
In a section on future research directions, the authors bemoan
the imprecision of what the term “understanding” might mean in
this domain (sect. 5, para. 6). Here we agree, and we draw their
attention to the fact that in the modular approach they reject, in-
tuitions about what should constitute having or not having “un-
derstanding” have been replaced by attempts to specify underly-
ing cognitive mechanisms, to delineate what their inputs are, to
characterize the representations they deploy, and to study how
they interact with domain-general processing mechanisms in solv-
ing “theory of mind” problems (e.g., German & Leslie 2001; Leslie
1987; 2000; Leslie & Polizzi 1998).
Throughout this same section, the authors themselves call for
research to “move from the intriguing findings relating individual
differences in the social experiences of infants and their social un-
derstanding to research that explores the processes involved”
(sect. 5, para. 4). But, despite a laudable insistence on the impor-
tance of models of process, they offer not a single proposal about
how “construction of understanding of mental states from social
interaction” is supposed to work. Instead, it is left to “future re-
search” to answer questions such as: “how . . . mothers’ tendency
to talk about their infants in psychological terms is positively as-
sociated with their child’s understanding of false beliefs almost
four years later?” (sect. 5, para. 4).
What is instructive about these gaps is that the modular frame-
work, far from “living uneasily” with the importance of social in-
put, is the only approach that has concrete proposals about how
social factors play their role. As Roth and Leslie (1998) put it, “the
emergence of [the “theory of mind” mechanism] solves a critical
but limited problem. It allows the young brain to attend to . . .
mental states despite the fact that such states cannot be seen,
heard, felt, or otherwise sensed . . . [and] being able to attend to
mental states is a prerequisite for learning about those states”
(p. 27; emphasis in original). The ability to attend to mental state
properties, such as pretending and believing, is a critical part of
what makes the social world the world it is and a critical part of
what makes experience of that world into social experience. With-
out this ability, though he or she may be constantly surrounded by
playful laughter, a child develops in social isolation; such is the lot
of the child with autism. Beyond this basic ability lies the later suc-
cess in answering questions about false beliefs. Here again, the
modular theory has made concrete proposals about how the child
learns about these social situations, learning things like “beliefs
tend to be false under systematic circumstances, surprise occurs
when a false belief is relieved, false beliefs can be induced in op-
ponents . . . [and] how to achieve the latter and get away with
it.”(Roth & Leslie 1998, p. 28).
C&L rightly remind us of the danger of “neurotic task fixation”
(sect. 4.1, para. 4; see Bloom & German 2000), and rightly ac-
knowledge that meta-analysis cannot resolve the question of
whether there is conceptual change (see Scholl & Leslie 2001).
Yet they make the very mistakes they warn against by implicitly as-
suming that “understanding” the concept of belief is just the same
thing as passing a false belief task. In particular, the authors fail to
distinguish competence and performance in their interpretation
of the false belief task, and, hence, in their interpretation of its cor-
relation with indexes of social interaction.
Positive associations between indexes of social interaction
(number of siblings, security of attachment, maternal mind-mind-
edness, parenting style, etc.) and mental state “understanding”
may be the result of many different factors in many different
mixes. Plausibly, some of these factors reflect shared genotypes,
some the structure and richness of inputs to relevant learning
mechanisms, and of course, let us not forget good old-fashioned
practice – in this case, practice with social cognizing. The studies
reviewed by the authors under this heading have invariably
demonstrated correlations with performance on a false belief task.
There is already good evidence for a strong heritable component
to false belief performance (Hughes & Cutting 1999). There is
also mounting evidence suggesting that an important, and perhaps
critical, factor in performance on false belief reflects inhibitory
processes that develop across the early years (Carlson et al. 1998).
Curiously, there is also at least one demonstration of a sibling ef-
fect on executive tasks without replication of the sibling effect on
false belief (Cole & Mitchell 2000). It is even possible that corre-
lations between various social indexes and “theory of mind” are
mediated by domain-general processes.
In conclusion, it is only by developing models of successful per-
formance on various component “theory of mind” skills, such as
recognition of agency in infancy (e.g., Johnson 2003), pretend play
(Leslie 1987; 1994), belief-desire reasoning (Leslie & Polizzi
1998), and recall of the contents of one’s own past mental states
(Barreau & Morton 1999), and by studying their specific neu-
rocognitive basis (Frith & Frith 1999; Gallagher & Frith 2003)
that we can hope to understand how the brain has been organized
to acquire this important knowledge base.
Individualism and cognitive development
Philip Gerrans
Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA 5005,
Australia. philip.gerrans@adelaide.edu.au
http://www.adelaide.edu.au/philosophy/people/pgerrans/
Abstract: Individualism is not inconsistent with social interaction; it is re-
quired to explain it. Social exchanges, evidenced in gaze monitoring, so-
cial referencing, emotional responses, protodeclarative and imperative
pointing, pretence, play, and conversation all play a role in development,
but the nature of that role is opaque without an understanding of the cog-
nitive mechanisms on which they depend.
The normal child is confronted not by an intentionally inert world
of moving objects but by one of animate bodies, facial expressions,
gestures, vocalizations, and emotions. In order to cognise the
world in this way, the child does not need to possess a fully fledged
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intentional psychology; rather, she possesses a set of cognitive
mechanisms whose proper function is to sensitise her to possibil-
ities for intentional engagement with her surroundings. As a re-
sult of this engagement, the normal child will develop the con-
cepts of intentional psychology.
I take it Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) would agree with this char-
acterisation; however, their approach does not lead to any deeper
understanding of either the mechanisms which initially sensitise
the child to her social environment, or those which subsequently
lead to the type of conceptual understanding tested in false belief
and other “theory of mind” (TOM) tasks. There are two reasons.
First, they endorse Wittgenstein’s argument that cognitive com-
petence is mastery of a practice best understood as a skill rather
than an intellectual or theoretical achievement. Second, the au-
thors do not connect their account of social understanding to the
understanding of autism. The two issues are related.
Wittgenstein gives no explanation of the way social interaction
produces social understanding. This is because he regards it as an
essentially unanalysable skill which, once acquired, allows the sub-
ject to perceive mental states directly. His reasons for rejecting in-
tellectualist accounts of skill acquisition (fast, fluent, and flexible
responses cannot be governed by rules understood as algorithmic
reductions of theoretical inferences) combine with his conceptual
analysis of the concept of an intentional state. The folk concept,
properly analysed, of an intentional state is not that of a covert
cause of overt behaviour. Social understanding feels like immedi-
ate and non-theoretical recognition of mental states exhibited in
overt behaviour, and that is because the cognitive process involved
is a skill and not a theoretical inference (Wittgenstein 1953/1968).
This may be so, but this is no recipe for developmental psy-
chology, which is, quite rightly, concerned with the neurocogni-
tive processes involved in concept acquisition. For example, it
would not do simply to say that after a period of social interaction
certain aspects of the child’s linguistic environment (prosody,
changes in amplitude) become “criterial” for language under-
standing. Some explanatory hypothesis is required about the na-
ture of the cognitive processes implemented in developing neural
architecture. Is the child processing phonology or syntax? How is
the relevant information represented and manipulated? It seems
uninformative to say that as a result of social interaction children
acquire the ability to hear sentences as meaningful, but that is pre-
cisely what Wittgenstein said. The best way to comprehend the
process is via a metaphor “Light dawns over the whole.” But it is
simply not true that the psychological explanation of concept ac-
quisition is exhausted by analysis of its phenomenology. And it is
doubtful that the philosophical understanding is, either.
Early cognitivists reconstructed these questions as questions
about the construction and confirmation by the developing child
of theories of the linguistic domain, implemented ultimately in
neural architectures. Perhaps this is slightly over-intellectual, but
the issue of what information is relevant to cognition of a particu-
lar domain and how it is computed is still essential. Furthermore,
that is a question about what is going on in the mind of the indi-
vidual who acquires a language. Putting it this way does not ex-
clude social interaction but it allows us to say why certain aspects
of social interaction are more significant than others and why some
children rather than others develop the relevant concepts in re-
sponse to that interaction.
Without such a theory, a linguist would be forced to say that
children with, say, Specific Language Impairment (SLI ) do not
acquire language normally because their linguistic interactions are
abnormal. True, but is this because they lack acoustic or phono-
logical information? The ability to process it? Or do they lack some
form of grammatical processing? One cannot say that one is con-
cerned only with normal development, because the adequacy of a
model of normal development is evidenced by its ability to predict
and explain characteristic developmental abnormalities. Similarly
for other psychological capacities: much, if not most, of our knowl-
edge of normal function depends on abnormal cases.
The same is true of social understanding. Indeed, the TOM hy-
pothesis was originally advanced to explain the difference be-
tween normal and autistic children. Perhaps the TOM idea is
overly intellectual and perhaps (as the authors argue persuasively)
TOM is not a cognitive monolith. In that case autism is unlikely to
be a monolith either. But we are then left with the idea that there
is a multiplicity of cognitive mechanisms involved in social under-
standing that reciprocally interact in a developmental cascade in
both normal and abnormal cases. Such a view seems entirely con-
sistent with methodological individualism, which is just the at-
tempt to find out what it is about cognitive architecture that en-
ables the normally developing child, first, to become embedded
in her social world and, second, to scaffold her development us-
ing social interaction. Social exchanges, evidenced in gaze moni-
toring, social referencing, emotional responses, protodeclarative
and imperative pointing, pretence, play, and conversation, all play
a role, but the nature of that role is opaque without an under-
standing of the cognitive mechanisms on which it depends.
The rejection of methodological individualism reflects a debate
in cognitive science over the explanation of skills (of which inten-
tional understanding certainly is one). Some argue that “know-
hows,” the fundamental capacities on which skills depend, should
be identified with socially acquired dispositions. Others argue that
the acquisition of those dispositions itself depends on some fun-
damental capacities that are essentially computational and inter-
nal to the mind of the individual acquiring the skill. For almost any
skill, it turns out that its ultimate explanation is the computational
one: Think of recognising faces, catching a ball, learning a lan-
guage, or playing at dressing up. Furthermore, the phenomenol-
ogy of skill acquisition is a poor guide to the nature of those com-
putational processes. For this reason, we should be sceptical of any
account that is essentially nothing more than an elaboration of
phenomenological insights.
The role of executive function in constructing
an understanding of mind
Suzanne Hala
Department of Psychology, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta T2N1N4,
Canada. hala@ucalgary.ca
http://www.psych.ucalgary.ca/People/Faculty/hala/
Abstract: Adopting a constructivist stance is not irreconcilable with exec-
utive function accounts of emerging social understanding. The executive
function view allows for a gradual transition in theory of mind, while spec-
ifying the underlying cognitive processes that push that development for-
ward. Executive function abilities can be seen as an important interac-
tional component in the epistemic triangle.
Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) have done the field a great service in
reminding us that the development of social understanding does
not take place in a social vacuum. They point out, quite rightly,
that the question of importance should not be whether early com-
petence in social understanding exists; rather, the central focus
should be turned towards the processes that allow for the emer-
gence of social understanding. The authors propose an alternative
constructivist account that promises to bridge the current di-
chotomy that exists between those who adopt an individualistic
developmental approach versus those who subscribe to an encul-
turation view. The inclusion of Chapman’s (1991) “epistemic tri-
angle” helps to further extend Piaget’s constructivist theory to the
social realm.
Although C&L’s proposal is highly laudable, nevertheless, as
was the case with Piaget’s original account, important aspects of
the developmental process remain underspecified. That is, saying
that development is a constructive process tells us little about the
exact nature of the cognitive functions that also contribute to de-
velopment of social understanding. The authors offer coherent
objections against three prominent theories that seek to explain
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the emergence of a so-called “theory of mind” in young children:
theory-theory, simulation, and modularity accounts. They neglect,
however, to address how a constructivist account might be related
to a newer, rapidly maturing, alternative theoretical perspective –
the executive function account.
The term “executive function” broadly refers to those cognitive
functions that underlie goal-directed behavior and that are
thought to be mediated by the prefrontal cortex (e.g., Welsh et al.
1991). A growing number of researchers maintain that gains made
in executive function abilities in the preschool years contribute
significantly to theory-of-mind performance (e.g., Carlson &
Moses 2001; Carlson et al. 1998; 2002; Frye et al. 1995b; Hala &
Russell 2001; Hala et al. 2003; Hughes 1998; Russell 1996; Zelazo
et al. 1997). As children increase their capacity to control and di-
rect their own actions, they become able to view alternative
courses of action – including actions based on beliefs (Russell
1996).
In contrast to the theories criticized by C&L, an executive ac-
count can readily incorporate the notion of a more gradual onset
of social understanding. Development of both executive control
and social understanding begin early and emerge over an ex-
tended period of time. Indeed, the precocious performance found
in many “modified” false belief and deception tasks (which the au-
thors highlight as increasing personal or social activity) may be ex-
plained in terms of reductions in the executive demands of the
tasks.
To illustrate: typical false belief tasks draw on at least two exec-
utive demands: (1) working memory (of where the object was in
the beginning or what the child thought was in a box) combined
with (2) inhibitory control (inhibit pointing to the spot where the
object is now known to be or reporting what one now knows is re-
ally in the box). Recent research has confirmed that those execu-
tive tasks that combine both working memory and inhibitory con-
trol are most strongly related to theory-of-mind performance
(Carlson et al. 2002; Hala et al. 2003). Reducing one or both of
these executive demands may result in improved performance.
For example, Freeman and Lacohée (1995) found that having
children “post” a picture of what they thought was in a box helped
them later to recall their own false belief in a contents task. Al-
though personal activity is certainly increased in this version, at
the same time so are the executive demands reduced (in this case,
working memory). Similarly, reducing the inhibitory demands of
deception tasks also results in improved performance (Carlson et
al. 1998; Hala & Russell 2001), whereas simply removing the op-
ponent – and hence reducing the social demands – does not (Hala
& Russell 2001). The reverse pattern is also found. That is, in-
creasing the inhibitory demands of theory-of-mind tasks detracts
from performance (Leslie & Polizzi 1998).
Though I use these examples of modified tasks to illustrate that
a more gradual onset of social understanding is consistent with an
executive account, I am not claiming that it is simply information-
processing complexities of specific tasks that stand in the way of
young children and their supposed theories of mind. Instead, I,
and others, suggest that there is a deeper relation between exec-
utive function and developing social understanding. Exactly what
this relation is has yet to be specified. Development of executive
function may make possible the emergence of a theory of mind
(Moses 2001). Alternatively, it may be that a strong relation is con-
sistently found between theory of mind and executive control, not
because one is causally implicated in the other in a linear fashion,
but because the two are interdependent in their development.
Admittedly, the bulk of the research on the relation between ex-
ecutive function and social understanding is of the individual-dif-
ferences variety and has not, as yet, wed itself to charting the so-
cial interactions the child is surrounded by. In principle, however,
the executive and constructivist accounts are not mutually exclu-
sive. Interaction with others challenges children’s current execu-
tive abilities, and, in Piaget’s terms, adaptation in knowledge struc-
tures may result, leading to increased knowledge and flexibility in
their thinking about their own and others’ mental lives. As chil-
dren grow in their executive function abilities, they become more
adept at interacting with and understanding others.
Introducing executive function ability into the epistemic equa-
tion affords a view of the process of development as bidirectional.
As has long been maintained by those who adopt a dynamic sys-
tems approach (e.g., Bronfenbrenner 1989; Gottlieb 1991; Scarr
& McCartney 1983/1984), the characteristics of the child influ-
ence the response of the environment just as the environment in-
fluences the child. In this vein, children’s executive maturity will,
at least in part, influence how their parents respond to them,
which in turn will influence and further enhance their developing
executive control and social understanding.
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Abstract: Interpersonal understanding is rooted in social engagement.
The question is: How? What features of intersubjective coordination are
essential for the growth of concepts about the mind, and how does devel-
opment proceed on this basis? Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) offer many
telling insights, but their account begs questions about the earliest forms
of self-other linkage and differentiation, especially as mediated by
processes of identification.
The article by Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) is an important cor-
rective to contemporary misconceptions about the development
of interpersonal understanding. The authors analyse distortions
introduced by individualistic “theory of mind” perspectives that
purport to show how children might derive concepts (even con-
cepts of mind) without appropriate forms of interpersonal en-
gagement, and they highlight the equally devastating limitations
of simulationist accounts that presuppose understanding of one’s
own mind as a basis for understanding the minds of others. The
arguments they marshal from Wittgenstein and Chapman in par-
ticular are, in my view, decisive. As C&L indicate, a theory in
which social exchanges are constitutive of understanding does not
lead to cultural relativism. On the contrary, it is only through in-
volvement with others that human beings are in a position to ac-
cord objective reality the status it deserves, and only when objec-
tive reality is conceived as such do concepts such as “belief” gain
a purchase. Moreover, mutual interpersonal relations that entail
communication and reference vis-à-vis a shared external world
provide a necessary basis for uniquely human ways of (1) acquir-
ing knowledge about that world; (2) understanding what it is to be
a person with alternative psychological perspectives on that world;
and even (3) thinking symbolically and creatively about people
and things and constructing concepts with which to think.
How, then, should we frame our account of early human devel-
opment if we are to elucidate how all this is possible and how de-
velopment proceeds from its starting point? Here I wonder
whether C&L are sufficiently radical in their revamping of theory.
Consider how concepts of “self” and “other” are integral to con-
cepts of mind. There is a paradox at the heart of any attempt to
reconcile developmental accounts of self-other understanding
that focus on the individual’s cognitive endowment, on the one
hand, and social influences, on the other. The paradox is that an
individual has to have bedrock experience of the social as social in
order to build upon this to construct progressively elaborated un-
derstandings of minds as connected and differentiated centres of
consciousness. Without some primitive modes of experiencing self
as self in relation to others, and of others as others in relation to
self, it is difficult to see how concepts of self and other could be
derived. (Note: this does not mean that infants, even infants at the
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end of the first year of life, have concepts or “understandings” of
the mental lives of others.)
The direction in which C&L move on this one, is to stress the
activities within which human interaction is embedded, adopting
what they call “a relational, action-based perspective” within
which communicative interaction also plays an essential role. Yes,
but what is the grounding for communication? When the authors
state that “Children’s social knowledge is based on action” (sect. 3,
para. 4), they are in danger of losing the plot. The crux is how in-
fants experience the activities and attitudes of self and other in in-
terpersonal relations, not merely how they act or interact with oth-
ers. C&L refer to the embodied nature of human exchanges, but
they do little to explain how infants are aware of persons as hav-
ing a mental as well as physical dimension, and how the nature of
this awareness is such as to allow for the partitioning into what be-
longs to the other and what to the self over successive phases of
development. What we need to explain, after all, is how a child
comes to understand persons as centres of individual experience,
not merely as centres of causality, and how the child’s concepts
about the different facets of subjective orientation towards the
world (intentions, feelings, wishes, beliefs, and so on) develop in
the early years of life. Alongside this, we need to account for the
forms of reflection and thinking about people – oneself as well as
others – that such concepts entail.
I think the solution to the conundrum is that humans are
equipped with a propensity for forms of role-taking that both link
an individual infant or child or adult with someone else, and at the
same time register the distinctiveness of self and other. At first
such role-taking is cognitively unelaborated, not yet amounting to
understanding: It takes place without pre-existing thought and in
a manner that is heavily imbued with emotion. From early in life,
children are moved by the attitudes of others: They are drawn to
identify with the psychological stance of a person with whom they
engage. It is through this mechanism that mutual relations with
others vis-à-vis a shared world yield the ability to relate to one’s
own mental relations, and with this, creates a kind of mental space
within which new forms of thinking are possible. A prime exam-
ple of how individuals interiorize the social, Vygotsky-style.
There is another sense in which this approach is more radical
than that of C&L. These authors give weight to the influence of
mother-child as well as peer relations in the ability to acquire and
apply concepts of mind. Here the active ingredients of develop-
ment are conceptualised in terms of cooperative social interaction
and exposure to talk about mental states. No doubt these things
are important. Beyond this, however, powerful socio-emotional
forces are at play.
Especially when you are in the heat of relating to others, it can
be an emotionally taxing business to think flexibly and to deploy
mental concepts effectively. Critically important for the early de-
velopment of this capacity are young children’s relations with at
least one other person who is able to tune into their minds. The
developmental influences are not merely intellectual, they are also
emotional. Studies in developmental psychopathology reveal that
in order to employ mind-related thinking effectively, one needs to
do more than construct understanding. To maintain a reflective
stance towards one’s own and others’ minds, one also needs to be
in appropriate forms of relation with oneself and others. Emo-
tional relatedness towards persons-as-represented in the mind is
a vital force in intrapsychic as well as interpersonal functioning,
and such relatedness and representation are powerfully influ-
enced by identification with the attitudes of others.
The sources of mentalistic understanding involve much more
than action, even co-action with others.
The sibling relationship as a context for the
development of social understanding
Nina Howe
Department of Education, Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec H3G 1M8,
Canada. nina.howe@education.concordia.ca
Abstract: Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) provide a convincing argument for
how children construct social understanding through social interaction.
Certainly mothers are important in family interaction; however, sibling in-
teraction may also be key in the process of developing social understand-
ing. In particular, the highly affective and reciprocal dynamics of the sib-
ling relationship in both positive and conflictual interaction may be critical.
Jeremy Carpendale and Charlie Lewis (C&L) have provided an
insightful and thoughtful discussion of the development of chil-
dren’s social understanding. To quote these authors, “What bene-
fits can be gained by adopting a constructivist approach to the de-
velopment of children’s social understanding?” (target article,
sect. 5). To my mind, there are many. First, as they indicate in their
review of the theory of mind (TOM) literature, the focus on the
False Belief Task has become very narrow and convoluted in its
perspective. Indeed, this literature suffers from the “neurotic task
fixation” syndrome that the authors outline. Lab studies can in-
form us only to a certain degree about children’s development and
they frequently suffer from overcontrol, a nondevelopmental per-
spective, and fail to consider the importance of the familial con-
text. Ultimately, such a path may doom the field to a slow and
painful death; the history of psychology is littered with many such
examples.
However, C&L provide an escape from this depressing sce-
nario. Humans are social, and therefore to study TOM or, as I pre-
fer, social understanding, within the context of relationships seems
ultimately a more satisfying, and theoretically compelling and con-
structive, approach. By placing children’s development within the
context of social relationships, the authors provide a framework
for their constructivist view of social understanding. As they ar-
gue, there is a long tradition of constructivist ideas regarding chil-
dren’s development. Indeed, in the field of early childhood edu-
cation, this approach has long acquired popularity. The notion that
“understanding comes through action” has been a fixture of early-
years programs for many decades and is one of the basic premises
of currently fashionable constructivist programs such as Reggio
Emilio’s.
Thus, I am in basic agreement with C&L’s premises, but some
important points should be emphasized more strongly. Clearly, it
is not the quantity but the quality and nature of children’s close re-
lationships that are important for social understanding. For more
than 20 years, Judy Dunn’s work (see Dunn 2002) has suggested
that the quality of young children’s relationships is related to their
social understanding. She has been a leader in reminding us that
children’s social worlds involve more than just parents and that
children spend considerable amounts of time with other young-
sters, especially siblings, but also peers. The field of child psy-
chology has suffered from a focus on the mother-child relation-
ship, and, to some degree, C&L fall into this trap. One of their
arguments is that triadic interactions are key to the development
of social understanding. Certainly mothers are important (we
know very little about fathers in relation to social understanding),
but the power of the dyadic sibling relationship should not be
overlooked once again. Dunn (2002) emphasizes that particular
relationships are important, namely those in which children have
a vested interest and which are colored by intense affective di-
mensions, because these elements may provide the motivation for
making one’s points understood. The reciprocal nature of the sib-
ling relationship, as opposed to the more complementary or hier-
archical parent-child relationship, affords children many oppor-
tunities to develop their social understanding in the context of
ongoing interaction.
C&L have identified cooperative parent-child relationships as
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key because they allow for free communication, which should fa-
cilitate understanding others’ minds. Yet, the nature of comple-
mentary relationships by definition places certain constraints on
freedom of communication that are not as present in more recip-
rocal relationships with siblings and peers (Hinde 1979). Fur-
thermore, the authors give little attention to the role of social con-
flict as another possible context in which children develop social
understanding, yet there is a literature providing support for this
view (Dunn 2002; Howe et al. 2002; Shantz & Hartup 1992). In
particular, the work that has focused on constructive versus de-
structive conflicts holds important promise here. In the context of
constructive conflict resolution, children must demonstrate the
ability to negotiate and resolve disagreements in ways that demon-
strate their understanding of the partner’s position, often marked
by their use of mental state language. Another area that has po-
tential to add to the strength of C&L’s argument is the literature
on shared meanings in pretend play. Again, when children have a
vested interested in constructing a dynamic play scenario, they
must extend and build onto each other’s ideas in ways that indi-
cate that they have developed a joint understanding of one an-
other’s minds (e.g., Göncü 1993; Lillard 2002). In sum, siblings are
frequent partners in this process because, as any parent knows,
who is there better to play with and fight with than your sibling?!
Although I have followed the TOM literature for a long time,
partly because it has been the fashion leader of social cognition
and promised to address some important issues, ultimately it is a
narrow literature. I have often wondered what the cognitive shift
at age four, as identified through the false belief task, had to do
with the real world of children. It took me a long time to make the
conceptual connections between TOM and the social-under-
standing work of Judy Dunn and others. Dunn’s work has clearly
shown that the development of social understanding is fascinating
when we examine children in their real-world context as they (1)
make meaningful and practical decisions about advancing their
points of view convincingly, and (2) negotiate their way through
the complex and rich world of social interactions. Moreover, the
development of individual differences in children’s social under-
standing is clearly a fruitful area of future work. For children (and
researchers) there is a wealth of fascinating questions and prob-
lems to address in figuring out how the social world works and how
to understand the depth, breadth, and meaning of one’s social re-
lationships. This is a developmental process that probably takes a
lifetime, but certainly extends past the age of five. If C&L have
pushed the social cognition field to recognize and address this
point, then they will have made a major contribution to the liter-
ature.
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Emotions and emotion cognition contribute
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Abstract: Carpendale & Lewis’s (C&L’s) interesting and insightful article
did not integrate several potentially useful notions from emotion theory
and research into their explanatory framework. I propose that emotions
are indigenous elements of mind and that children’s understanding of
them is fundamental to their understanding of the mental life of self and
others, understandings critical to the development of social and emotional
competence.
At several points in their insightful article, Carpendale & Lewis
(C&L) allude to the role of emotions in the construction and un-
derstanding of mind. Yet, they typically move on to a discussion of
cognitive or social cognitive processes without really integrating
any aspect of emotion theory into their conceptual framework.
For example, they acknowledge the usefulness of Hobson’s (2002)
emphasis on the infant’s emotional engagement in social interac-
tions. Then, without further reference to the role of emotion, they
immediately make the point that the infant’s ability to engage in
joint attention depends on her understanding of causality. A con-
sideration of the role of emotions in developing such understand-
ing and in constructing and understanding mind might broaden
and strengthen their position. Some researchers have shown that
people make important decisions, especially in risky situations,
largely on the basis of emotion feelings. Such feeling-determined
decisions may come after careful cognitive analysis of the conse-
quences (Loewenstein et al. 2001). Others now maintain that
brain systems involved in emotions become active when subjects
perform tasks related to research on theory of mind (Zimmer
2003).
Thus, both theory and research suggest the possibility of en-
riching and expanding the authors’ attractive concept of the epis-
temic triangle to create an emotion-cognition triangle. An emo-
tion-cognition account of the construction and understanding of
mind would emphasize three principles: (1) emotion feelings are
dynamic indigenous components of mind that influence percep-
tion and cognition; (2) emotion cognition can shape the world as
interesting, friendly, and cooperative, or as stressful, hostile, and
competitive; and (3) emotion-related action will emerge as con-
structive or destructive behavior depending on the effectiveness
of arousal regulation, the quality of the thought in emotion-cog-
nition interactions, and the effectiveness with which one modu-
lates the expressions of emotions in words and deeds.
Most of the evidence for the existence of emotion feelings as in-
digenous components of mind comes from studies of infants’ abil-
ities to perceive the facial and vocal expressions of others and to
encode their own. Beginning as early as age three or four months,
infants discriminate between the facial and vocal expressions of
several basic emotions. They respond to them, as well as to differ-
ent environmental conditions, in ways that suggest they can mean-
ingfully decode external emotion signals and respond sensibly to
their own internal signals (Haviland & Lelwica 1987; Izard et al.
1995; Sullivan & Lewis 2003; Sullivan et al. 1992; Weinberg &
Tronick 1994). If one accepts these findings as evidence that feel-
ings are natural elements of mind, two things follow. First, as part
of the processes involved in the construction of mind, the infant
can learn various associations or connections between feelings, ex-
pressions, and contingent events (e.g., caregiver actions in re-
sponse to infant’s expressions of feelings). Second, an important
part of the sense of self as causal agent can emerge from sensing
the contingency of emotion feelings (and expressions) and the
changes they induce in the social environment (Tronick et al.
1977; Izard 1978; Malatesta et al. 1989). The processes underly-
ing these developments could surely play a significant part in the
construction and understanding of mind. If emotions are indige-
nous elements of mind, then understanding emotions is tanta-
mount to understanding parts of mind, arguably the parts that
drive the workings of the other parts (Izard 2001; Tomkins 1962).
Emotion cognition affects the construction and understanding
of mind both in terms of its content and via ongoing information
processing. It has two major aspects: (1) understanding or knowl-
edge of emotion feelings, expressions, and functions; and (2) the
feeling-influenced information processing mechanisms involved
in perception and thought. Emotion knowledge and emotion in-
formation processing may play major roles in the development of
processes often identified as aspects of theory of mind (Zimmer
2003).
Emotion cognition may have particular consequences for the
development of social and emotional competence and the self-
concept. Emotion knowledge (EK) relates positively to social
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competence and inversely to various indexes of internalizing be-
havior (Denham 1998; Schultz et al. 2001). Indeed, EK in pre-
school children at risk predicts their social and academic compe-
tence in third grade (Izard et al. 2001). By age 11 years, children
low in EK see themselves as anxious, depressed, and socially iso-
lated (Fine et al. 2003). Furthermore, given certain environmen-
tal conditions, and probably a genetic proneness to negative emo-
tionality, a child can come to see others or their intentions as
interesting and friendly, or as hostile or frightening. A strong and
persistent association exists between proneness to anger and ag-
gression, on the one hand, and a hostile attribution or anger 
perception bias, on the other (Crick & Dodge 1994; Dodge &
Coie 1987; Fine et al., in press; Schultz et al., in press). Thus,
emotion perception or attribution biases help determine the con-
tent of mind, as well as the direction of emotion-motivated ac-
tion. These mental biases indicate that things went awry in the
development of emotion-cognition relations and the construction
of mind.
The association between proneness to anger and anger percep-
tion bias illustrates an important emotion-cognition connection.
Some research suggests an equally significant connection between
emotion, emotion perception bias, and action (e.g., aggression),
particularly in peer-rejected children (Hubbard 2001). Their
emotion perception bias and related proneness to anger and ag-
gression undoubtedly affect the processes involved in the con-
struction of mind and in understanding the mind of others. Anger-
and aggression-prone children show a strong tendency to see
anger signals and hostile intentions where none exists (Crick &
Dodge 1994; Fine et al., submitted; Shultz et al., in press).
Emotion action is conceived of as overt behavior determined or
significantly influenced by emotion feelings. The effectiveness or
adaptiveness of emotion action probably depends in large mea-
sure on one’s success in modulating emotion arousal, particularly
intense emotion arousal in stressful social situations (Izard 2002).
Strong and persistent expression of negative emotions apparently
constitutes mind stuff that may contribute to the development of
traits of personality. Negative emotion expression in the more
stressful episodes of the Strange Situation (Ainsworth et al. 1978)
at age 1.5 years predicted the personality trait of neuroticism at
age 3.5, whereas modulated positive emotion expression pre-
dicted conscientiousness and agreeableness (Abe & Izard 1999).
One might expect such traits and their expressions in social inter-
actions and other behavior to figure prominently in the construc-
tion and understanding of mind.
The space in between: The development of
joint thinking and planning
Jennifer M. Jenkins and Keith Oatley
Department of Human Development and Applied Psychology, University of
Toronto, 252 Bloor St. West, Toronto M5S1V6, Canada.
jenny.jenkins@utoronto.ca koatley@oise.utoronto.ca
http://fcis.oise.utoronto.ca/~jjenkins/
Abstract: We argue that theory-of-mind understanding has developed to
facilitate joint thinking and planning, defined as the creation of new men-
tal objects that could not have been created by one mind. Three compo-
nents of this ability are proposed: the mental architecture indexed by false
belief understanding, domain-specific knowledge, and the prioritization of
the joint mind over the individual mind.
Introduction. Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) are exactly right
when they argue for a middle position between individual and en-
culturation accounts of theory-of-mind understanding. Yet, for the
social domain to be seriously considered in this realm where
purely cognitive considerations have dominated, one must know
which components of theory-of-mind understanding are influ-
enced by individual processes. We suggest that the best way of
identifying the components is to argue back from the likely func-
tion that theory-of-mind understanding serves in human life.
Our proposal is that theory-of-mind understanding functions to
enable the uniquely human activity of joint thinking, which is the
creation of new mental objects that could not have been created
by one mind, and joint planning, which is the arrangement of plans
that could not be accomplished alone. Such joint mental processes
are generative. One person’s thought or suggested subgoal is con-
veyed to someone else. The second person takes in the mental ob-
ject and transforms it. Transformations, slight enough so that new
objects can be assimilated by their recipients, provide the creative
elements on which culture is based. For Winnicott (1971) they oc-
cur in the “space in between” people, a space of possibilities and
generativity in which, as a person offers a thought to another per-
son and the thought comes back transformed, something new hap-
pens. The building of scientific theory provides an adult example.
One scientist offers a theory and another, having assimilated de-
tails of that theory, offers a revision. Reading a novel is another ex-
ample. As the reader engages with the thoughts of the writer, the
reader’s mind is transformed. In both examples, thoughts are gen-
erated that are the product of two minds (Oatley 2003).
False belief should be understood not as a stand-in for theory-
of-mind understanding but as one of its components. We suggest
that three components enable joint thinking and joint planning, as
shown in Figure 1: mental architecture (structure), domain-spe-
cific knowledge base (content), and the prioritization of joint goals
over individual goals (the motivation). Taking the dimension of in-
dividual/enculturation proposed by C&L, evidence suggests that
these three aspects have different developmental influences.
Mental architecture. To identify discrepancies between one’s
own thoughts and those of another, we need simultaneously to
represent and compare two potentially conflicting mental objects.
This has been assessed by measures of false belief. In contrast to
C&L, we suggest that existing data imply that development of
false belief is most strongly influenced by individual factors. First,
the meta-analysis of Wellman et al. (2001) demonstrated that the
age effect in false belief is substantial, unmoderated by other fac-
tors, and universal. Hence, biological maturation goes a long way
to achieving it. Second, in a sample unrestricted by age (e.g., zero
to ten years old) effects of cognitive maturation on false belief
would be large and those of social factors, small. Social influences
have been shown to speed up acquisition (Cutting & Dunn 1999;
Jenkins & Astington 1996), but such influences are always demon-
strated within a very narrow age range, serving to enhance their
relative effect. Third, children without unusual cognitive impair-
ment such as autism, or unusual linguistic experiences such as be-
ing deaf with hearing parents, almost all acquire false belief un-
derstanding. Except for the unusual cases, by about eight years old
there are no individual differences in this skill. Variation in family
Commentary/Carpendale & Lewis: Constructing an understanding of mind
112 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2004) 27:1
Figure 1 (Jenkins & Oatley). The components of theory of mind
understanding and their role in joint thinking and planning
and cultural experiences becomes irrelevant: The false belief
switch gets turned on anyway.
Language provides some of the architecture necessary for false
belief understanding (Astington & Jenkins 1999; Jenkins & Ast-
ington 1996), and insofar as social factors do speed up the acqui-
sition of false belief understanding, this probably occurs through
the effect of social influences on language development. Recent
evidence suggests that this may occur through the linguistic struc-
ture of complementation (de Villiers & Pyers 2002). Language
also contributes to our next proposed component: the content of
domain-specific knowledge.
Domain-specific knowledge. Successful generative thinking and
planning between minds requires content knowledge of the domain
under discussion. We distinguish two aspects. One is the subject of
the discourse: cars, dance, engineering, genetics, and so on.
Hutchins (1987) investigated distributed cognition on a navy ship,
and reported that successful performance in a seven-person navi-
gation team required that team members had experience of the dif-
ferent roles in the team. This gave them content knowledge to un-
derstand ambiguous utterances and to solve problems in a way that
was close to the perspective of others. A second aspect is talk about
mental processes. If two people misunderstand each other, they
may introduce process talk to clarify meaning, intention, and so on.
Mental state talk is essential in such clarification: “Do you remem-
ber?” “What did you think?” “Are you angry?” The social process
suggested by C&L is clearly central to the development of such con-
tent knowledge (Jenkins et al. 2003; Ruffman et al. 2002).
Prioritization of joint goals. Only if one cares enough about the
internal experiences of others can the joint goal achieve promi-
nence over one’s own goals. Oatley and Larocque (1995) have
shown that a whole class of errors in joint planning derives from
one person being committed to goals of the self rather than joint
goals. Bowlby (1971) described what he called goal-corrected
partnerships, in which toddlers represent and act upon the goals
of others through having experienced the same thing in their par-
ents’ treatment of them. In support of this, Herrera and Dunn
(1997) found that those children who had had their own goals rec-
ognized by parents and siblings earlier were more likely to play co-
operatively with peers two years later. This aspect of theory-of-
mind understanding is thus strongly influenced by the social
processes outlined by C&L.
Conclusion. Our delineation of components of theory-of-mind
understanding allows for increased conceptual clarity of social an-
tecedents in development. False belief understanding occupies a
pivotal role in theory-of-mind development because it enables a
type of interaction between minds not otherwise possible (Jenk-
ins & Astington 2000). False belief and theory of mind are not syn-
onymous. Once false belief has been acquired, other components
of theory of mind become more important in explaining why in-
dividuals differ in their capacity to enter into the minds of others.
Reconstructing children’s understanding of
mind: Reflections from the study of atypical
development
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Abstract: Carpendale & Lewis’s (C&L’s) theoretical reconstruction of the
“theory of mind” problem offers new hope but still has far to go. The study
of atypical development may provide some useful insights for dealing with
the work ahead. In particular I discuss three issues – the boundary prob-
lem, the question of end states, and the issue of the centrality of triadic in-
teraction.
Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) proclaim the end of theories of “the-
ories of mind” as we know them. Hoorah! Social interaction wins
the vote. Out goes individualism, in comes relationalism. Old-
fashioned accounts of understanding mind – theory formation, in-
trospectionism, enculturation, and modularity – are all dead.
Long live constructivism! This view is good news for anyone who
has ever questioned the primacy of a cognitive account to explain
social reasoning. It is also good news for anyone who has ever
questioned the lack of developmental emphasis in the study of
children’s understanding of mind. So C&L’s theoretical recon-
struction brings new hope to the theory-of-mind weary.
Now, the next question is how to pull it off. There is much work
that still needs to be done. Below I take up three issues – the
boundary problem, the question of end states, and the issue of a
central role for triadic interaction. For each I suggest ways in
which research on atypical populations might give some caution-
ary insights on how to proceed with the work ahead.
The first issue is the boundary problem – a common theme in
the field. C&L aim to explain how children acquire “social under-
standing.” This broad term refers to all manner of social knowl-
edge, including knowledge of the mind. When it comes to detail-
ing how knowledge is actually constructed within social interaction,
wouldn’t it help to be specific about the boundaries of that knowl-
edge? Understanding the mind as a representational device may be
a very different kind of knowledge than understanding of social
rules, or the ability to talk about inner states and the role of social
interaction may differ for each of type of knowledge. C&L seem to
agree that different types of social interaction experience may re-
late differently to particular types of social knowledge when they
refer to Peskin and Ardino’s (2003) study. But if we want to try to
understand better how social interactions actually work in helping
to construct different types of knowledge, it may help to study an
atypical group with impaired social interaction – children with
autism. For example, if children with autism lack basic social re-
latedness, is it possible that they are ever able to fully grasp the rep-
resenting function of a symbol or representation, even when such
symbols or representations are removed from a social context?
A second problem is how to avoid the notion of “end states.” In
section 4, C&L make developmental links between children’s
early social interaction experiences and later social understanding.
This makes social understanding look like an end state or devel-
opmental outcome. I do not think this is the intention. On the con-
trary, what C&L want to emphasise is “progressivity in develop-
ment,” the idea of a movement away from an initial starting point
rather than a directionality towards a predetermined endpoint
(Chapman 1988a). But given the way the account is currently for-
mulated, it is difficult to get a sense of the nature of this progres-
sivity. The process of development, as they point out, is a problem.
Ideas about development being embedded in activity, regularity,
social practice, or conversations and involving transactions be-
tween self and others have a long way to go. And we probably need
to start at the beginning and look forward rather than trying to ex-
plain social understanding backwards.
The study of atypical development may offer some insights
here. The way that development is modelled in neuroconstruc-
tivist accounts of atypical development (Thomas & Karmiloff-
Smith 2002) is to examine how precursor states may be related to
particular outcomes given different sets of constraints or circum-
stances. Although the idea of predetermined end-states might not
appeal, connectionist dynamic systems and transactional accounts
all argue that development is emergent, that influences are bidi-
rectional rather than unidirectional, and that development in-
volves a series of changes in a self-organising system. Capacities
may disappear and then reappear later, may peak and then decline
with time, and may start as general and become more specific. Or-
ganismic and systems theories also propose changes that include
integration of earlier accomplishments as experiences and abilities
are integrated into the subsequent reorganisation of the system.
A fuller account is still needed of the way in which develop-
mental change proceeds over time from the starting state of social
interaction. However, the idea that development involves an inte-
gration or reorganisation of earlier accomplishments is high-
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lighted in C&L’s discussion of the epistemic triangle. Triadic in-
teraction is given a central role in this account as it incorporates
and integrates more basic dyadic skills. The centrality of triadic in-
teraction is consistent with a view of development in which one
form of knowledge is considered more complete or more ade-
quate than other forms of knowledge. But how central is the role
of triadic interaction? Does it supplant other forms of activity and
knowledge? Does it remain central throughout development?
Our research in autism (Leekam & Ramsden 2003) indicates that
while triadic interaction difficulties are critically important, dyadic
interaction difficulties alone are a very powerful indicator of lan-
guage and cognitive skills. Atypical groups, therefore, may give
further insights into the continuity and discontinuity of link be-
tween dyadic and triadic skills. For example, children with autism
have high levels of engagement with objects, whereas, in contrast,
children with Williams syndrome have high levels of dyadic en-
gagement with people and poor non-social knowledge. Both
groups have difficulties with triadic interaction. What kind of un-
derstanding can be constructed from these different starting
points and how is the ongoing development of this understanding
constrained, facilitated, or transformed by experiences across
time? C&L’s account may not be able to answer these questions
yet but it provides a good starting point for constructing a new un-
derstanding of children’s understanding of mind.
Rich interactions and poor theories
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Abstract: Carpendale & Lewis’s (C&L’s) critique of traditional accounts
of “theory of mind” is well taken, but the alternative theory they propose
is premature at its best, unconvincing at its worst. The proposed theory is
ad hoc and confirmatory in its findings; vague and generic in its claims; and
unjustified and unnecessary in its (putative) novelty.
Critic John Horgan (1999) recently commented discouragingly
about progress in psychology: “Theories of human nature never
really die; they just go in and out of fashion” (pp. 6–7).
I am extremely sympathetic to Carpendale & Lewis’ (C&L’s)
paper because it presents a scholarly review of the literature on
children’s understanding of the mind. However, the authors’ al-
ternative theory seems so ad hoc and vague that it conforms to
Horgan’s critique.
Ad hoc theory. When a new theory is proposed, one expects
that its authors will contrast the theory’s ability to deal with em-
pirical findings against the ability of alternative theories. When
this is not the case, the findings invoked to support the new the-
ory are not critical, but confirmatory. In the present case, the find-
ings invoked by C&L are consistent not only with the authors’ new
theory, but also with the approaches they criticize, and even with
theories the authors do not mention. For example, if the “sibling
effect” (with all its qualifications) found in children’s social un-
derstanding may be interpreted in terms of C&L’s account, it may
be interpreted also in terms of (1) the theory-theory view, which
states that theories are revised because, among other things, “chil-
dren . . . depend on a social world . . . for much of the information
they will use in theory construction” (Gopnik & Meltzoff 1998,
p. 19); (2) the simulation theory, which states that interactions
among children help them understand their own and others’ men-
tal states (Harris 1991); (3) the enculturation perspective, which
claims that “children internalize the folk psychology of their par-
ticular culture” (Astington & Olson 1995, p. 184); (4) the experi-
ential approach, which “takes into account both the conditions of
experience in the specific social and cultural world, and also the
phenomenology of experiencing on the part of the child” (Nelson
et al. 2003, p. 25); and (5) even modular theories for which “there
is nothing in the notion of modularity that prevents even matured
modules from learning and developing” (Scholl & Leslie 2001,
p. 698). More generally, when findings are interpreted a posteri-
ori they can be made to accord with almost any theory. Hence,
C&L’s theory reminds us more of an approach to which data have
to conform than one that conforms to the data.
Vague theory. C&L’s main proposition is that the development
of children’s social understanding occurs within a triadic interac-
tion involving the child’s experience of the world as well as com-
municative interaction with others about their experience and be-
liefs (i.e., Chapman’s [1991] epistemic triangle). Although true
and of some heuristic value, this proposition is inherently vague.
Without further qualitative or, better still, quantitative specifica-
tions, the proposition can be used, as is often the case throughout
the paper, to make almost any claim, to generate almost any pre-
diction, to explain almost any finding, to describe almost any psy-
chological process, and to be applied to almost any developmen-
tal phenomenon. For example, it is hardly new – perhaps it is plain
common sense – that the psychological development of children
involves an activity matrix made up of biological, social-cultural,
and psychological dimensions. In the same vein, to expect that
children do better on false belief tasks when they are actively in-
volved; to say that conversation about the mental world may be es-
sential for the development of social understanding; and to de-
clare that the extent and nature of social interactions experienced
by children facilitates their development of social knowledge,
hardly raises above common sense. What seems to be the great-
ness of C&L’s theory – its apparent consistency with countless
findings, authors, and theories – may be the hallmark of its
fragility, for only at the cost of remaining at a generic level can the
theory accord with almost anything psychological.
Consider the following example. C&L maintain that although
Thelen and Smith’s dynamic systems approach is in many ways
consistent with their account, the ideas of interactionism and
transactionalism make their account distinctly different. For, in
contrast with traditional children’s “theories of mind,” C&L’s ac-
count integrates the social and individual dimensions of develop-
ment. However, because the two key concepts of interactionism
and transactionalism were not specified, the authors’ claim would
certainly be classified as vacuous by Thelen and Smith: “Interac-
tionism and transactionalism are everyone’s comfortable buzz-
words, and the proffered ‘solution’ to the nature-nurture di-
chotomy [and many others]” (1994, p. xv).
Unnecessary theory. C&L’s account boils down to the idea that
children’s social understanding occurs within social interaction, is
gradual, and involves an active subject. But when these claims re-
main at a simply verbal level they will not be powerful enough to
sustain an alternative theory of individuals’ social understanding,
regardless of how flawed previous accounts may be. Without ad-
ditional specifications and elaborations, Piaget’s appeal to con-
structivism and gradualism and Vygotsky’s focus on social interac-
tion do not need to be repeated. In addition, they do not justify
yet another theory on children’s social understanding. Because all
subjects behave and while behaving must perforce be active, we
should be careful when proposing theories whose essence relies
on the contrast between an active and a passive individual. What
counts as a subject’s passive or active role in his or her psycholog-
ical functioning may be more a semantic problem – all too com-
mon in disputes among weak psychological theories – than a sub-
stantial problem (see Lourenço 2001).
Regarding the necessity of C&L’s account, I believe it does not
go any further in terms of claims, processes, or predictions than
previous developmental theories, such as those of Piaget, Vygot-
sky, or Selman. For example, because Selman’s (1980) theory
identifies five levels in individuals’ interpersonal understanding,
and also appeals to the idea of an active and interactive child, it
goes well beyond C&L’s seemingly distinctive idea of the emer-
gence of an interpretive theory of mind, which according to these
authors would be the second (and last) level in individuals’ un-
derstanding of the mind.
It might be argued that even if C&L’s approach were reducible
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to previous ones, the account would still be necessary because it
allows us to explore five areas of urgently needed research, one of
which would be a detailed analysis of infants’ interaction. Ironi-
cally, C&L are the first to recognize that some contemporary re-
search of this sort already exists.
In summary, C&L’s critique of traditional accounts of “theory of
mind” is correct. However, in its present state their new theory is
clearly premature – unless, that is, one favors the proliferation of
weak psychological theories and the perpetuation of what Meehl
(1978) has called the slow progress of soft psychology.
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Abstract: Although I am broadly in sympathy with Carpendale & Lewis’s
(C&L’s) version of social constructivism, I raise two issues they might ad-
dress. One bears on the question of how social understanding develops: Is
their resistance to individualism inappropriately combined with a resis-
tance to internalism? A second question concerns a more radical implica-
tion of their view for what social understanding is.
Three cheers for Carpendale & Lewis’s (C&L’s) “constructivist”
approach to the development of social understanding, with its in-
sistence on the gradualistic, action-oriented, and socially embed-
ded nature of this process. In C&L’s view, developing children be-
come, not theoretically competent in a body of folk-psychological
(FP) knowledge, but skilled social beings, able to demonstrate in
myriad ways their capacity-in-action to negotiate the complex,
normatively structured social world in which they and their fellows
are embedded. I am broadly in sympathy with this account but
raise two issues C&L might address. One bears on the question of
how social understanding develops, the other on what social un-
derstanding is.
Let me first address the question of how social understanding
develops. By taking the skills approach, C&L are able to chart a
constructivist middle way between the extremes of “individual-
ism,” which credits the child with having or doing too much in de-
velopment, and collectivism, which credits the child with having
or doing too little. Yet despite C&L’s focus on how development
occurs – in particular, given their resistance to a passive and wholly
mysterious view of social enculturation – their own account of this
process, especially in early infancy, is mechanistically vague. How
do self-other differentiation and coordination gradually emerge
within the context of parentally supported dyadic and triadic in-
teractions? It has something to do with the infant’s developing and
combining sensorimotor schemes, we are told, but the “riddle” of
this emergence has yet to be solved.
Where do we look for the answer? C&L suggest it will be found
in more detailed longitudinal analysis of behaviours that emerge
in the context of such interactions. Although no doubt helpful, this
leaves the mechanistic side of this puzzle quite untouched. I worry
that C&L’s justifiable anti-individualism may seem to blend into
less-justified anti-internalism, a resistance to investigating what
cognitive/perceptual mechanisms within the infant could support
the gradual emergence of progressively more skilled social be-
haviours.
Such mechanisms need not be so richly specified as to amount
to a prewired capacity for social understanding, nor need they be
such as to presuppose sophisticated (theory-like) processing of
others’ intentional behaviour as such. They may be quite low-level
mechanisms: for example, the mechanisms underlying early imi-
tation, allowing infants to cross-modally map their own proprio-
ceptively experienced bodily movements onto like movements
that they see performed by others (Meltzoff 1990; Meltzoff &
Gopnik 1993; Meltzoff & Moore 1992). The progressive develop-
ment and combination of sensorimotor schemes would then be
explained, in the first instance, by the infant’s primordial percep-
tual urge to map what others do onto what they do themselves. Of
course, this perceptual urge may soon be reinforced by the other
benefits that infants gain through such interactions – for example,
epistemic benefits that derive from adults’ intentional scaffolding,
but also, perhaps at first more importantly, the sensory/affective
regulative benefits suggested by C&L in connection with a lean
interpretation of early joint attention behaviour (Baldwin &
Moses 1996; Gergely & Watson 1996; McGeer 2001).
However, my point here is not to push any particular view, but
to query C&L about their general attitude towards internalism
(versus individualism). In connection with this, it is interesting to
note a parallel “neuroconstructivist” movement focused on inter-
nal structures and mechanisms that attempts to chart a middle way
between the extremes of nativism (too much prespecified struc-
ture) and empiricism (too little structure) to explain the develop-
ment of higher-order capacities through the child’s interaction with
a progressively structured, even necessarily social environment
(Elman et al. 1996; Karmiloff-Smith 1998; Quartz & Sejnowsky
1997). Given the similarity of constructivist ambitions, there may
be fruitful connections to exploit between these two programs.
Now to the question of what social understanding is. I begin by
noting that once the resistance to individualism is clearly sepa-
rated from a needless resistance to internalism, C&L may well
avail themselves of a better way to characterize the infant’s start-
ing state than one of relative nondifferentiation between self,
other, and world. However true this characterization may be, it
suggests a lack of structure and/or activity on the infant’s part that
seems to fit better with the enculturation model C&L rightly re-
ject. The infant is not a passive receptacle but active in construct-
ing skills in and through social relationships that eventually con-
stitute the skills of a genuine folk-psychological agent, that is, of a
person who manifests his or her social understanding in myriad
skillful ways of interpreting others and acting in the normative
terms of folk-psychology.
The developmental challenge is therefore not so much one of
“differentiation” as it is of transforming/having transformed early
meaningless activities into the progressively more meaningful ac-
tivities of a well-behaved folk-psychological agent. This charac-
terization may constitute a subtle shift of emphasis, but its point
is to bring out an important implication of C&L’s approach not
fully highlighted in their target article – namely, that “social un-
derstanding” is not just a body of knowledge, even in the sense of
know-how, allowing individuals to understand one another as in-
tentional agents. It is, more significantly, a regulative practice –
that is, a complex set of skills by means of which individuals regu-
late themselves in accord with the norms of folk-psychology,
thereby themselves becoming well-formed agents from the folk-
psychological point of view (McGeer & Pettit 2002). The devel-
opment of “social understanding” is therefore, in actuality, the 
development of social agency: a progressive enablement of indi-
viduals’ agential skills by means of which they are also progres-
sively empowered to act and react in self-standing ways within a
community of others. All this is quite compatible with C&L’s pro-
gram: It merely raises the question of whether their substitution
of the phrase “social understanding” for “theory of mind” goes far
enough in capturing their sense of what children are constructing
within social interaction.
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Infants’ minds, mothers’ minds, and other
minds: How individual differences in
caregivers affect the co-construction of mind
Elizabeth Meins
Psychology Department, University of Durham, Science Laboratories, South
Road, Durham DH1 3LE, United Kingdom. elizabeth.meins@durham.ac.uk
Abstract: Carpendale & Lewis’s (C&L’s) constructivist account needs
greater emphasis on how individual differences in caregivers’ impact on
the efficacy of epistemic triangle interaction in fostering children’s under-
standing of mind. Caregivers’ attunement to their infants’ mental states
and their willingness to enable infants to participate in exchanges about
the mind are posited as important determinants of effective epistemic tri-
angle interaction.
Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) argue that children are active partic-
ipants in acquiring mentalising abilities, constructing an under-
standing of mind during social interaction within the epistemic tri-
angle. Their account represents an advance on individualistic and
enculturation approaches to theory of mind (ToM) development,
but would benefit from a greater consideration of how individual
differences in caregivers influence the efficacy of interaction in
the epistemic triangle in fostering an understanding of mind. In
order for children to benefit most from social interaction in con-
structing a ToM, the interlocutor should be sensitive to and cog-
nisant of the child’s current state of mind. For example, in one of
our longitudinal studies on the social determinants of ToM per-
formance, we found that mothers’ use of mental state language
that commented appropriately on their 6-month-olds’ putative
mental states was an independent predictor of children’s ToM per-
formance at age 4 (Meins et al. 2002). In contrast, indices of the
general quality of the mother-infant relationship (maternal sensi-
tivity and attachment security) did not predict children’s subse-
quent ToM.
What is perhaps most interesting about this study’s findings is
that ToM performance was related to only certain kinds of early
mental state language, and not to exposure to mental state talk in
general. Mothers’ use of mental state language that appeared in-
appropriate to the infant’s current mental state, indicating that
they were misreading their infants’ minds, was unrelated to later
ToM understanding. Hence, although C&L claim that their “ap-
proach to the development of children’s social understanding fo-
cuses on the relations between people” (sect. 2.1, para. 8, empha-
sis in original), they need to move beyond the assumption that the
same form of relationship (e.g., mother-infant, child-sibling) will
result in the same form of interaction. At present, C&L provide a
detailed description of prerequisites required by the child to en-
gage in constructive interaction in the epistemic triangle (e.g.,
joint attention skills, a certain level of linguistic competence), but
individual differences in caregivers are not considered. Their ac-
count therefore places too much burden on the child’s attributes
in explaining individual differences in ToM understanding. In-
deed, C&L need to consider the possibility that the child’s attri-
butes may initially be rather unimportant beyond giving the care-
giver an indication of basic competence.
There is also the issue of timescale. In setting up the epistemic
triangle as the context in which children construct an under-
standing of mind, the authors focus exclusively on infancy. Yet,
they seek to use their account to explain social influences on ToM
that come into play much later in development (sect. 4.2). For ex-
ample, the facilitative effects of sibling (Dunn et al. 1991b) and
peer (Brown et al. 1996) interactions have been found only in the
preschool period, and the sorts of parenting style found to relate
to ToM performance (Ruffman et al. 1999) would appear to be ap-
plicable only to children beyond infancy. Preschool children’s so-
cial interactions involve complex abilities, such as pretense, with
perhaps several playmates, whereas the classic epistemic triangle
interaction involves a much more pared-down form of triadic ex-
change. It therefore seems that in focusing on preschool influ-
ences, C&L are trying to explain the “wrong” evidence. If epis-
temic triangle interaction is the means by which children con-
struct a ToM, the authors need to concentrate more clearly on so-
cial-environmental factors that act during an earlier period of
development.
Of course, this is a difficult task, because very little long-term
longitudinal research on the social determinants of ToM exists.
C&L mention one early social factor that has been linked to ToM
(attachment security), but they need a much more thorough crit-
ical appraisal of how such differences in attachment are related to
the child’s active construction of mind. For example, no author has
proposed a direct link between attachment security and children’s
ToM. Rather, certain precursors of attachment security, such as
maternal mind-mindedness (Lundy 2003; Meins et al. 2001) or
mothers’ internal working models of attachment relationships
(Fonagy et al. 1991), are likely to be at the root of any observed
security-related differences in ToM. The epistemic triangle is an
ideal context for highlighting how caregiver attributes – their
mind-mindedness, their willingness to interpret their infants’ be-
haviours as having intention, their representations of their own
childhood experiences – are brought to bear on what they say to
their infants and how they manage early dyadic and triadic inter-
actions. Such a focus would also enable C&L to discuss in greater
detail how atypical development (e.g., deafness, autism) may af-
fect the caregiver’s ability to interact within the epistemic triangle,
and thus, children’s ToM development.
In order for the constructivist account to explain how the social
environment influences ToM, it needs to address how the attri-
butes of the caregiver work in concert with those of the infant to
provide early interactions that will foster the child’s understand-
ing of mind. Such interactions need to do more than merely en-
sure that the child is exposed to mental state language. It is likely
that our finding that mothers’ mind-related language at 6 months
predicts later ToM performance is due in part to the fact that such
language is one facet of a broader picture of general attunement
between mother and infant (e.g., Lundy 2003). An insufficient at-
tention to the child- and caregiver-centred determinants of this at-
tunement means that C&L’s account is in danger of suffering from
the very failing that they complain about in traditional accounts of
ToM development, namely, the lack of an “integrated system”
within which social-environmental influences on ToM can be un-
derstood. A more careful emphasis on caregivers’ attributes (as
well as those of the child), and their willingness to allow children
to participate in exchanges about the mind, would provide the au-
thors’ account with precisely such integration with the wider con-
text of social-cognitive development.
Structure, genesis, and criteria
Carol A. Millera and Ulrich Müllerb
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Abstract: We agree that social interaction is crucial for understanding the
development of theory of mind, but suggest that further elaboration of cer-
tain issues is needed. Detailed description of the knowledge structure of
a developing theory of mind is necessary, and the notion of criteria for the
use of mental state terms requires consideration of the sentence structures
in which such terms appear.
Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) make a timely contribution to current
debates regarding the development of theory of mind. C&L’s em-
phasis on the gradual development of theory of mind in the con-
text of interactions between child, other, and object provides a
much-needed balance to the extremes of current accounts of the-
ory of mind development, which focus narrowly on processes
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within the individual, or the cultural construction of psychological
states, and ignore the interface between individual and culture.
However, we contend that C&L’s approach needs to be extended
and made more precise in order to fulfill its explanatory potential.
Two issues in particular are in need of elaboration: The first issue
pertains to the relation between structure and genesis, and the
second to the concept of criteria.
C&L provide a genetic account of the development of social un-
derstanding in general, and theory of mind in particular. Their
proposal, however, lacks any detailed description of the knowl-
edge structure that characterizes different levels of social under-
standing. They briefly allude to three features that are required
for the acquisition of a theory of mind: (1) the assumption of a sta-
ble, external world; (2) the importance of the realization that there
is access to information through seeing; and (3) attentional capac-
ity. None of these features, however, clarifies how understanding
of, say, false beliefs differs from understanding of, say, the concept
of seeing, or why the former is acquired at a later age than the lat-
ter. To the extent that C&L focus on the developmental mecha-
nisms that lead to the acquisition of a theory of mind, their pro-
posal is, in fact, compatible with a number of proposals that focus
more on the knowledge structure involved in theory of mind.
Other proposals have tied this knowledge structure to metarepre-
sentation (Perner 1991), confronting of perspectives (Perner et al.
2002), the embedding of if-if-then rules (Zelazo & Frye 1997),
working memory (Gordon & Olson 1998), inhibition (Carlson &
Moses 2001), and mastery of sentence complements (deVilliers &
deVilliers 2000).
Without a more detailed description of what is involved in a
theory of mind, the specific forms of social interaction that may
promote or impede the development of a theory of mind (Turn-
bull & Carpendale 1999a) remain underspecified. It is possible
that different aspects of social interaction contribute to different
aspects of the knowledge structure characteristic of theory of
mind. For example, whereas the coordination of conversational
turns may promote the increase of working memory, contrastive
utterances may facilitate perspective-taking (Sabbagh & Callanan
1998). The forging of closer links between social interactions and
the development of a theory of mind requires detailed descrip-
tion of what is involved in the acquisition of a theory of mind. In
fact, the close linkage of structure and genesis is one of the main
theses of Piaget’s theory (1967, p. 147): “Genesis emanates from a
structure and culminates in another structure” (emphasis in orig-
inal).
C&L suggest that mental state terms are learned by observing
“the patterns of activity that are criterial for the use of such men-
tal state terms – that is, the pattern of interaction for which we use
these words” (sect. 3.2, last para.). Following Wittgenstein, they
reject the notion that mental state terms point to inner objects.
However, the same arguments against the view of words as corre-
lated with things also apply to the view of words as correlated with
events, that is, “patterns of activity.” Lila Gleitman and colleagues
have cogently presented the case that words are not simply
mapped onto events in the world (Gillette et al. 1999; Gleitman
1990; Landau & Gleitman 1985). If a learner were to try to match
a single word to its contingencies in the world, the possible hy-
potheses of the word’s meaning are, if not infinite, certainly in-
tractable, especially for verbs. Mental state terms would be par-
ticularly difficult to learn through word-to-world matching, as
psychological states are not directly observable.
In other work, Carpendale argues that in order to understand
the role of talk in the development of theory of mind, one must
set aside the traditional “code model” of language (Turnbull &
Carpendale 1999a). We would argue here that although “talk-as-
interaction” is crucial to the development of theory of mind, the
language code itself is also important and must be integrated into
an overall account of social interaction and theory of mind. The
structure of language is as important for learners as the way lan-
guage is used.
Consider the verb to think. The number of “patterns of activ-
ity” that could reasonably occur in social interactions at about the
time when an adult utters the word think is huge. What common
elements could be extracted from those situations and taken to
constitute the criteria for the use of think? Worse yet, thinking is
going on all the time, yet talking about thinking is not. L. Gleit-
man and colleagues (e.g., Gillette et al. 1999) have suggested that
the child can solve these difficulties by using, among other sources
of information, the structure of the sentences in which mental
state terms appear as a cue to their meanings. For instance, men-
tal state terms and communication terms take propositions as ar-
guments. By noting the range of sentence structures in which a
verb appears, the child can gain crucial information about its
meaning, for example, that mental states relate to propositions.
As C&L point out, “language, or communicative interaction, is
the means through which children learn about other people’s ex-
perience and so develop a more complete set of criteria” (sect. 3.2,
para. 9). That set will not be complete unless it includes the sen-
tence structures in which mental terms appear. We are very much
in sympathy with C&L’s approach to the study of theory of mind.
We suggest that a first step in moving the approach forward is a
more elaborated understanding of the relation between structure
and genesis, and consideration of both the linguistic and nonlin-
guistic contexts in which mental state terms are used.
Being able to understand minds does not
result from a conceptual shift
Peter Mitchell
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Abstract: If anything, Carpendale & Lewis’s (C&L’s) target article could
have gone even further in challenging the view that a radical conceptual
shift equips children with a theory of mind. Also, the authors should have
elaborated on why their social constructivist account is more plausible than
nativism. Their argument against simulation theory is perhaps the least-
developed part of their thesis, and does little service to their cause.
Carpendale & Lewis’s (C&L’s) thought-provoking target article of-
fers a compelling account of the development of an understand-
ing of the mind, and will be welcomed as a refreshing and attrac-
tive alternative to the rather ubiquitous “theory-theory” and
modular accounts. On finding myself broadly in agreement with
most of the views expressed in the article, I shall confine com-
ments to matters of emphasis and the few areas of disagreement.
First, though, the most significant aspect of the article deserves
to be highlighted. The authors provide a convincing argument on
the gradual character of development in this important sphere of
human functioning. On face value alone, it seems much more
plausible than the popular claim from theory-theory that children
undergo a singular radical conceptual shift. As Chandler and Hala
(1994) persuasively argued, there are much more important and
interesting changes that occur both before children begin passing
a traditional test of false belief, and indeed afterwards. This brings
into focus a detrimental consequence of theory-theory’s dominat-
ing position as the mainstream account: Attention has concen-
trated so heavily on what happens at four years of age that it has 
effectively blinded many researchers to developments in under-
standing the mind that occur both before and after this time. If
C&L stimulate attention to developments taking place at these
other times, it will have done a great service. Indeed, they could
have been even more ambitious and ventured further into the ter-
ritory of development beyond the age of four years.
Another aspect of the article that needs to be highlighted is the
much-welcomed critique of Wellman et al.’s (2001) claim to have
discovered the truth about false belief. C&L correctly say that
these authors set up a straw person as an alternative to their (Well-
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man et al.’s) favoured conceptual change account. Here, C&L
show restraint, for they could have pointed out that Wellman et al.
were highly selective in stating developmental trends that would
be predicted by rival accounts. Of course, it came as no surprise
to find that children begin systematically giving incorrect judg-
ments in a test of false belief and then gradually change over a pe-
riod of months such that the probability of giving a correct judg-
ment increases monotonically. In this context, C&L should have
pointed out two obvious things:
1. Anyone who predicts sharp conceptual change should not be
predicting a monotonic trend (as Wellman et al. curiously did), but
an S-shaped function. That is, children should be predicted by this
brand of theory-theory to begin consistently giving an incorrect
judgment, and then they should suddenly shift to giving correct
judgments, and, on reaching that plateau, continue thereafter
with few or no errors.
2. Those theory-theorists who believe in a radical conceptual
shift seem not to have a satisfactory account of children’s system-
atically incorrect judgments in a test of false belief (but see Perner
1988; Wimmer & Hartl 1991). This is something that C&L also
neglect, though in fairness the phenomenon does not threaten
their account.
To get a sense of how problematical it is for an advocate of con-
ceptual change, one need only look at the way Wellman and col-
leagues struggle to provide a description of children who perform
below ceiling level. The trouble is that a theory-theorist is com-
pelled to say that a child who performs below-ceiling lacks com-
petence. But then Wellman and colleagues find they need to ac-
knowledge two kinds of incompetence. One is the incompetence
that prevents some children from responding systematically (i.e.,
they are correct about 50% of the time), and the other is the in-
competence that afflicts even younger children in a way that leads
them to be systematically incorrect. Now, if children are re-
sponding systematically (albeit incorrectly), then, according to the
principles of theory-theory, it surely implies that they are acting
upon a strategy. Acting upon a strategy seems to be more advanced
with respect to theory-theory than not acting upon a strategy;
therefore, a theory-theorist should predict that being correct 50%
of the time, where there is no evidence of strategy, should devel-
opmentally precede being correct systematically less than 50% of
the time, where there is evidence of (incorrect) strategy. This kind
of U-shaped development is what Wellman et al. should have pre-
dicted. But if they had done so, then they would have to face a dis-
appointing refutation when looking at the results of their meta-
analysis.
C&L focus on aspects of early social interactions and how these
are vital for children to construct an understanding of the mind.
This well-formulated thesis deservedly takes centre stage in their
account, but some of the evidence pointing to the level of profi-
ciency in children’s early social functioning could be interpreted
as a sign that they are even more able than C&L recognize. The
authors interpret the proficiency as a precursor of later develop-
ments; they see these abilities as being necessary ingredients for
quality social interactions, and, in turn, the ensuing interactions
will supply the grist from which children construct a better-devel-
oped understanding of the mind. Another possibility, though, is
that these are signs of an early understanding of the mind rather
than precursors. In other words, although C&L do an excellent job
of challenging theory-theories that are premised on conceptual
change, perhaps their arguments against accounts of early com-
petence are somewhat less elaborated.
Similarly, their argument against simulation theory is a lesser
feature of their article, being premised on the straw person of in-
trospectionism. Actually, simulation theory can posit that in plac-
ing yourself imaginatively into another person’s (e.g., John’s) per-
spective, you orient outward from that vantage point to see how
the world appears (e.g., Currie & Ravenscroft 2002; Heal 1996).
On finding that the world looks like X, you then use an ascent rou-
tine: I believe X. Then you step out of the imaginative mode and
can impute John with belief X. Clearly, this process does not com-
fortably fit the description, “introspection.”
In summary, C&L do an excellent job of championing an ac-
count of gradual development. Their account is refreshing and
compelling in its focus on the value of early triadic relationships.
I think that their account would have been even more powerful if
some of the emphases had been slightly different, but notwith-
standing, they have done a great service in generating a cogent al-
ternative perspective to the mainstream.
Challenging theory-theory accounts of social
understanding: Where is the social
constructivist advantage?
Derek E. Montgomery
Department of Psychology, Bradley University, Peoria, IL 61625.
montg@bradley.edu
Abstract: Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) contend that correlations between
sociolinguistic factors and theory-of-mind performance indicate that so-
cial knowledge develops from social interactive processes. However, the-
ory-theory proponents also regard these correlations as compatible with
their view of how mental concepts develop. A more fruitful distinction lies
in the differences of both accounts in explaining how mental concepts ac-
quire meaning.
Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) provide a welcome alternative to in-
dividualist and enculturation accounts of the development of so-
cial understanding. They argue that children’s mentalistic con-
cepts, at the center of social understanding, are neither passively
acquired conventions nor theoretical postulates individually con-
structed through inference and introspection. Instead, these con-
structs originate in the crucible of everyday social activities and ex-
changes.
Two issues in this area stand out as fundamental: (1) to what ex-
tent mental states are understood by young children as theoreti-
cal entities with causal properties, and (2) the mechanisms by
which children develop an understanding of the mind. Regarding
the second issue, C&L conclude that mentalistic knowledge de-
velops largely through interpersonal rather than intrapersonal
mechanisms. Consequently, they see the correlations between so-
ciolinguistic factors and theory-of-mind task performance as
clearly playing to the advantage of social constructivist theories
(see, especially, sect. 4.2). This advantage, however, may be based
to an extent on an incomplete picture of the theory-view. At one
point C&L write, “children’s social knowledge is based on action;
it is not theoretical in the sense of a set of laws formed on the ba-
sis of observation to explain the doings of other people” (sect. 3,
para. 4) (emphasis mine). This is slightly misleading since the the-
ory-view does not explain theories as forming simply from obser-
vation. Instead, the child’s social activity presents a data set which
influences the development of mental concepts. Bartsch and
Wellman (1995), for instance, regard conversations about causal-
ity and about conflicting desires as being directly related to the de-
velopment of a theory of mind because these conversations help 
children to grasp that mental states are subjective causal entities.
Theory-theory proponents, like social constructivists, regard soci-
olinguistic influences on individual differences in theory-of-mind
understanding as being complementary to their own view. Well-
man and Gelman (1998, p. 542) claim quite plainly that children
“who are exposed to very different amounts of mental state data
should acquire mental state understandings on different timeta-
bles.”
The first of the two fundamental issues mentioned earlier – how
children regard the ontological status of mental state concepts –
is the fault line where social constructivist and theory-theory ac-
counts most clearly divide. Theory-theory accounts assume that
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children regard mental states as private and internal sensations
that are causally related to, and distinct from, outward behavior
and other mental states. The meaning of children’s language about
the mind is derived from its referential association to these corre-
sponding mental concepts. But this picture is essentially wrong
from a social constructivist view, for a number of reasons (see
Montgomery 2002), some of which are discussed by C&L (sects.
2.2 and 3.2). One problem is that the theory view lacks a plausible
account of how a meaningful language could be developed by a
process of labeling private and internal referents. For example,
obstacles to word learning arising from the indeterminate nature
of referential labeling are only exacerbated when the referent is
both internal and private, and it is unclear from the theory-theory
position how children would overcome such obstacles (Mont-
gomery 2002).
Figuring out word-referent relations for various mental states is
not a fundamental component of social understanding. Children
learn about the mind through communicative interactions, and
linguistic meaning follows from how mental verbs are used in dis-
course rather than from the nature of a referent they are labeling.
Indeed, Wittgenstein (1958, para. 293) suggests that the nature of
a referent can be irrelevant to linguistic use:
Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a “beetle.”
No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows
what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle–Here it would be quite
possible for everyone to have something quite different in his box. One
might even imagine such a thing constantly changing–But suppose the
word “beetle” had a use in these people’s language?–If so it would not
be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the
language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even
be empty.
What communicative end is achieved by pointing, in a sense, to
an internal sensation? How often does a child simply say, “I
wanna,” where the communicative end is simply to reveal that the
speaker is presently experiencing the sensation of desire? One can
imagine such an utterance as making sense only in the context of
obtainment. The necessity of explicitly or implicitly attaching the
verb to a complement, “I want that x,” underscores that the cen-
tral communicative end of using “want” is to express obtainment.
Understanding the pragmatic ends toward which mental verbs
are aimed is a critical plank in the research agenda for social con-
structivists. This agenda reflects the importance of studying forms
of understanding that precede explicit comprehension indexed by
theory-of-mind tasks (sect. 5). Forms of social understanding es-
pecially pertinent to the prelinguistic child concern the commu-
nicative purpose of a word rather than figuring out, through in-
ference and introspection, a preverbal mentalistic referent.
Consequently, investigators should find that these pragmatic ends
are evident to the prelinguistic child. For example, if “want” is
used to express obtainment, then the linguistic stimulus (“the [ac-
tor] wants [that target]”) should be associated by infants with
scenes where an actor is pulling a target object toward herself
rather than scenes where the actor is pushing away the target.
Verb comprehension would be evident in this test when children
look longer at the scene matching the linguistic stimulus (see
Hirsh-Pasek & Golinkoff 1996). Experimental tasks of this nature
point the way toward illuminating the interpersonal and social fea-
tures from which mental concepts originate. And this is a central
goal for social constructivist theories of social understanding.
Toward a collaborative community of minds
Katherine Nelson
Department of Developmental Psychology, City University of New York
Graduate Center, New York, NY 10016. knelson@gc.cuny.edu
Abstract: Three points extend the authors’ comprehensive and provoca-
tive argument: (1) The idea of “entering a community of minds” is sug-
gested to replace theory of mind or social understanding; (2) learning
words and concepts through a Wittgensteinian process often involves a pe-
riod of “use without meaning”; (3) concepts based in social interaction are
achieved through collaborative – neither individual nor social alone – con-
struction.
Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) have done the field a great service in
assembling the theory and evidence for a social interaction ac-
count of the development of social (and psychological) under-
standing in infancy and early childhood. In doing so, they have also
clarified the distinction between an enculturation model of de-
velopment and a constructivist model based in triadic relation-
ships integrating individual and social dimensions.
This approach is broadly consistent with proposals and argu-
ments that I, and my students, have made (Nelson 1996; Nelson,
in press; Nelson et al. 1998; 2000; 2003; Nelson & Shaw 2002).
From this perspective, I suggest that they present an excellent
case but do not go far enough in a cultural-historical direction.
This is not to endorse a radical relativism with regard to concepts
of mind but rather to emphasize that a child’s development of such
concepts takes place within sociocultural-historical contexts.
These contexts extend beyond triadic relationships to those em-
bracing many community members who display increasingly var-
ious mental perspectives and attitudes toward matters of concern
to the community.
Based on these concerns, we propose reconceptualizing “ac-
quiring a theory of mind” as the process of entering a community
of minds. This construct emphasizes the notion of a gradual ap-
proach toward the status of member of the community wherein
matters of minds are of interest and concern and are topics of talk.
These concerns involve plural minds, indicating that the problem
for the child, as for people in general, is not just to track and co-
ordinate the perspectives of the self and one other, but to embrace
the idea that people in general have different knowledge about
and perspectives on states of the shared world.
The problem of integrating early social understanding and in-
teraction with the acquisition of language is viewed by the authors
from a Wittgensteinian perspective of language as activity. They
reject the prevailing view that concepts are acquired before words
can be learned to express them, arguing instead that children learn
concepts and words at the same time. Their brief discussion gives
little hint of the radical position they are taking on language learn-
ing in relation to current conceptions of the process. Nonetheless,
their view accords with the evidence not only from theory of mind
but from evidence of word learning in natural environments, as
they note in citing Nelson (1997). Further, a study of the acquisi-
tion of the words know and think by 2!s-to-4-year-olds in natural
home contexts was reported in Nelson and Shaw (2002; Shaw
1999). There we showed that, consistent with the claims of the tar-
get article, these words were used casually by parents in activity
contexts (playing, eating) most frequently to direct the interaction,
with fewer uses referring to mental states. Most of the children of
the ages studied knew and used the words in activity contexts con-
sistent with the uses by their parents, but their reference to men-
tal states was ambiguous at best, with little evidence of shared
meaning for these terms, despite the shared usages.
The evidence supports the authors’ claim that words and con-
cepts are acquired together; I would add the caution that words
are often “used without meaning” by the child for a long period
(months or years) during which the concept remains partial or elu-
sive. The criteria for the use of mental state words are difficult for
a learner to discern for two reasons: on the one hand, the mental
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state concept (e.g., know or think) does not exist a priori in the
child’s mind and can only be inferred from opaque references to
other words; and, on the other hand, the words themselves have
many different uses in activity contexts, only some of which refer
to mental states. Consider the mother saying “I think this one goes
here,” as she places a puzzle piece; in what way might a child dif-
ferentiate this from the statement “this one goes here?” (The am-
biguous meaning of think in everyday contexts and psychological
tasks is discussed in Nelson et al. 2003.) These comments bear on
the authors’ research agenda for the study of the development of
“shared meaning” (Nelson 1985), which they point out is one of
the most difficult and important problems (and, I would add, most
neglected) in developmental psychology.
The authors make an important point that children must as-
sume that they live in “a common, stable, external world that is the
same for the self and others.” But as they note, this assumption is
challenged when through language children learn that other peo-
ple’s experience is different. Coming to grips with this knowledge
is the entry point to the community of minds and the foundation
for the radical change in self and consciousness that takes place
during the later preschool years, of which the standard theory-of-
mind tasks have tapped one small piece. This knowledge depends
upon evidence derived in social interactions but it does not come
as a prepackaged concept; rather it requires knowledge construc-
tion from accumulating pragmatic evidence. At the same time it is
a mistake, I believe, to suggest that the construction is achieved
by the individual child, any more than to suggest that it is trans-
mitted as a social construction from parent to child. Rather, the
process may best be viewed as a collaborative construction in
which the child’s emerging awareness of different experiences and
different perspectives is supported, explained, and elaborated by
parents or others through everyday discourse.
One of the most important kinds of such discourse is talk about
the past and the future – reconstructing memories of child and
parent and forecasting coming activities. As recent work in the
emergence of autobiographical memory has shown, more elabo-
rative talk about the past by mothers is associated with more and
earlier personal memories as well as better performance on the-
ory-of-mind tasks by their preschool children (Reese 2002). This
is but one indication that theory of mind is not a separate or mod-
ular achievement, but rather, one of an integrated complex of de-
velopmental moves taking place during the later preschool years,
which bring the child to a new level of social and psychological un-
derstanding, preparatory to the further developments that will oc-
cur later during middle childhood.
Children’s understanding of mind:
Constructivist but theory-like
Ted Ruffman
Department of Psychology, University of Otago, Box 56, Dunedin, New
Zealand. tedr@psy.otago.ac.nz
Abstract: Although in general agreement with Carpendale & Lewis’s
(C&L’s) claims, I argue that (1) gradual development is better supported
by within-task eye gaze/verbal comparisons; (2) gradual development and
social construction do not contradict the theory-theory view; (3) there is
good evidence for an early developing self-other distinction; and (4) the
language–false belief link could be mediated by parental talk.
Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) argue against the notion that theory
of mind is innate. They might concede, however, that there is
likely to be some innate basis for theory of mind, such as newborn
infants’ interest in the eyes and face (Bakti et al. 2000; Johnson &
Morton 1991). This interest means that infants’ attention is fo-
cused on a region that expresses mental states so that they are ide-
ally situated to learn about theory of mind either through their
own initiative (e.g., by asking others questions about motivations
for actions; Dunn 1988), or through others’ initiative (e.g., through
parent teaching or siblings’ and peers’ influence in play and else-
where). C&L do a good job of discussing evidence in favor of this
latter path and, in so doing, do the field a service.
C&L justify their claims about gradual development using con-
trasting results obtained with different false belief tasks. Yet dif-
ferences in information-processing demands or in the concept ac-
tually tapped in different tasks weaken such arguments (Perner et
al. 1994). A stronger case for gradualism might be made on the ba-
sis of within-task discrepancies (Clements & Perner 1994; Gar-
nham & Perner 2001 Garnham & Ruffman 2001; Ruffman et al.
2001b). For instance, we found that children who passed an eye-
gaze measure of a false belief task (looking correctly when antici-
pating a story character’s return), but gave an incorrect verbal pre-
diction, could be split into two groups (Ruffman et al. 2001a). The
younger such children showed complete confidence in their ver-
bal answer, betting all counters (used to indicate the character’s
predicted location of return) on the location consistent with their
verbal answer. In contrast, some of the older children with correct
eye gaze but incorrect verbal performance showed awareness of
the knowledge manifest in their eye gaze by placing at least some
counters on the location consistent with their eye gaze. Thus, con-
fidence varied for children who showed identical performance on
both the eye-gaze and verbal measures.
Likewise, older children who passed both the eye-gaze and ver-
bal measures were not fully confident in their verbal answer, be-
cause they placed at least some counters on the location that was
inconsistent with both their eye gaze and verbal answer. In sum,
changes in eye gaze and confidence over time are consistent with
the following pattern of gradual development: (1) children fail
both eye-gaze and verbal measures (no understanding evident);
(2) children pass the eye-gaze but not the verbal measure, and
show full confidence in their verbal response (understanding is
implicit); (3) children pass the eye-gaze but not the verbal mea-
sure, and lack confidence in their verbal response (the dawning of
conscious insight into false belief); (4) children pass both mea-
sures but still lack full confidence in their verbal response; (5) chil-
dren pass both measures and are confident of their verbal re-
sponse. Increasing confidence seems to indicate a deepening
understanding, perhaps because children come to understand
better why the character will hold a false belief.
Although I agree that theory-of-mind knowledge is constructed
in a social context and understanding is gradual, I do not see ei-
ther conclusion as a threat to the theory-theory (TT). TT is based
on the idea that children form theories about the mind that are in
some ways similar to scientific theories. Scientific theories are of-
ten the result of years or decades of hard work, sometimes with
many scientists from different laboratories contributing. Hence,
scientific theories, the very basis for TT, are typically constructed
both gradually and as the result of a community (social) effort. 
Arguments against TT on these grounds are therefore erroneous.
Instead, arguments should focus on whether the structure of chil-
dren’s understanding is theory-like (i.e., possesses the character-
istics of a theory), and there are good reasons for thinking that this
is at least partially true (e.g., Gopnik & Wellman 1992; Perner
1991; Ruffman 1996; Wellman 1990).
There are other more minor issues. First, although C&L restrict
their criticisms of TT to false belief understanding, in a broader
context current versions of TT do allow for gradualism. For ex-
ample, it is a basic tenet of TT that desire understanding begins
before belief understanding, which begins before belief-based de-
sire understanding, and so on. Second, C&L argue against the
simulationist idea that children understand the mind using anal-
ogy, claiming that this presupposes a distinction between self and
other. Yet, infants understand something about others’ desires as
different from their own by 18 months of age (Repacholi & Gop-
nik 1997), and mirror self-recognition indicates some rudimentary
understanding of self by 3 or 4 months of age (Rochat & Striano
2002). This allows a role for individual development of social un-
derstanding from some time in early or late infancy at least. Fur-
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ther, there are also non-introspectionist versions of simulation the-
ory (e.g., Gordon 1992).
Finally, the authors note the robust correlation between social
understanding and language ability. One caveat is that this relation
might hold only for explicit performance on theory-of-mind tasks.
Preliminary evidence indicates that language might not correlate
with implicit understanding (Ruffman 2000). In addition, al-
though some might take the language–social understanding rela-
tion as evidence for individual, nonsocial factors affecting theory-
of-mind development, there is a way of reconciling this relation
with the social constructivist view. Mother mental state language
is highly related to (1) child mental state language (e.g., Brown &
Dunn 1992; Ruffman et al. 2002); and (2) child mental state un-
derstanding (e.g., Dunn et al. 1991b; Ruffman et al. 2002). In ad-
dition, aspects of mother language (e.g., question asking) are re-
lated to later aspects of children’s expressive, syntactic language
and vocabulary (Hoff-Ginsberg 1986; Hoff-Ginsberg & Shatz
1982; Weizman & Snow 2001). It is entirely possible that the link
between child language and theory of mind would be at least par-
tially mediated through parents’ linguistic input (e.g., mother lan-
guage facilitates child general language which facilitates child the-
ory of mind).
Wittgensteinian developmental investigations
John Shotter
Department of Communication, University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH
03824-3586. jds@hypatia.unh.edu http://pubpages.unh.edu/~jds
Abstract: I criticize Carpendale & Lewis’s (C&L) attempt to produce a
Wittgensteinian theory, as an alternative to work in the “theory of mind”
tradition, not because I disagree with it as theory, but because Wittgen-
stein would be critical of any attempt to make such a use of his work. His
concern is with descriptions, not theories.
Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) want to criticize the whole “theory of
mind” tradition in developmental research for its grounding in
“individualistic processes.” Instead, they want to propose an “al-
ternative theory” drawing on, among others, Vygotsky and Witt-
genstein, but especially on “Wittgenstein’s arguments.” I whole-
heartedly endorse their turn to Wittgenstein. However, I am still
critical of their use of material from Wittgenstein’s later philoso-
phy. For, after all, in the Investigations he notes with respect to his
methods of inquiry that:
It was true to say our considerations could not be scientific ones . . . we
may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypo-
thetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation,
and description alone must take its place. (Wittgenstein 1953/1968, No.
109).1
His argumentative and other kinds of remarks are aimed at a quite
different kind of investigation from those of a scientific kind.
Although Wittgenstein is not critical of science as such (in its
own, proper context), the whole scientific approach is in fact in-
imical to the character of his investigations. His investigations are
of a grammatical kind. Wittgenstein’s remarks are thus not at all
aimed at arguing for what is in fact the case. They are to do with
“giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of
language easily make us overlook” (No.132), with drawing our at-
tention to “what is possible before all new discoveries and inven-
tions” (1953/1968, No.126) – they are expressions of a concern
with what already lies “seen but unnoticed” (Garfinkel 1967, p. 36)
in the background to all our everyday (and professional) commu-
nicative activities. Although each of us might uniquely do our own
thing – like taking our own particular path through a landscape –
if we are not to mislead or confuse those around us, they must be
able to see how the path we are taking relates to those possible for
them; if they are to coordinate their activities with ours, they need
to know, not what we are actually doing now, but its “point,” what
it is aimed at in the future, where we are trying to get to; they must
be able to “follow” us. Whereas in scientific investigations, “we
feel as if we [have] to penetrate phenomena,” says Wittgenstein
(1953/1968), his grammatical investigations are “directed not to-
wards phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the ‘possibili-
ties’ of phenomena” (No.90). Hence, theories (and arguments in
their support) would be necessary in these investigations only if
one were convinced that the influences shaping people’s behavior
in this grammatical fashion were so radically hidden that they
could be discovered only indirectly, by a process of scientific in-
vestigation. Whereas, as Wittgenstein (1953/1968) notes: “If it is
asked: ‘How do sentences manage to represent?’ – the answer
might be: ‘Don’t you know? You certainly see it, when you use
them.’ For nothing is concealed” (No. 435). Indeed, they cannot
be concealed, else all around us would have to orient toward us as
aliens from another planet.
In other words, like C&L, Wittgenstein sees all the events of
importance in our teaching our children to be like ourselves (as
well as in our coming to an understanding of each other’s unique
“inner lives”) as occurring “out there” in the living relations be-
tween ourselves and the others and othernesses around us. But, as
Wittgenstein (1953/1968) realizes, the relevant events are of such
a subtle and complex kind, and “it all goes by so quick” (No. 435),
that we cannot easily get an overall view of them. A visual grasp
allowing us to survey all their detailed interconnections at once –
hence, to know ahead of time what might follow from what –
seems, at first, impossible.
It is at this point, however, that Wittgenstein and C&L part
company. For what C&L miss, as indeed the whole tradition of
“scientific” inquiry in psychology misses, is the fact that certain so-
cially shared influences, influences that Wittgenstein calls “gram-
matical” influences, are always ineradicably at work between us in
our use of language. Although we easily fail to notice them be-
cause of their socially distributed nature, it is the undeniable fact
that these influences are always present in our meetings with each
other which he wants to bring to our attention. The meanings of
the words we use in our utterances are not, and never can be, a
matter of our own choosing.
Because the events relevant to our instructing our children and
understanding each other’s “inner lives” are not in fact radically
hidden, Wittgenstein does not turn to theoretical claims and con-
jectures in their investigation. This is where his later philosophy
is quite revolutionary. He introduces a whole compendium of de-
vices – vignettes, dialogues with other “voices,” arguments, dra-
matic scenes, metaphors and similes, striking examples, subtle
particularities, and so on – all aimed, not at learning “anything
new,” but at “understanding something that is already in plain
view . . . something that we need to remind ourselves of ” (No.
89).
In practice, then, Wittgensteinian investigations into child de-
velopment would not involve researchers in continually arguing
for theories, either in terms of evidence derived from attempts to
test them empirically, or conceptually in terms of whether they ad-
equately encompass all the relevant phenomena or not. They
would face a different kind of task. Just as we come to know our
“way about” inside a particular new house or city by taking the
trouble to explore connections between its unique details to gain
a sense of what leads to what, so we can gradually develop the
same kind of clear understanding of what is involved in our chil-
dren coming to an understanding of others’ minds. And to be con-
fident in this way, we do not feel that we need to be able to write
out the whole town map. For Wittgenstein wants in his investiga-
tions “to replace wild conjectures and explanations by the quiet
weighing of linguistic facts” (1981b, No. 447), thus to produce
merely a description of the facts that matter in the issue concerned
– a description which, if one was initially intellectually disori-
ented,2 justifies saying to those around one (at least for the im-
mediate, practical purposes in hand): “Now I know how to go on”
(1953/1968, No.154). C&L take Wittgenstein’s philosophy piece-
meal; it needs to be taken as a whole.
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1. All date-only citations are to Wittgenstein’s works.
2. “A philosophical problem has the form: ‘I don’t know my way about’”
(1953/1968, No.123).
Social understanding and the cognitive
architecture of theory of mind
Michael Siegal
Department of Psychology, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S10 2TP, United
Kingdom. M.Siegal@sheffield.ac.uk
http://www.shef.ac.uk/psychology/staff/siegal.html
Abstract: Although Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) correctly emphasize the
importance of conversation in children’s social understanding, they ne-
glect several complex issues. Contrary to their assertion, the focus on men-
tal state processing has not been misplaced, and there is a need to recog-
nize that different aspects of social understanding are liable to undergo
distinctive developmental changes that vary in relation to social interac-
tion.
Carpendale & Lewis’s (C&L’s) article is a welcome addition to the
debate on the relation between language and theory-of-mind rea-
soning that has been stimulated in two recent related BBS target
articles (Bloom 2001; Carruthers, in press). According to C&L, “A
common problem with the dominant perspectives of the field is
that each focuses on the cognitive architecture of mental state rea-
soning, without reflecting on the social landscape in which such
reasoning is constructed” (target article, sect. 2.2, last para.). The
main motivation for the social interaction approach that C&L pro-
pose is the observation that social understanding develops gradu-
ally and that research on social understanding is overly fixated on
theory-of-mind false belief tasks that prevent us “from examining
the longer view of development” (sect. 4.1, penultimate para.). In
their proposal, C&L rightly highlight the central role of conversa-
tion in development. However, they do not adequately recognize
that this role varies according to different aspects of social under-
standing, and they gloss over the fundamental distinction between
having the concept of belief and differences in how specific beliefs
are used in judging persons and situations (Scholl & Leslie 1999).
It is no wonder that so much attention has been fixed on the
core cognitive architecture of theory-of-mind (TOM) reasoning
that involves knowledge of how mental states such as beliefs may
not conform to reality. Correlations between performance on
TOM tasks and opportunities for positive social interaction from
peers and siblings are consistent with the notions that forms of so-
cial interaction speed up the manifestation of TOM reasoning and
that having TOM may be a good thing for a wider social under-
standing (Peterson & Siegal 2002). However, as shown on tasks in-
volving predictions of the behavior of a protagonist who holds a
false belief, TOM is achieved by all typically developing children
by about four to five years of age. Modifications to the structure
of these tasks in order to ensure that children understand the rel-
evance and purpose of an experimenter’s questions reveal com-
petence at an earlier age (Siegal 1997), and, to a considerable ex-
tent, the tasks themselves really amount to tests of children’s
conversational understanding (Bloom & German 2000). Early im-
mersion in conversation with others may suffice to trigger the dis-
play of TOM reasoning even in three-year-olds, alerting children
to the fact that others are repositories of information about men-
tal states that may differ from one’s own, and from reality.
But obstacles to conversational understanding and hence TOM
reasoning can occur. Conditions such as deafness, autism, and
anarthria often do not permit the child to engage even minimally
in conversations that permit insight into the nature of mental
states. In all these cases, children may function quite normally or
even excel in situations that involve reasoning about number, bi-
ology, or physics and yet have protracted difficulty on TOM tasks.
This pattern of results is of great significance to developmental
psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists, as it points to the pos-
sibility of early auditory and attentional barriers that preclude par-
ticipation in conversations and success on TOM tasks (Siegal &
Varley 2002). The diagnosis of such barriers promises to alleviate
the social isolation of children with developmental disorders, in
the process enhancing their communication and literacy. A neu-
rocognitive approach is fundamental to the study of this aspect of
social understanding.
Unlike the concept of belief, specific beliefs do vary in typically
developing children. In particular, children may vary in their spe-
cific beliefs about the usefulness of false belief knowledge in an-
swering questions about what they and others know. C&L cite a
study by Varouxaki and colleagues (1999) suggesting that many
(but not all) five-year-olds neglect to report knowledge that can be
inferred or deny that they are ignorant despite a lack of knowl-
edge. They interpret these responses to reflect the development
of beliefs beyond those shown on TOM false beliefs tasks. Yet, in
this instance, forces of enculturation and language may either ren-
der some children to be more modest than others in their inter-
pretation of knowledge (Lee et al. 1997), or prompt children to
give affirmative or other perseverative responses in situations in
which they do not yet understand the purpose and relevance for
the task at hand (Deák et al. 2003; Fritzley & Lee 2003). Such be-
liefs involve an altogether different aspect of social understanding
from that of simple TOM reasoning – one that does need to be
considered on its own merits in terms of social interaction influ-
ences.
Therefore, whereas the expression of TOM reasoning itself can
be viewed in terms of a “poverty of the stimulus” analysis in that,
like the syntax of language, only a minimal environmental input
seems to be needed for it to emerge, social interaction can pow-
erfully influence specific beliefs about the knowledge, emotions,
and intentions of others. Gradually, the massive cultural differ-
ences in adult beliefs come to be reflected in children’s beliefs
(Hejmadi et al., in press; Shweder et al. 1998) – a development
that is distinctive from the core cognitive architecture of TOM.
Can differences in specific beliefs be explained solely through
the Piagetian constructivist processes that C&L advocate? It is
likely that different aspects of social understanding undergo dis-
tinctive developmental changes, much as does development in
various scientific domains such as biology, cosmology, and physics
(Siegal 2002). For example, in reasoning about food, particularly
the edible-inedible distinction that is close to survival, children are
constrained to initiate conversations in order to meet the sharply
defined goal of avoiding contamination. By contrast, no such con-
versations are necessarily forthcoming on cosmological knowl-
edge. For children to know about the shape of the earth and the
day-night cycle may require direct cultural transmission in school.
A constructivist account does not fully characterize either of these
changes. Similarly, the landscape of social understanding is huge.
It includes the interpretation of facial expressions and the acqui-
sition of cultural traditions of dietary laws and other social cus-
toms. We await an analysis dedicated to how children’s under-
standing of such varied aspects of the social world comes about.
Acts of judgment, not epistemic triangles
Leslie Smith
Department of Educational Research, Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1
4YL, United Kingdom. 1.smith@lancaster.ac.uk
http://www.lancs.ac.uk/staff/erals/
Abstract: Carpendale & Lewis’s (C&L’s) reanalysis of Chapman’s (1999)
epistemic triangle dealing with the coordination of interactions with phys-
ical objects and people’s communication is misleadingly incomplete. An al-
ternative proposal is outlined combining the causality of action with the
normativity of knowledge in acts of judgment. This alternative is empiri-
cal and developmental, with a focus on rich but neglected phenomena.
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Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) argue for a third alternative to indi-
vidualism and collectivism with regard to cognitive development
in terms of Chapman’s (1999) epistemic triangle (ET). This trian-
gle has a central apex in the coordination of the remaining duality
consisting in interactions with physical objects and communica-
tions with other people (target article, sect. 3). My argument is
that C&L’s re-analysis is misleadingly incomplete. My alternative
proposal is in terms of the human capacity to make judgments.
What is an object? An answer in terms of Popperian realism
about three worlds, recently recast by Bereiter (2001), is instruc-
tive: world 1 is the world of physics; world 2, the world of psy-
chology/sociology; and world 3, the world of epistemology. Trans-
lated into C&L’s re-analysis, an ET is the coordination of world 1
physical objects with minds in societies in world 2. But this is prob-
lematic. The objects and properties of these worlds are exclusive,
and so problems of Kuhnian incommensurability remain. First,
physical objects and their properties are not psychosocial. Nor are
psychosocial objects and properties physical. This means that they
have in common no distinctive properties – other than causality,
which is addressed below – and so C&L’s re-analysis has not been
carried through. Second, there is worse: Whereas physical and
psychosocial objects have causal properties, world 3 epistemic co-
ordination objects would have normative properties. Paradigm
cases of normativity include truth-values (only truths can be
known) and entailments (knowing 3 1 4 5 7 entails 3 3 4 5 12).
Nor are these the only cases in the class (Smith 2002). There is
nothing in C&L’s proposal to show how this reconciliation of the
normative and causal properties of knowing could be carried
through in the construction of true knowledge bound by necessi-
tation. Hence, ET coordination in C&L’s re-analysis names but
does not explain cognitive development.
An alternative proposal is to regard objects intentionally as the
content of acts of judgment (Smith 2002; 2003). Acts include phys-
ical and communicative interactions, and so straddle worlds 1 and
2. These interactions occur as lawful regularities in contingencies,
contexts, and cultures for causal explanation in psychology/sociol-
ogy. An important type of act is assertion and denial when an agent
makes a judgment. The content of a judgment is an intentional ob-
ject based on norms internal to the act. Norms include rules, ob-
ligations, and directives with a common logic (von Wright 1963).
They occur in all domains of knowledge and are used by individ-
uals in societies. Acts have agents who regulate their actions in
terms of norms – following Piaget (1965a, p. 159) “a subject is al-
ways ‘normed.’” The implication is not whether agents use norms,
but rather which norms these are and how they are used. Regula-
tions may occur as normative facts which are “imperative rules
whose origin is in social interactions of all kinds, and which act
causally, in their turn, in the context of individual interactions” (Pi-
aget 1977/1995, p. 69). Normative facts are facts and are empiri-
cal. They are open to investigation at all developmental levels.
Central to this developmental epistemology (DE) is the proposal
that (intentional) objects are constructed in virtue of linkages be-
tween causal facts and normative facts through uses of the capac-
ity to judge.
Here are some examples of normativity covering both adults
and children:
A. Martin Luther was directed at a religious tribunal to explain
why his judgment was to be trusted over that of his peers. Luther
argued that “I do not accept the authority of popes and councils,
for they have contradicted each other. Here I stand, I cannot do
otherwise.”
B. Galileo argued that the Ptolemaic and Copernican models
of the universe were false and true, respectively. He was directed
by the Church to accept that this analysis was erroneous. Asked to
explain why he had violated this command, Galileo insisted that
he had no memory of agreeing to it.
In examples [A] and [B], an individual is in social dispute with
peers. This dispute is manifest in incompatible judgments, which
are due to commitments to divergent norms in their societies.
C. Mat was asked to add 3/4 and 1/4, adding numerators and
denominators, making 4/8, and then through a pie chart, making
1. Asked a normative question about how to decide which answer
was right, Mat replied permissively: “it depends on which method
you are told to use” (Kamii 1982).
D. Normative commitments about number conservation were
at work in 20% of children’s incorrect responses: lengthening one
line of counters reduced their number in that “you’ve taken two
away (and so) these two aren’t there.” These judgments were anal-
ogous to a normative disqualification in a game when a player is
“sent off” (Smith 2002).
In [C] and [D], children are in causal settings influencing their
performances. Their erroneous judgments are made by reference
to norms which are divergent from those of their teachers.
E. In a study of mathematical induction, young children re-
peatedly added one counter to each of two containers, where ini-
tially X’s contents were one more than Y’s. Asked a generalisation
question, John replied “that (X) would be right up to the cover in
the sky and that (Y) would be right up to God, so then they would
still have to be more.” This was superb reasoning by analogy
through a cultural belief that God lives in Heaven on the top of
which was a cover. Thus were the contents of B still more than
those of A, and necessarily so (Smith 2002).
Cases [A] and [B] show that normative advances are made by
adults, and [E] that they are made by children, with [C] and [D]
giving testimony to the difficulties. These rich phenomena cry out
for explanation. Central to DE is how “each individual is led to
think and re-think the system of collective notions (Piaget 1977/
1995, p. 76). Norms are used in the initial “thinking” of sociocul-
tural notions, and are developed in their “rethinking.” Key ad-
vances are made from causality to normativity (Piaget 1977/1995,
p. 51), from “normative pressure” to autonomous normativity (von
Wright 1963). Quite how such advances could be made remains
indeterminate in C&L’s re-analysis.
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Abstract: Although in fundamental agreement with Carpendale & Lewis’s
(C&L’s) position, we discuss a potential source of confusion regarding the
socially constituted nature of mental states. Drawing from recent work by
Kusch (1997; 1999), we argue, more specifically, that mental states are in-
stances of “artificial kinds,” and so, stand between the more common clas-
sificatory extremes of “the natural” and “the social.”
Most of us, we suspect, labor under the impression that our
thoughts are private and that even if Big Brother scrutinizes other
aspects of our lives, at least our mental lives are safe from prying
eyes. To be told otherwise – that is, to hear on good authority that
our minds are not the private sanctuaries we have always imagined
them to be – would be unsettling. Although this was not our own
first reaction to Carpendale & Lewis’s (C&L’s) broad proposal re-
garding the socially constructed nature of the mind, we argue here
that perhaps it should have been. In their treatment of the debate
concerning the relative contribution of social versus individual
processes in development, C&L effectively “out” the often clos-
eted “individualistic” assumptions underlying much of the present-
day smart talk about children’s understanding of mind and, in the
bargain, usher in a set of perhaps even more radical claims. That
is, Orwellian threats notwithstanding, we suggest something even
more insidious is afoot in C&L’s proposal, not the least of which is
that our mental lives may never be quite so “private” again.
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Perhaps one of the more controversial claims that C&L make
in this regard turns on the so-called “contents” of the mind (men-
tal states such as beliefs and intentions) and their relation to hu-
man action. In rejecting the “causal psychological view of the
mind” that posits mental states as hidden causal “entities” driving
behavior, C&L effectively claim that our language about mental
states has fooled us all and that, in fact, “there are no such con-
tents.” All of this seems quite hard to swallow. Nevertheless, C&L’s
position is not without support. Although borrowing ostensibly
from Wittgenstein to develop their alternative view, C&L might
just as easily have taken a page from Dewey (see, e.g., his 1912 es-
say, “What are states of mind?” in Dewey 1912/1979), who simi-
larly argued that “psychical” states are the result of “retrospec-
tively” reframing our broader activities and experiences – what he
calls “organic reactions” – and, as such, “are neither antecedents
nor concomitants, in a separate realm of existence . . . but are the
very qualities of these reactions” (Dewey 1912/1979, p. 36). The
upshot of this view, as expressed in more current philosophical cir-
cles, is that “our psychological classifications are constitutive of
our mental states and events” (Kusch 1997, p. 18; see also Taylor
1985), or, phrased more polemically, that our private thoughts are
in fact “social institutions” (see Kusch 1999, pp. 321–68).
Much of what is polemical here, however, follows from a some-
what different classification issue. The culprit in this case is the
traditional bimodal scheme of classifying things as either natural
or social kinds. As the logic in this scheme would have it, if natural
kinds refer to real things in the world, then, by default, social kinds
must refer to made-up things, or, worse, to nothing at all. Mental
states, in this either-or classificatory system, must either be seen
then to somehow cut the mind-brain at its natural joints or amount
to mere “mythical posits.” C&L, as well as many others who might
otherwise agree with their assessment, are likely to be dissatisfied
with these two options. Thankfully, there are other, more reward-
ing ways to divide the spoils.
In addition to – or more precisely, in between – such natural
and social kinds are what some philosophers have come to call
“human” (Hacking 1992) or “artificial” (Kusch 1997; 1999) kinds.
To be clear, insofar as each kind involves a self-referential com-
ponent, they are all in some sense socially constructed. Still, the
degree of self-referentiality differs in important ways for each. At
one end of this continuum, there are social kinds that are entirely
created, sustained, and enforced by our collective actions without
making any kind of reference beyond such activity. That is, they
admit no “alter-reference” that, as Kusch (1997) explains, “refers
away from itself toward individuals in the physical world, individ-
uals that exist independently of the reference” (p. 17). The other
anchor point – natural kinds like mountains and rivers – possesses
these independent characteristics, although even here some col-
lective agreement is necessary in order to establish the criteria by
which we meaningfully sort them. Finally, and falling in between
these extremes, there are artificial or human kinds that possess
such an alter-reference, much like natural kinds, but that are also
similar to their social counterparts in that they do not exist apart
from human classifying and meaning-making activities – in fact,
human activities are what bring them into physical existence in the
first place.
Importantly, then, artificial kinds are no less real than any other
humanly constructed or manufactured object. More central to our
purposes here, however, is not so much what they are, but what
they sometimes become. That is, artificial or human kinds are
sometimes prone to a reification process by which the construc-
tive, or socially constituted, element is overlooked or even forgot-
ten. Kusch (1997) claims that this is the case, for instance, with
money: “‘to be money’ is easily thought of as being an intrinsic,
non-social property of certain metal discs” (p. 3). Although it
would hardly seem to require a philosopher to demonstrate that
this is a mistake, a related error is often made when it comes to
understanding mental states. Like money, mental states are an in-
stance of an artificial or human kind, and not coincidentally, are
“easily thought of as being intrinsic, non-social properties of cer-
tain entities called selves or minds” (Kusch 1997, p. 3).
Viewing mental states as human or artificial kinds (rather than
natural or social), and acknowledging this tendency toward reifi-
cation, clearly fits with the Wittgensteinian proposal on offer by
C&L and, we argue, helps to further bridge what C&L call “the
impasse between individual and social perspectives on social un-
derstanding” (sect. 5, para. 1). It does so, we claim (and here is our
main point), without at the same time drawing us toward the en-
culturation view that C&L rightly warn us against, and without
whittling away at the contribution of individual agency in the con-
struction of mental life.
The social matrix reloaded: An attachment
perspective on Carpendale & Lewis
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Abstract: The “new” theory of Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) needs be com-
pared with existing elaborated and tested models concerning the social ori-
gins underpinning the sense of being a person with thoughts and feelings
in relation to others. Illustrations are provided from contemporary attach-
ment theory and research in the context of questioning the potential legacy
of Piaget as a theorist of social relationships.
Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) are right to draw attention to the pri-
macy of social context, for our sense of self depends on the mean-
ings we take from, and give to, our closest relationships. The view
advanced by C&L is highly compatible with elements of attach-
ment theory (Ainsworth et al. 1978; Bowlby 1969/2000). Bowlby
regarded his theory as one among a range of psychoanalytic ob-
ject-relations theories (Bretherton 1998). Object-relations theo-
ries have in common the view that the primary motivation in hu-
man life is the wish to form and maintain an enduring emotional
relationship with other persons (Steele & Steele 1999).
The complicated interactive dances that typify mother-and-
baby interactions are thought to facilitate or dampen the infant’s
regulatory system and brain development (Schore 2000). As Tron-
ick and Weinberg (1997) have described, “mutual regulation is
one of the processes that shapes the human brain itself . . . Thus
the brain, like emotional experience, is jointly created” (p. 73).
What infants learn from these early social interactions is thought
to be stored in their internal working models, which denote an ac-
tive person experiencing and constructing emotions, expectations,
memories, and narratives (Nelson 1999).
C&L remind us that Piaget had much to say about the funda-
mental role of social relationships upon cognition. Piaget’s dis-
tinction between constraining and cooperative relationships cap-
tures some of the risks and opportunities of social interaction. Yet
this dichotomous model leaves us a bit short, as it does not take
into account much of the nuances in describing the complexities
of human relationships. Contemporary attachment theory and re-
search, such as those utilising narrative analyses in children and
adults (Main et al. 1985), pay close attention to an extensive range
of identifiable speech patterns concerning attachment topics such
as separation, rejection, loss, and trauma. Some of these speech
patterns, such as profound lapses in the monitoring of speech or
reason concerning past loss or trauma, are markers of risk factors
for both parent and child (Steele & Steele 2003; van IJzendoorn
& Bakersman-Kranenburg 1996; Wallis & Steele 2001). Other of
these speech patterns, sharing a robust adherence to Grice’s
(1975) maxims of “good conversation,” that is, truth, economy, re-
lation, and manner, are predictors of optimal parenting and emo-
tional well-being in children (Steele 2002).
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The theory of theory of mind advanced by Carpendale & Lewis
could thus be bolstered by incorporating the burgeoning knowl-
edge on the nature of parent-child interactions and on individual
variations in dyadic emotion-regulation patterns out of which
emerges a sense of self. Recent theorising and research on infant
development underscores how early and in what contexts the
sense of agency and relatedness may be observed to thrive or suf-
fer (Koulomzin et al, 2002; Schore 1994; Stern 1985; Trevarthen
2003; Tronick & Weinberg 1997). Further data from diverse
sources, such as facial affect recognition (Skuse 2003), are con-
verging to elucidate a more detailed understanding of emotional
development.
One would wish to heed the sympathetic call by C&L to take
account of the infant’s social context, dyadic, triadic, and beyond.
However, the extent to which this is a new call or an old echo is
debatable. Consider the continued relevance of Bronfenbrenner
(1979) or psychoanalytic object-relations theorists. Beyond
Bowlby, the words of Donald Winnicott come to mind: “there is
no such thing as a baby.” This provocative statement draws im-
mediate attention to the baby’s social context. At the same time,
Winnicott did not underestimate the paradoxical – both individu-
alistic and social – challenge of development. Healthy psycholog-
ical development, he urged, is likely to be secured by cultivating
and protecting the capacity to be alone in the presence of another
(Winnicott 1965).
C&L find support for their approach in the findings that “se-
cure” attachments appear to facilitate the development of a the-
ory of mind. In our own longitudinal attachment research (Steele
et al. 1996), we have also observed advanced theory-of-mind skills
not only among infants with a history of a secure attachment, but
also among those with a previously observed highly anxious/fear-
ful, disorganised attachment to mother (Fonagy et al. 1997). No-
tably, these successful predictions from infant-mother attachment
security at one year to theory-of-mind performance at age five
were in respect of belief-desire reasoning skills, that is, where the
child was required to guess correctly the feeling state of a deceived
puppet. Attachment security did not predict belief-belief reason-
ing, that is, where the child was required to guess correctly the be-
haviour of a doll acting on information that is no longer valid.
Thus, the relations between infants’ social experiences and the
evolution of their theory-of-mind skills are likely to depend on the
extent to which the context loads more on the social-emotional
register as opposed to the cognitive-behavioural one. Also, given
the similar performance we have observed in children with or-
ganised-secure and disorganised early attachments, we must not
assume that similar phenotypic outcomes share the same type of
social determinants. In one case a child may be advanced in the-
orising about emotion because one or both parents have provided
much helpful talk about feelings (Dunn et al. 1991a). In another
case, the child may be advanced because the parent was liable to
unpredictable and frightening behaviour such that the child
needed to know when to run or hide. The value of quickly detect-
ing (on the caregiver’s face) the imminent rise of anger before it
reaches its full-blown potential (when this has previously led to
abusive behaviour from the caregiver) cannot be underestimated
(see Pollak & Sinha 2002).
Hence, the long-term effects of early social experience are
likely to be manifest in the domain of emotion recognition and
emotion understanding (Steele et al. 1999) and social cognition
(Steele et al. 2002) and not necessarily in the broad cognitive do-
main, to which most theory-of-mind tasks belong. In other words,
a social constructionist account of social cognition may be highly
apt, but an individual-differences and emotion-focused account of
many aspects of cognition may nonetheless have continued rele-
vance.
The internalization of mental state discourse
contributes to social understanding
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Abstract: Children’s exposure to and participation in mental state dis-
course contributes to their development of social understanding. Vygot-
sky’s mechanism of internalization is used to account for this process,
which has advantages of cultural and linguistic universality. If children in-
ternalize mental state discourse, however, then their own use of mental
state language should be related to social understanding.
Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) are commended for their social con-
structivist account of the origins of social understanding. They
provide a theoretical context for recent work which has shown that
various features of the early social environment of children are re-
lated to their concurrent and later performance on false belief
tasks, tasks which are seen as indices of theory of mind, specifi-
cally, or social understanding, more generally. Their approach
brings together social and cognitive development research do-
mains, which have proceeded largely in isolation from one another
for decades (with several noteworthy exceptions), very like the
parable of the learned blind men of Hindustan examining differ-
ent parts of the social understanding elephant.
To support their thesis, C&L review research on the impact of
social discourse. This research has shown that social understand-
ing develops relatively earlier in children exposed to mental state
language in a variety of interactional contexts that include play in-
teractions with peers and siblings, parental discipline, and joint
reading with parents (e.g., Meins et al. 2002; Ruffman et al. 2002).
Further, a series of training studies (e.g., Appleton & Reddy 1996;
Slaughter & Gopnik 1996) lends experimental evidence to the
claim that exposure to discourse about mental states can enhance
children’s performance on false belief tasks. Issues arise which in-
clude drawing causal inferences from longitudinal and experi-
mental data, the external validity of false belief tasks, and the
largely unknown cultural specificity of links between relationship
variables, language, and social understanding. But the evidence is
compelling.
However, C&L have been tentative in delineating a mechanism
for the developmental relation between interpersonal factors and
social understanding. For example, in the concluding comments
of this paper, C&L highlight the recent and persuasive findings of
Meins et al. (2002) that mental state discourse of parents predicts
children’s false belief understanding four years later. They then
pose the question: “What is it about the nature of these parents’
interactions with their infants that correlates with the develop-
ment of social understanding?” (target article, sect. 5, para. 4). Re-
framed, the critical question could be: How does exposure to dis-
course about mental states lead to enhanced social understanding
in children? An answer lies in Vygotsky’s mechanism of internal-
ization (see Bruner 1986; Lloyd & Fernyhough 1999; Vygotsky
1978; 1986).
Vygotsky proposed that children internalize social speech, and
such internalization socializes a child’s practical intellect. Higher-
order thought originates in the internalization of external social re-
lationships and meanings, not by merely imitating the external in
the internal, but by recoding what is known about the external into
the internal (C&L’s “reconstruction of knowledge,” target article,
Note 2). Applied to social understanding, mental state discourse
leads to young children internalizing the notion that others can
have thoughts and emotions that differ from their own. Children
experience discourse about thoughts and beliefs of others and in-
tegrate such talk into their own behavior. This is fundamental to
self–other understanding and passing false belief tasks.
C&L actually discuss internalization earlier in the article, but it
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is not in Vygotsky’s framework. Instead, Piaget and Wittgenstein
dominate the theoretical approach of this article, even though Vy-
gotsky, and even John Bowlby, are social constructivists who have
discussed social mechanisms by which cognitive processes arise.
Piaget was simply not a social constructivist. However, emphases
on consistencies as opposed to differences between theoretical ap-
proaches are critical to developing coherent developmental theory,
much like an exchange of information between the blind men from
Hindustan before definitively declaring what they have discovered.
C&L conclude that “researchers studying talk about the psy-
chological world should be concerned not just with mental state
terms but more broadly with talk about human activity” (sect. 5,
para. 4). Data suggest that it is discourse about mental states of
self and others that predicts social understanding, not discourse
about behavioral or physical attributes. Internalization must have
a cognitive basis, and this basis may relate back to Piaget’s schemas
or John Bowlby’s working models of self and other. This is the
common mechanism of social understanding and relationship
processes that is being intensely examined in current develop-
mental research on mental state discourse (see Symons 2004).
Another advantage of Vygotsky’s concept of internalization is
that variation in language and culture are accommodated as chil-
dren internalize what they experience in what C&L call triadic in-
terchanges. Although there are potential variations between
groups in language and culture, as well as rate of acquisition of
self–other understanding, ultimately all developmentally intact
children come to some understanding that others have mental
events that can differ from their own: what has been described as
a “human universal” in self–other understanding.
But if mental state discourse is socialized into children, is it re-
flected in children’s own language use? Researchers have been
careful to examine parents’ use of mental state discourse in the
presence and absence of children, but have largely ignored chil-
dren’s own discourse about mental states outside of social situa-
tions. Children’s discourse in solitary tasks may be important to 
examine. For example, in our recent analyses of children’s spon-
taneous discourse in Canadian and Australian samples (Symons et
al., in press), children’s use of mental state language during story-
telling tasks correlated as high as .62 with performance on a bat-
tery of false belief tasks, even with general language ability con-
trolled. It would therefore seem appropriate that children’s
self-talk about mental states within their sociocultural context be
included in any developmental model that leaps from parental
mental state discourse to children’s social understanding, which
C&L address in their discussion of a Wittgensteinian approach to
private language. Internalization can be seen as a social process,
but is rendered meaningless unless specific cognitive and linguis-
tic mechanisms are added so that we can address the following:
Internalized into what? Encoded how? Carried forward in what
fashion? With what meaningful life impact? Answers to these
questions cannot be fully addressed from a single perspective.
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Elucidating relational influences on early
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Abstract: Relational experiences shape emergent social understanding,
and two influences deserve particular attention. First, parent-child con-
versation about shared experiences incorporates both implicit and explicit
information about mental states that catalyzes the social construction of
understanding, especially in juxtaposition with the child’s direct experi-
ence. Second, emotion infuses the contexts and cognitions about social ex-
periences that provoke the child’s constructivist efforts.
There have already been many responses to what Carpendale &
Lewis (C&L) are calling for in the target article: namely, greater
theoretical attention to the influence of social interaction on the
development of children’s social understanding. These include
Rogoff ’s (1990) constructivist view of the appropriation of social
cognition in shared activity, Nelson’s (1996) portrayal of the
growth of the linguistically mediated mind, and the inquiry of the-
ory-of-mind researchers into social influences on psychological
understanding (e.g., Lagattuta & Wellman 2002). Social develop-
mentalists have also been concerned with the influence of social
interaction on mental representation. Attachment theorists, for
example, believe that representations (or “internal working mod-
els”) of people, self, and relationships arise from variations in at-
tachment security and patterns of communication shared within
secure or insecure parent-child relationships (Bretherton & Mun-
holland 1999).
The view that communication within salient relationships
shapes early social understanding provides an opportunity to bet-
ter understand the processes by which social interaction is influ-
ential. This is one of the future directions for research identified
by C&L, but we believe there are at least two relational influences
that are neglected in their analysis and that deserve greater atten-
tion. The first concerns explicit and implicit features of conversa-
tional discourse between parents and children. There is now an
expanding research literature showing that mothers’ conversa-
tional style with young offspring – especially, the extent of the
elaborative detail, contextual information, and provocative ques-
tions mothers provide – contributes not only to the sophistication
of children’s event representation but also to their understanding
of emotions, conscience development, autobiographical memory,
and other features of social cognitive growth (Thompson 1998).
Maternal conversational references to people’s feelings and emo-
tions are also related to young children’s emotion and moral un-
derstanding (Thompson et al. 2003).
Mothers in secure attachment relationships are more elabora-
tive in conversational discourse (and also make more frequent ref-
erences to emotion), and this may be one reason for the working
models their offspring develop (Thompson 2000). Elaborative dis-
course about shared experiences in the context of a generally
warm, secure relationship may enhance children’s receptiveness
to the understanding of psychological states embedded within
such conversations. For this reason, we are exploring in current
research the association between maternal “mind-mindedness”
(Meins 1999) and elaborative discourse to elucidate avenues by
which attachment security and social cognitive development may
be related. This work also offers avenues for clarifying the nature
and development of the “internal working models” of interest to
attachment researchers (Thompson & Raikes 2003).
Discourse quality in parent-child conversation is important not
only for the reasons identified by C&L (e.g., as a means for be-
coming aware of beliefs; as a way of representing false belief in
contrast to reality), but also as a means for understanding the so-
cial constructivist processes within relationships that they empha-
size. In conversation about shared experiences, the secondary rep-
resentations provided in parental discourse are juxtaposed with
the child’s direct representations through experience; and the con-
vergence, dissonance, complementarity, and differential focus of
these representations are a rich basis for the constructivist
processes described by C&L, because parents and children often
perceive shared experiences differently (Levine et al. 1999).
This work therefore significantly expands the authors’ propos-
als for how relationships influence social-cognitive growth in early
childhood, and suggests also that relational quality as well as vari-
ations in the nature of parent-child discourse – including nonver-
bal features of parent-child conversations, such as affect, gesture,
and context – contribute significantly to representations of men-
tal and psychological functioning of young children. Early parent-
child conversations are important not only because they offer
guidance to young children concerning the relations between be-
havior and people’s thoughts, feelings, and beliefs, but because
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they also include implicit and explicit moral judgments, inten-
tionality attributions, and even characterological ascriptions to the
child that are likely to contribute significantly to the construction
of social and psychological understanding.
Furthermore, the context of shared conversation is important.
Contrary to C&L, conflict as well as comity is a salient conversa-
tional context because nothing focuses a young child’s attention on
differing mental states than the realization that conflict with an-
other must be managed. Thus, maternal verbal conflict-resolution
strategies in shared conversation during disputes, such as mother’s
use of justifications, references to emotions, and limited use of
threatening or intimidating tactics, predict young children’s emo-
tional and moral development months later (Laible & Thompson
2002).
The second feature of social interaction highlighted by these
findings – and largely neglected by C&L – is emotion. Young chil-
dren’s efforts to manage and comprehend their feelings and the
emotions of others are significant catalysts to understanding men-
tal states, and such experiences constitute salient interactional
contexts in which mental state differences are the focus of shared
observation and communication. This is true from the inaugura-
tion of the “epistemic triangle” in infancy, as emotions contribute
to self-other differentiation and contexts of shared reference and
joint attention (such as in social referencing). Moreover, emotion
organizes early understanding of mental states by connecting
emotion to broader emergent representations of relationships,
self-referent beliefs, and comprehension of behavioral expecta-
tions. Emotion is important, therefore, because it is not only think-
ing about emotion (which has been the focus of much theory-of-
mind research) but thinking with emotion about self and others
that stimulates early social understanding. This is one reason why
in our studies (see Thompson et al. 2003) as well as others (La-
gattuta & Wellman 2002), relational influences are especially ap-
parent in children’s conversations about and comprehension of
negative emotional events. Constraint and cooperation are both
conceptually provocative experiences for young children.
In sum, emotion is often salient to the activity that contributes
to social understanding. In early childhood, moreover, conversa-
tion about these experiences with an adult who elaborates the
child’s direct experience, in the context of a warm, secure rela-
tionship, provides a rich basis for the child’s construction of social
understanding. This social constructionist view provides provoca-
tive opportunities to integrate the focus on normative develop-
ment, emphasized by students of early conceptual growth, with
the focus on individual differences emphasized by students of
early sociopersonality development.
In defense of enculturation
Penelope G. Vinden
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Abstract: Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) view enculturation as the internal-
ization of cultural concepts given in social interactions. They claim that en-
culturation implies relativism and fails to take into account both the con-
structive activity of the child and the gradual nature of development. Their
view is contrasted with the notion of the child as both enculturated and
enculturing throughout the course of development.
Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) argue against a social construction
view, which they see as equivalent to enculturation, or the inter-
nalization of cultural concepts given in social interactions. I would
claim, however, that enculturation need not be seen as a simply
passive process of information transmission (cf. Vinden 2000).
Furthermore, if viewed as an interactive process, enculturation is
a term that nicely captures the unique role that culture plays in
human social development; a role that includes but extends be-
yond triadic interactions.
The narrowness of C&L’s conception of enculturation is re-
flected in their discussion of its supposed implications. In the first
place, they maintain that enculturation is the importing of “ready-
made” concepts from the social world to the individual, which im-
plies cultural relativism (cf. target article, sect. 3.2, para. 7). En-
culturation need not involve, however, either a unidirectional
social transmission model or radical relativism.
At first glance, enculturation may seem to be a one-way street.
A newborn child seems little able to engage in even the most
rudimentary of dyadic interactions. He or she is fed, moved,
changed, spoken to (or not) according to the wishes of the care-
taker. Crying may or may not influence these interactions – a re-
sponsive caretaker may attune him- or herself to the child, but the
child is as yet unable to attune to the other as other. As C&L point
out, young children may not initially understand the social impli-
cations of interactions and only gradually move from “behavioris-
tic” interactions (crying brings food) to “behavioristic/mentalistic”
interactions (crying makes Mom do what I want) to “mentalistic”
interactions (crying makes Mom think I’m hungry). But the child,
whether intentionally or not, certainly influences the actions of the
caregiver from the moment of birth onwards. A child who comes
into the world kicking and screaming, and whose behavior con-
tinues, for whatever reason, to be characterized by kicking and
screaming in the months and perhaps years to follow, is certainly
enculturating her caregiver in a manner quite different from the
newborn who is all cooing and contentment.
My suspicion is that there are cycles of directionality in the en-
culturation process. At some points in the child’s life, encultura-
tion may be primarily a learning of the criteria for competent in-
teractions by the novice from the expert. This is what the authors
seem to focus on. Though they want to emphasize the active role
of the child, they still seem to fall into talk that would imply that
much of the learning is of norms (situational/relational norms, not
ideational norms) already established “out there” in the world:
“children . . . learn the appropriate contexts for the use of various
words referring to the psychological world” (sect. 3.2, para. 3);
they “learn the criteria for words to talk about human activity and
then can reflect on the psychological world” (sect. 3.2, para. 9).
What C&L fail to emphasize, however, is that at times learning
may be primarily in the direction of child to other, as the other is
called upon to adjust to the new abilities or demands of the child
by relating in a new way. Enculturation is always by the child of
others as well as of the child by others.
Enculturation need not invoke a relativism that leaves one un-
able to say that some forms of knowledge are “better, more com-
plete, or more adequate” than others (sect 2.1, para. 10). As C&L
clearly point out, there are likely basic universal shared practices
that are common to all human experience. But it is also well doc-
umented that differences exist among cultures at quite a funda-
mental level – for example, the degree to which the individual or
the group is emphasized (cf. Lillard 1998; Vinden & Astington
2000). If a cultural group puts a low priority on talking about in-
ner states, or does not conceive of them as particularly personal
and individual, then the public criteria for learning about thoughts
and emotions might be quite different from the typical public cri-
teria in a culture where people are seen as individuals with dis-
crete, personal, private inner lives. Hence, although understand-
ing and getting along with other human beings may be universal,
what that means and the criterial situations for learning about get-
ting along can vary widely from culture to culture. And if the cri-
teria vary, why would the understanding constructed from those
situations not vary also?
Certain kinds of criterial situations may provide knowledge that
is better or more adequate for living in those situations. There is
a certain kind of circularity here, but not, I think, a vicious sort.
For example, when living on a small atoll in the Pacific Ocean,
where one’s friends, neighbors, and relatives are all the same peo-
ple, individuality might not be as adaptive as communality. The
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same might be true for those living on an African-American inner-
city “atoll” within a predominantly Caucasian middle-class city.
Once an emphasis on group rather than individual processes is es-
tablished, the situations in which that understanding is fostered
become criterial and could tend to self-perpetuation. But what
may work well on an atoll may not work elsewhere – what is bet-
ter, more complete, or more adequate in one social or cultural sit-
uation may not be so in another.
That being said, there is still no reason per se why cultural vari-
ability need go hand-in-hand with a view of passive transmission
of mental concepts to the child. The child is influential not only in
constructing his or her understanding but also in defining the con-
text in which learning takes place, and even the content of what
should be learned. Furthermore, individuals are not the only
things that interact in relationship – groups, societies, cultures all
relate and influence one another.
In short, although I applaud C&L’s efforts to make social inter-
action the center of development, rather than merely an add-on
explanatory variable, I feel they are not radical enough. Seeing tri-
adic interactions as the epicenter of development does not neces-
sitate relegating cultural variability to the sidelines. Children’s de-
velopment is not constructive only in the sense that they gradually
cobble together cultural criteria for language use and other be-
haviors. It is also constructive because part of their development
consists in constructing the criteria for themselves and for others.
Without this active transforming of the world, caregivers would
never adapt to their children, peers would never learn how to
pacify or enrage their playmates, and societal and cultural change
would not exist.
Interpretation based on richness of
experience: Theory development from 
a social-constructivist perspective
Arlene S. Walker-Andrews and Judith A. Hudson
Department of Psychology, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ 08854-8020.
arlenewa@rci.rutgers.edu jhudson@rci.rutgers.edu
http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~arlenewa/
http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~jhudson/
Abstract: The view that children’s understanding of mind is constructed
through social interaction is consistent with other social-constructivist
models. We provide examples of similar claims in research on emotion per-
ception, pretense understanding, autobiographical memory, and event
knowledge. Identification of common elements from such socio-cultural
perspectives may lead to greater theoretical integration and provide a new
framework for exploring human development.
Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) propose that the development of 
understanding of others’ minds grows not from a kernel of knowl-
edge already in a child’s brain, nor from the assumption of envi-
ronmental-cultural norms, but through dynamic, ongoing inter-
actions with caregivers and the physical world. This is a welcome
step into the already burgeoning literature in a number of areas
– motor development, cognitive development, socio-emotional
development – spurred by theories such as dynamic systems, the
ecological approach, and contextual approaches. The view that
children’s understanding of mind is part of the larger process of
social understanding and is constructed through social interac-
tion is consistent with other models that attribute a critical role
to the process of social interaction in development. We provide
examples of similar claims in research on the development of the
perception of emotion, pretense understanding, autobiographi-
cal memory, and event knowledge. These lines of research pro-
vide support for the notion that richness of experience, not rich
interpretation, provides an interpretive framework for under-
standing children’s emerging understanding. They also indicate
that social interaction is fundamental to human development
across a wide range of social, emotional, cognitive, and perceptual
phenomena.
C&L argue that development of an understanding of others’
minds (intentions, beliefs, emotions) is not “all or none.” Research
on infants’ understanding of emotional expressions supports this
contention. Whether an infant perceives an emotional expression
and responds to it depends on the age of the infant, the expression
that is being enacted, the task by which the experimenter mea-
sures perception, the definition of perception (detection, dis-
crimination, recognition, understanding), and the context in
which the expression is encountered (Walker-Andrews 1997). In-
fants as young as three months show intermodal matching for
their mothers’ happy and sad facial-vocal expressions, but not for
expressions posed by a female stranger (Kahana-Kalman &
Walker-Andrews 2001) Similarly, infants show intermodal match-
ing for fathers’ happy and sad facial-vocal expressions only when
they have highly involved fathers (Montague & Walker-Andrews
2002). Lest one think that this is because infants are merely ex-
posed to maternal expressions more than paternal expressions, re-
fer to research by Dunn and colleagues (Dunn et al. 1991a; 1991b)
that illustrates the importance of the family context and interac-
tions in the perception of emotion by children.
Children’s understanding of the pretense of others also devel-
ops gradually (Harris 1994b). For example, Walker-Andrews and
Kahana-Kalman (1999) concluded in a study of pretense under-
standing that “toddlers move from appreciating that an adult part-
ner initiated a game of pretend to understanding the pretend stip-
ulations of the adult, and finally, at 24 months, to using that
understanding to enter into collaborative pretend play” (p. 531).
In particular, some 15- and 18-month-olds imitated the experi-
menter’s pretend transformations as a way to coordinate actions
with the experimenter. To borrow from the description of chil-
dren’s involvement in deception, the toddlers entered into the
pretense “with only partial understanding and such experience is
the context for learning” (target article, sect. 4.1, para. 6) about
such mental states as pretense and deception. The comprehension
of another’s pretense emerges early in the second year, but the
ability to tailor one’s pretend actions in that interaction is not
demonstrated until later.
C&L propose that conversation provides a context for children
to interpret and talk about the mental world. Conversation also
provides a context for thinking and talking about past events, as
demonstrated by extensive research on the development of young
children’s autobiographic memory (Reese 2002). Although chil-
dren’s contributions to conversations at two to three years consist
solely of short answers to specific questions, over time, children
develop the narrative skills to discuss the past more fully and to
eventually construct independent memory narratives (Haden et
al. 1997; Hudson 1990; Nelson 1993). Through conversation chil-
dren learn how to remember, not what to remember; they do not
simply repeat what was told to them but acquire memory and nar-
rative skills (Hudson 1990). This distinction is similar to C&L’s ar-
gument that through social interaction, children do not simply
adopt socially available knowledge, but rather, construct their own
understandings within the interactional context. Research has also
shown that individual differences in parents’ reminiscing style af-
fect children’s independent narrative ability in later years, indi-
cating that characteristics of the dyadic relationship influence chil-
dren’s autobiographic memory development (Reese et al. 1993).
Finally, research on the development of event knowledge illus-
trates the tension between performance factors and underlying
competence discussed by C&L. A large body of research has
shown that children’s generalized event representations (GERs)
provide a cognitive context for the development of memory, plan-
ning, narrative, inferential reasoning, and temporal understanding
(Nelson 1986). Before children display these skills in novel, de-
contextualized, experimental tasks, they accurately use temporal
language, draw appropriate inferences, construct future plans, re-
member stories and events, and construct story narratives when
reasoning about familiar events in meaningful interactive contexts
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(Hudson 1993; Hudson et al. 1995). This reprises the issue of the
role of partial understanding in development. Researchers exam-
ining the role of event knowledge in children’s cognitive develop-
ment have argued that knowledge displayed within familiar con-
texts provides the foundation for later, more generalized skill. Just
as a lexicon for talking about the mental world provides children
with a cognitive resource for reflection and interpretation, chil-
dren’s GERs allow initial “understanding-in-action” to be consol-
idated through reflection on internal event representations.
We propose that a more social-interactional approach is needed
at this stage of social-constructivist theory development. All of
these lines of research stem from approaches emphasizing the so-
cial-cultural embeddedness of development. Although specific
mechanisms may vary, they constitute a “family” of social con-
structivist approaches. Our single concern with the C&L model is
that it may not be adequately inclusive. The tendency to label as
“passive enculturation” approaches that vary in small degrees
from the C&L position may limit the potential for integration
across research domains. Rather than focusing on differences
from an individualist framework, joint attention on common prin-
ciples and collaborative interactions may be more fruitful for the-
ory development.
What infants know about intentional action
and how they might come to know it
Camille Wilson-Brune and Amanda L. Woodward
Department of Psychology, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637.
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Abstract: Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) propose that social knowledge is
constructed from triadic interactions. This account generates testable pre-
dictions concerning social knowledge in infancy. Current evidence is not
entirely consistent with these predictions. Infants possess action knowl-
edge before they engage in triadic interactions, and triadic use of an ac-
tion does not always precede knowledge about the action.
Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) propose an ontogenetic relation be-
tween interacting and knowing: By participating in increasingly
well-organized social exchanges, children come to construct a
theory of mind. Evaluating this proposal requires measuring both
social actions and social knowledge. Given this requirement,
C&L’s review reveals striking gaps in the empirical record. The in-
fant work presented concerns assessments of social behavior, al-
though underlying social cognition (or lack thereof) is only in-
ferred. The studies of older children concern social cognition as
assessed in interview studies, with factors such as parenting style
standing as proxies for children’s social interactions. A full account
must address both gaps. We will focus on the first.
C&L propose that triadic interactions, in which the infant and
caretaker mutually coordinate attention on the same object, are
necessary for the construction of social knowledge and, ultimately,
a theory of mind. Because infants do not engage in triadic inter-
actions until the end of the first year of life, this account predicts
that they have not yet begun to construct social knowledge. C&L
further predict that, once triadic interactions are established, so-
cial behavior relevant to a particular aspect of intentional knowl-
edge will emerge before the knowledge itself does. Recent evi-
dence from our laboratory and others’ speaks to these predictions.
This evidence indicates that triadic interactions and social knowl-
edge do not always travel together in ontogeny.
Aspects of social knowledge are present months before infants
engage in triadic interactions. Infants represent actions not as
purely physical motions through space but rather as directed at
objects or states of affairs (Baldwin et al. 2001; Csibra et al. 2003;
Gergely et al. 1995; Moore 1999; Woodward 1998; Phillips et al.
2002). To illustrate, in one study (Woodward 1998), 6-month-old
infants viewed a person reaching for and grasping an object. Fol-
lowing habituation, infants demonstrated a stronger novelty re-
sponse to test events that disrupted the relation between agent
and object than to test events that maintained this relation while
varying the spatial properties of the reach. Infants did not respond
in this way when viewing inanimate objects that touched or
grasped other objects, or when viewing manual contact that ap-
peared purposeless to adults (Woodward 1999). Therefore, in-
fants’ social knowledge reflects a foundational aspect of mature
conceptions of intentional action – namely, that certain human ac-
tions are object-directed (see Barresi & Moore 1996).
This work highlights infants’ knowledge about instrumental ac-
tions. C&L focus on interactions in which infant and caregiver
share attention, as expressed by looking and pointing. But these
are just a subset of the actions that adults view as intentional. In-
deed, many investigators have elucidated infants’ developing abil-
ity to extract the goals behind observed instrumental actions
(Gergely et al. 2002; Meltzoff 1995; Wenner & Bauer 1999; Wood-
ward & Sommerville 2000). Our recent findings are consistent
with the thesis that experience contributes to infants’ construction
of social knowledge; however, in this case what matters appears to
be infants’ experience of acting on objects rather than of partici-
pating in triadic interactions (Sommerville & Woodward, in press).
Recent studies also elucidate infants’ knowledge about the ac-
tions involved in triadic exchanges. Infants begin to follow gaze
during the first year of life, but, as many have noted, this observa-
tion alone does not tell us whether infants understand the “look-
ing at” relation (e.g., Barresi & Moore 1996). Several studies in-
dicate that by 12 months, infants encode looking and pointing as
relational (Moore 1999; Phillips et al. 2002; Woodward 2003;
Woodward & Guajardo 2002). Prior to 12 months, infants respond
to gaze by orienting their own attention but seem not to encode
the relation between looker and object (Woodward 2003). This
pattern of findings is consistent with C&L’s proposal. Infants be-
gin to understand the looking relation after several months of re-
sponding appropriately to shifts in others’ gaze.
However, the emergence of pointing suggests that this pattern
does not hold in all cases. Knowledge about pointing is evident be-
fore infants employ it robustly in triadic interactions. Infants’ first
points are often described as indexing their own attention rather
than being communicative (Bates et al. 1979; Schaffer 1984a). It
is not until 12 to 15 months of age that infants produce points in
a clearly communicative manner and follow others’ points to their
distant referents (Bakeman & Adamson 1986; Carpenter et al.
1998; Desrochers et al. 1995). Furthermore, infants do not use
contextual cues to determine when to point until around their sec-
ond birthday (e.g., Dunham et al. 2000; Moore & D’Entremont
2001). Consistent with the thesis that experience is related to
knowledge, at 10 months, those infants who produce object-di-
rected (but not clearly communicative) points understand ob-
served points as relational (Woodward & Guajardo 2002). There-
fore, although experience may contribute to infants’ knowledge
about pointing, the evidence suggests that the relevant experience
is not triadic in nature.
To conclude, recent findings indicate that although triadic in-
teractions may be one source of infants’ social knowledge, they are
not the sole source. Infants are sensitive to the object-directed-
ness of instrumental actions well before the onset of triadic inter-
actions and come to understand certain actions before using them
in triadic interaction. In addition to interaction, firsthand agentive
experience is a likely contributor to this system of knowledge. That
is, there seems to be more than one route into social understand-
ing. This may account for the fact that all normally developing
children construct a theory of mind despite the existence of broad
cross-cultural variation in the nature of early triadic interactions
and habits of talk about the mind (Lillard 1998; Rogoff et al. 1993).
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Constructing an understanding of mind 
with peers
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Abstract: Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) stress the importance of social in-
teraction for social understanding, but focus on the adult-child relation-
ship. In the present commentary, we discuss the development of social un-
derstanding within early peer relationships. We argue that peer interaction
stretches the limits of early social understanding, thereby providing both
unique challenges and unique opportunities for constructing an under-
standing of others’ minds.
In their target article, Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) assert that chil-
dren construct social understanding through interactions with
others and that social knowledge is fundamentally based on action
within these relationships. In particular, they emphasize that early
triadic interaction facilitates the development of language and that
conversation about the mental world, in turn, permits children to
perceive, understand, and reflect on their own and others’ mental
and emotional states. We share the authors’ view that social inter-
action contributes to social understanding. However, we believe
that the authors have limited their argument by focusing so heav-
ily on early parent-child interaction. In the present commentary
we discuss the contributions of early peer interaction to social skill
and social understanding. Although C&L acknowledge the “sib-
ling effect” (Perner et al. 1994) and the role of cooperative inter-
actions with age-mates for children’s use of mental state terms
(Brown et al. 1996), they do not discuss how interactions with sib-
lings and peers differ from adult-child interactions, and the possi-
bly unique role played by interactions with other children in gen-
erating early social understanding.
C&L argue that “children’s initial, fragile social understanding”
is “at first evident when supported by social interaction” (sect. 4.1,
para. 9, emphasis ours) and that “children gradually construct so-
cial understanding through the regularities they experience in in-
teracting with others” (sect. 3, para. 1, emphasis ours). In their
formulation, the young child’s adult partner supports social en-
gagement through regular and routinized interaction and, in that
context, interprets and labels the child’s mental states. From our
view, this type of cooperative interaction, although probably ini-
tially necessary for children’s nascent social understanding, can
take children only so far toward a more general understanding of
mind. In routinized interactions, especially with a sensitive adult
who has complex mental state understanding, the child has little
need to predict the partner’s behavior or to communicate his own
mental states. When social partners’ behavior is predictable, and
when routines and communication are either built-in or highly
learned, having to read minds is not necessary.
Peer interaction, in contrast, provides a social context in which
children’s partners are unpredictable and their goals, intentions,
and desires are often difficult to read even for sensitive, mind-
minded mothers. The challenges of interacting with peers may re-
quire that children be explicit about communicating their inten-
tions. Consistent with this notion, Smiley (2001) found that
toddlers were more likely to state their future intentions in peer
play than in mother-child interactions. Furthermore, peer inter-
action also provides children their only opportunity for true coop-
eration, defined by both Piaget (1932/1965b) and C&L as “inter-
action among equals.” Thus, peers pose both unique challenges
and unique opportunities for the growth of early social under-
standing.
Children are capable of establishing and maintaining positive
peer interactions in play and in cooperative problem-solving by
the end of their second year (Brownell et al. 2003; Eckerman et
al. 1989; Howes et al. 1989). Without a way to “make sense” of
other children’s behavior, the toddler cannot anticipate a peer’s
behavior, hence cannot behave in a coordinated, reciprocal, ac-
commodating manner, and peers’ behavior will simply be in-
scrutable for the very young child. The fact that children can im-
itate one another by 14 to 18 months (Eckerman et al. 1989;
Hanna & Meltzoff 1993) but cannot cooperate with one another
until 24 months or later (Brownell & Carriger 1990; Brownell et
al. 2003; Tomasello et al. 1993) suggests that their early under-
standing of others’ minds, as constructed in adult-child relation-
ships, remains too incomplete to serve interaction more generally.
Moreover, the social understanding that develops in the context of
early peer play is not a function of mental state talk between peers.
Nonverbal interaction may be even more important for children’s
developing social understanding of one another. Mutual imitation,
for example, may provide the first means for children to begin
making sense of their peers’ behavior and may be the grist for gen-
erating initial understanding of peers’ intentions (Eckerman et al.
1989).
Social understanding not only arises in situations of peer coop-
eration and positive interaction around a shared theme, goal, or
desire, but may also be adaptive and necessary in instances of com-
petition. It is notable that possession struggles and conflicts, which
constitute a relatively high proportion of early peer interactions
(Brownell & Brown 1992; Hay & Ross 1982), are unique to child-
child interactions. When one toddler approaches another, the
child must figure out whether the peer intends to hug her, play
with her, take away her favorite toy, or something else. Caregivers
are not always available to assist children in interpreting and un-
derstanding such situations, and even when they are present, they
often prefer to let children figure it out on their own. Hence, chil-
dren may be motivated to learn how to read other children’s men-
tal states and to understand the relations between mental states
and behavior so that they can effectively negotiate ambiguous,
emotionally charged situations. Such interactions may also pro-
vide children insight into the nature of their own emotional expe-
riences (Balaraman et al. 2003).
We do not mean to suggest that parent-child relationships and
peer relationships are unconnected, however. Young toddlers who
are more responsive to an adult’s bids for joint attention are also
better at coordinating their actions with a peer toward a common
goal (Brownell et al. 2003). Toddlers who have more positive ex-
periences in play with their mothers engage in more complex so-
cial play with their peers (Howes & Stewart 1987; Zerwas &
Brownell 2003). Thus, the social understanding children construct
during interaction with adults is also brought to bear on their in-
teractions with peers. Nevertheless, establishing and maintaining
positive interactions with peer partners pose distinctive challenges
both affectively and cognitively. Peer interaction thereby stretches
the limits of children’s early social understanding and makes
unique contributions to its development.
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Abstract: We explore three types of criticisms of our theory on
the development of children’s social understanding. We reject
suggestions that we offer nothing new to traditional theories of de-
velopment or recent “social” accounts of “theory of mind.” Sec-
ond, we take the point that there are grounds for improving our
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account of dyadic interaction in infancy but reject claims that we
have not sufficiently accounted for how we incorporate the no-
tions of criteria and structure into the theory. Third, we accept that
the epistemic triangle, as defined, would benefit from an affective
dimension and such a formulation could be used to describe the
dynamic of developmental change from infancy to beyond early
childhood. We still feel that the combination of Wittgenstein, Vy-
gotsky, and Piaget remains as an antidote to the flaws in current
“theories of mind” approaches to social understanding.
The squirrel does not infer by induction that it is
going to need stores next winter as well.
—Wittgenstein, On Certainty (1969, para. 287)
For us the starting issue was that the dominant theories in
the area of the development of children’s social under-
standing, referred to as “children’s theories of mind,” view
the problem that children must solve as inferring the pres-
ence of and learning about unobservable inner mental
states. Wittgenstein’s rejection of the idea of “squirrel cog-
nition” summarizes our suspicions about an account of early
human development that imputes the child with a social un-
derstanding that develops in an individualistic manner not
grounded in shared practices. The dominant accounts ini-
tially made little reference to the child’s experiences except
to examine the young theoretician’s database, although they
are now accommodating to research on children’s social ex-
perience. Hence, we turned to Wittgenstein and the very
traditions within developmental psychology that the theory
of mind tradition set itself up against. The target article was
an attempt to pull together these diverse views in order to
get a child’s eye view of development. This we assume to be
much more piecemeal and embedded in experience than
recent accounts have suggested.
We have been both moved and inspired by the commen-
taries and strongly recommend them as worthwhile read-
ing. In writing this Response, we feel we could have done
more justice to about half the number and apologize to
those who we simply mention; but we were restricted to
about 200 words per commentary. So we have concentrated
on some much more than others – and mainly those we felt
challenged us more (they tended to be those we thought
were closest to us in theoretical terms). The response is di-
vided into three sections: general criticisms, specific con-
cerns with our theory, and the many elegant extensions that
were recommended. Far from criticizing our plea to make
theories of the development of social understanding more
socially embedded, many of these commentaries empha-
size just how rich the child’s social experiences are and how
we did not go far enough.
R1. Is our theory needed? Or should it be
upended?
There are three ways in which the commentators question
whether our position is necessary: One group, who are dis-
cussed in the first subsection that follows, takes the long
view and suggests that our approach is hardly new in its dis-
tillation of fine theories. The second part deals with a dif-
ferent view – that we have been trumped by recent socially
embedded criticisms of theory of mind – and we discuss
this in section R1.2. Finally, in sections R1.3 and R1.4 we
reflect on the view that traditional accounts of theory of
mind worked just nicely without the critical analysis that we
offer, particularly the need for a Wittgensteinian analysis.
R1.1. Piaget and Vygotsky – again?
We are pleased that many of our commentators agree that
a social perspective has long been neglected in the area
known as children’s theories of mind. And, like them, we
believe it is needed. But have we simply recycled classic de-
velopmental theories in this article? Certainly, Lourenço
assumed that we were making more grandiose claims about
proposing a completely new theory than we were.1 We
make it clear that we draw on Piagetian and Vygotskyian
theory – ideas with extensive histories. Thus, we agree with
Chesnokova that the ideas we are working with have long
histories, and we thank her for adding Luria’s name to the
list of theorists we rely on. Sokol & Lalonde also bring in
Dewey and this list could be extended considerably to in-
clude the influence of Janet, Baldwin, Pierce, Werner, Büh-
ler, and G. H. Mead. Tracing the extensive histories of the
ideas in question was beyond the scope of our target article
and we refer readers to excellent sources such as Overton
(1998a) and Valsiner (1998).
So, is it “new” to draw upon Piaget and Vygotsky?
Lourenço asserts that “without additional specifications
and elaborations” Piaget and Vygotsky’s theories “do not
need to be repeated.” Ironically, he has felt it necessary to
contribute to the task of repeating these ideas to fend off
common misinterpretations embedded in the scientific
folklore (Lourenço & Machado 1996). In our defense, there
is nothing we know of in Piaget and Vygotsky’s work about
issues equivalent to Wittgenstein’s notion of criteria. This
we draw from Chapman’s (1987a; Carpendale et al. 1996)
work on operational thinking and extend to children’s rea-
soning about social matters. As many commentators point
out, this is no straightforward matter and we turn to some
of these issues below.
Perhaps implicitly criticizing our reliance on Piaget,
Symons and Fernyhough suggest that we should instead
rely more on Vygotsky. Vygotskian ideas, as Chesnokova
rightly points out, are embedded in our approach.2 Symons
argues that we are tentative in outlining a mechanism of de-
velopment and suggests we should employ Vygotsky’s idea
of internalization. However, this mechanism is far from
fully specified, and Vygotsky himself acknowledged that “as
yet the barest outline of this process is known” (1978, p. 57).
Clearly, Vygotsky’s theory needs to be fleshed out, as Chap-
man (1991) and Fernyhough (see also Fernyhough 1996)
have done to some extent. Thus, we maintain that there is
no necessary incompatibility between Piaget’s views and
Vygotsky’s views on social relations and we feel that the for-
mer’s account of internalization is required to flesh out the
ideas of the latter.
R1.2. Are we merely repeating current social
constructivist theories?
A few commentators imply that our ideas echo recent ones
within the theory of mind tradition (see explicit statements
in Astington and Steele). Astington questions how new
our approach is and groups us with a family of similar the-
orists, some of whom are also commentators (Astington,
Fernyhough, Montgomery, Nelson; see also Harris, in
press). Astington is correct in pointing out areas of agree-
ment between our article and the theorists she lists. We
could also go further than Astington in identifying theorists
with whom we have much in common concerning infant de-
velopment, such as Hobson, and Barresi & Moore. We
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cite most of these authors in the text and acknowledge how
they have influenced our ideas. However, we suggest both
that there are clear differences between the authors she
groups together and that we differ from all of them. For
some, the differences relate to matters of detail. For exam-
ple, Montgomery and Fernyhough still need an account of
social development in infancy in order, among other rea-
sons, to overcome the problems Bickhard points out in his
commentary concerning the development of prelinguistic
normativity. We agree with Astington and Howe that Judy
Dunn’s work has been seminal in establishing a need for a
socially embedded model of mental state understanding
and our theory is premised upon that assumption. It is work
like Dunn’s that stimulates a need for a detailed theoretical
account and we suggest that a constructivist one provides
an answer.
Many of the theorists cited by Astington differ from us
over how children learn the meaning of mental verbs. For
example, she groups us with Garfield et al. (2001). Here, if
we stick to the general issue of the importance of language
and social interaction, we could say we are in agreement.
Indeed, Garfield et al. coordinated a great deal of evidence
and advanced convincing arguments. However, we differ
on the very starting problem that children have to solve.
That is, are mental states some sort of hidden inner object
that must be inferred? Like Montgomery but unlike oth-
ers in Astington’s list, we suggest that this is the wrong way
of setting up the problem that children must solve. Bick-
hard and Sokol & Lalonde also present complementary
positions in their commentaries. Astington acknowledges
that there are differences, but considers these to be only de-
tails. However, this is where the devil is, and discussion of
such differences is essential for further theoretical devel-
opment.
There is an interesting implication in the fact that
Lourenço and Chesnokova say the theory is old and they
mean it is Piagetian and Vygotskian, whereas Astington
says it is old but she means it is the same as a family of the-
ories including Nelson (1996), Harris (in press), and her-
self. But someone has to be wrong, or not quite right. Un-
less we are mistaken, the theorists listed by Astington either
do not mention Piaget or explicitly distance themselves
from Piaget’s fundamental ideas (see, e.g., Perner & Ast-
ington 1992). It seems that everyone recognizes something
of themselves in our approach. Alternatively, it could be
that they might be happy with the interpretation of Piaget
that we draw on.
Lourenço further argues that our proposal is vague and
ad hoc, and that a weakness of our approach is that we can
explain anything by it. It is clear from the commentaries
that this is a weakness shared by all the other theories in this
area. German & Leslie argue that modular theory has no
difficulty accommodating to the evidence that social inter-
action is important in social development. In fact, they now
allow the inclusion of domain general processes in their
model, which indicates that they are moving away from
most other modular positions, apparently towards theory
theory. Gerrans (2002, p. 308, original emphasis) has sug-
gested that “on any view of modularity, the operation of a
module cannot be affected by central, domain general pro-
cesses.” Similarly, several commentators (Bartsch & Estes,
Montgomery and Ruffman) argue that theory-theory can
also deal with the evidence. The commentaries arguing that
the modular and theory theory accounts explain the data
that we present only discuss the data on social relationships,
notably sibling interactions. We concede that these per-
spectives can be accommodated to such evidence, but, as
noted in our target article (sect. 2.2), as the range of data
widens this task becomes more difficult and their theories
become more diffuse. Indeed it is getting quite hard to dis-
tinguish between these two positions:
“theory of mind” is described as having an innate and possibly
modular basis, not as consisting in its entirety as either innate
or as a module. (German & Leslie, original emphasis)
It is certainly true that there are some innately given kinds of
psychological knowledge. However, it seems to us that these are
most likely to be “starting state” theories. (Gopnik & Wellman
1992, p. 168)
Lourenço also claims that we have not conclusively
ruled out the other theories in this area. First, even if we
had devoted our target article to criticizing current theories
(and more criticism is provided by commentators Hobson,
Mitchell, and Montgomery), we still could not conclu-
sively rule them out. They are not single theories, but rather
families of theories sharing core assumptions or research
programs in Lakatos’s (1970) sense. Research programs
cannot be simply ruled out because a modified theory based
on the same core assumptions can always be proposed. Sec-
ond, our criticism based on Wittgenstein is more far-reach-
ing because it reveals flaws in an assumption on which all
the dominant theories are based (Chapman 1987a; Mont-
gomery 1997; 2002). The aim of the next subsection is to
show that such an approach is a firm conceptual foundation
on which to build (see sect. 2.2 in our target article).
R1.3. Is theory theory an adequate explanation? 
Or do we need Wittgenstein?
Ruffman’s final paragraph presents some interesting at-
tempts to reconcile the theory and constructivist perspec-
tives, but does not bridge a fundamental difference be-
tween our approach and the theory theory in how children
learn the meaning of mental state terms. Montgomery
makes the point that the sibling data can be used to support
the positions we criticize, but then goes on to elaborate on
the argument from Wittgenstein. He writes that according
to the theory theory (and, we would add, simulation and
modular theories) children learn the meaning of mental
state terms by means of a referential association with pri-
vate inner sensations that are causally related to but distinct
from outward behavior. Section 3.2 of the target article pre-
sents arguments like Montgomery’s current and recent
work (see Montgomery 1997; 2002). Bickhard’s discussion
of the frame problem adds to the argument that beliefs are
not objects that can be learned about through introspec-
tion. Bickhard points out that in the case of talk about be-
liefs there “is nothing unitary, no coherent kind of matter of
fact, for belief talk to refer to.” The frame problem shows
that there is no limit to the number of beliefs a person could
be said to have.
Sokol & Lalonde point out that Dewey’s ideas about
mental states are consistent with Wittgenstein’s later work.
One misunderstanding that might be possible after reading
their commentary that we want to guard against is the claim
that we are denying the existence of mental processes. It
might appear that Wittgenstein denies mental states, and
therefore he must be a behaviorist. If Wittgenstein denies
that a sensation is a mental object, it may appear that he is
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saying there is no sensation, in which case the child’s un-
derstanding of mind amounts to no more than learning to
talk about mental states through enculturation. But that is
not what he intended: “And now it looks as if we had denied
mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny
them” (Wittgenstein 1968, para. 308). “To deny the mental
process would mean to deny the remembering; to deny that
anyone ever remembers anything” (Wittgenstein 1953/
1968, para. 306). What Wittgenstein did reject was labeling
mental processes as private objects in the same way we la-
bel physical objects. Thus, his argument is about how our
language makes us think about psychological processes, not
a denial of psychological processes.
Our use of Wittgensteinian ideas is questioned by Shot-
ter, although we note that he does not challenge our philo-
sophical interpretation. Shotter argues that Wittgenstein
should not be taken piecemeal and that he was concerned
with description not theory. To deal with this criticism we
need to apply Wittgenstein’s own method to be clear about
both the task he took on and the sense in which he used the
term “theory.” In the paragraph cited by Shotter, Wittgen-
stein (1953/1968, para. 109) goes on to explain why his con-
siderations could not be scientific ones. It is because the
problems he addresses are not empirical but philosophical,
focusing exclusively on the meaning of words, due to us be-
ing misled by the workings of our language: “Philosophy is
a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by
means of language” (para. 109). His analysis leads to the
conclusion that words are torn free from their natural con-
text, and meanings of words only exist in particular contexts.
It is this crucial insight that we draw upon in our analysis.
Using this idea is not incompatible with the study of human
development. Indeed, there are two reasons why we feel
justified in using it in our developmental account. First, we
should begin from the foundation that Wittgenstein has
cleared. In Wittgenstein’s words: “I am not interested in
constructing a building, so much as in having a perspicuous
view of the foundations of possible buildings” (Wittgenstein
1980, p. 7e). This does not preclude what is built on these
foundations. Indeed, secondly, after he disposes of our
common misconceptions about how children learn the
meaning of words for inner sensations, Wittgenstein goes
on to answer his own question of how children learn the
meaning of such words by writing: “Here is one possibil-
ity . . .” (1953/1968, para. 244). It is just this possibility that
we are exploring in our theory. This runs counter to Shot-
ter’s relativistic stance on Wittgenstein, but we are agreed
that these ideas provide a damning critique of the dominant
theories of theories of mind.
We should consider why Wittgenstein felt that theory
was not appropriate for the task he took on. Given his con-
cern that words only have meaning in particular contexts, a
general set of rules for mechanistically deriving meaning
(i.e., a theory in one sense of the term) cannot be formu-
lated, because meaning is not mechanistic (see Goldberg
1991). Instead, meaning is indexical. It depends on the lo-
cation of words or utterances in sequences of interaction
(Budwig; see also Suchman 1987; Turnbull 2003). This is-
sue can be illuminated by considering a parallel debate be-
tween Searle (1992) and Schegloff (1992) on whether a the-
ory of conversation is possible. Searle concluded that a
theory of conversation is not possible. In one sense of the
term “theory” Searle (1992) is correct. That is, it is not pos-
sible to form a theory that would allow us to derive mean-
ings of utterances in conversation because such meanings
always depend upon their location in particular sequences
of interaction. However, this does not stop us from learning
a great deal about the process of conveying meaning in con-
versation, as shown by Schegloff (1992). The indexical na-
ture of meaning pointed out by Budwig is part of a general
problem of the development of knowledge that leads us to
a constructivist view, including how children learn the
meanings of mental state terms.
R1.4. Is modular theory an adequate explanation?
Reductionism and constructivism revisited
German & Leslie object to our presentation of the mod-
ular view, and they especially object to our contrast between
this and the position that humans have evolved the capac-
ity to develop an understanding of mind. Instead, they in-
sist that it is the latter position that they endorse as the mod-
ular position. In fact, the statement that humans have
evolved the capacity to develop social understanding is just
a logical necessity. Within that general agreement there is
obviously a lot of controversy. In support of their case, Ger-
man & Leslie cite a study by Hughes and Cutting (1999) re-
porting a strong heritable component (60%) to false belief
performance. However, in their more recent research with
a sample 10 times the size, Hughes et al. (in press) found a
much weaker relation: only 16% genetic influences com-
pared with 63% environmental influences (see also De-
neault et al. 2003). Furthermore, such findings tell us noth-
ing about the process through which any genetic influences
might work.
German & Leslie quote Roth and Leslie (1998), who
state that the theory of mind mechanism is essential because
it “allows the young brain to attend to . . . mental states de-
spite the fact that such states cannot be seen, heard, felt, or
otherwise sensed” (emphasis in original). They go on to state
that what is critical is the ability to attend to mental state
properties such as pretending and believing. However, what
it could possibly mean for the child to attend to believing is
far from clear in their account. The Wittgensteinian argu-
ment above and in section 3.2 of our target article shows that
they have gone wrong from the very start because the ques-
tion they address is misconceived – mental states cannot
simply be “attended to” (see also Bickhard, Montgomery,
Sokol & Lalonde). The fact that German & Leslie do not
recognize our position as a proposal implies that their start-
ing assumptions differ so much from ours that they have a
different notion of just what a proposal should look like. Yet
we call their starting assumptions into question.
Thus, there is an even more fundamental problem with
German & Leslie’s account that is shared by two other
commentaries. Their approach is reductionistic in their talk
about how the “young brain attends” to mental states, and
this reduces attending to neural activity (Brown 2003).
Craig & Barrett take a stronger position than German &
Leslie in assuming that folk psychology is innate, due to
“certain devices inside us” (Millikan 1993, p. 63). Further-
more, they claim that it is a job for neuroscientists to look
for those devices. Gerrans takes a similar tack, treating
Wittgenstein’s investigations as irrelevant for development
psychologists who, he states, should really be concerned
with discovering the “neurocognitive processes” involved in
concept formation. In our view, a Wittgensteinian analysis
undermines the leap that these commentators make so ef-
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fortlessly between neural activity and psychological con-
structs.
Neurological research will not address the questions we
are concerned with because it does not deal with meaning.
Craig & Barrett exemplify the problems inherent in a re-
ductionist approach in their claim that the only thing they
are certain of is that knowledge of the world is embodied in
one’s particular configuration of synaptic connections. Why
stop here? Wouldn’t it be even more certain to go to the
level of the distribution of neurotransmitters at the synapse
or at an even finer biochemical level? Synaptic connections
may contain information, in some sense of the word, but not
knowledge. A train schedule has information but no knowl-
edge; a person is required to read and interpret the sched-
ule. Therefore, a homunculus is required (Heil 1981;
Kenny 1991; Müller et al. 1998a; 1998b). In addition to fo-
cusing on neurocognitive mechanisms, Gerrans also takes
a computational approach. This is fundamentally flawed
because there is no way to deal with meaning. “Computers
don’t understand anything, nor do they care” (Hobson
2002, p. xiv). The problem for this sort of approach is to “ex-
plain the transition from causal processes in the brain to
conscious, meaningful experience” (Müller et al. 1998a,
pp. 229–30. For similar arguments, see Hacker 1991).
It is for this reason that we are committed to the alterna-
tive, constructive approach to development. Siegal asks
whether the constructive view can account for the devel-
opment of specific beliefs, distinguishing these from “core
cognitive architecture.” Exactly the same process is in-
volved. From a constructive view of knowledge develop-
ment, concepts cannot simply be transmitted ready-made.
Rather, understanding of all types must be constructed by
the child in interaction. Nevertheless, our constructive ap-
proach is consistent with evolutionary theory. We take the
point from Eddy, Fonagy, and German & Leslie that it
is important to consider what biological adaptations allow
humans to develop social interaction and social under-
standing. These make language, human history, and culture
possible (Elias 1978). In addressing this problem, we follow
Tomasello (1999b) in being particularly cautious about at-
tributing innate knowledge to infants. The problem is not
simply solved by saying that infants are born being able to
attend to mental states. It is still necessary to explain how
an ability evolved. Furthermore, if it is possible for it to have
evolved we need an explanation for why it could not de-
velop in individual ontogeny (Bickhard 2004).
Eddy considers a possible interpretation of Povinelli and
Eddy’s (1996) findings that although chimpanzees follow
gaze they do not demonstrate an understanding of the psy-
chological implications of seeing. He notes the possibility
that the chimpanzees may have failed their task because
they were responding to humans and not to other chim-
panzees. Although we agree with Eddy that it is an unlikely
explanation, the possibility remains to be evaluated. How-
ever, it is evident that we humans do not restrict mentalis-
tic interpretations to our own species, because we had 
assumed that when chimpanzees follow gaze they also un-
derstand the psychological implications of seeing just as we
do. If it were found that chimpanzees did restrict their so-
cial understanding to members of their own species it
would indicate a difference in their social understanding
compared to that of humans. In any case, there is additional
evidence that a range of increasingly complex forms of gaze
following can be observed in human infants.
R2. Should the theory be amended?
Although some of the commentators discussed in section
R1 are keen to maintain that traditional theoretical posi-
tions remain intact in the face of the evidence we summa-
rize, a second group examined the internal consistency of
our theory, and we address these here. In the three parts of
this section we consider claims from a number of angles
that the notion of the epistemic triangle does not fit very
well in describing infants’ social skills (R2.1), that Wittgen-
stein’s notion of criteria exposes us to a diversity of possible
problems (R2.2), and that we have not specified the nature
of the structures or processes that the child develops (R2.3).
All these analyses call for amendments to the original the-
sis.
R2.1. The development of the epistemic-relational
triangle in infancy: Getting dyadic
Do we give a full enough explanation of infant develop-
ment? For a start, as Bickhard argues, Wittgenstein did
not account for prelanguage normativity. We agree.
Wittgenstein said that the use of words is built onto previ-
ous shared practices but he did not explain how these prac-
tices arise except to say that the child is “trained.” Such
practices are where Wittgenstein said he hit bedrock and
his spade was turned. But this is where Piaget kept on dig-
ging (Müller 1999). And for this part of our argument we
rely on Piagetian theory in accounting for development in
infancy.
It is Chapman’s (1991) notion of the epistemic triangle
that helps us build a social dimension in a Piagetian ap-
proach to infancy. Does this formulation stand up to the
critical scrutiny of our commentators? Ruffman is con-
cerned because he suggests that there is evidence of an
early developing self-other distinction. He cites two exam-
ples. One is at 18 months of age when we too would obvi-
ously expect a self-other distinction to have developed. He
also refers to evidence from research with infants from 3 to
4 months of age. The study cited by Ruffman (Rochat &
Striano 2002) was with 4- to 5- and 8- to 9-month-old in-
fants. There was evidence of longer looking time in the
other condition compared to the self condition, as well as
development between the two age groups. However,
Rochat and Striano acknowledged that there were a num-
ber of differences between the conditions in addition to self
versus other that make firm conclusions difficult. And in-
fants’ ability to respond differentially tells us little about
whether they have any understanding of a self-other dis-
tinction (Müller & Carpendale, 2004). However, in a de-
velopmental account such as ours, early forms of self-other
knowledge must be looked for. Therefore, we agree with
Rochat and Striano (2002, p. 44) that these abilities emerg-
ing at 4 to 5 months form the “foundation from which chil-
dren can eventually develop the conceptual and explicit
sense of themselves expressed by the middle of the second
year.”
The problems to be solved in infant social development
are set up very well and in different ways by Barresi &
Moore and Hobson. Our position is very similar to that of
Barresi & Moore. We agree that social understanding de-
velops out of engagement with others – that it is “always out
of shared activity with others that advances in understand-
ing of mental phenomena are first made.” We recognize
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that two individuals have independent perspectives of the
object and of each other; but there remains one issue of
possible disagreement between us and this concerns the na-
ture and development of representation. Barresi & Moore’s
use of terms like “reflective representation” and “integrat-
ing information” may buy into a theory of representation
which is at odds with the activity-based view that we hold
(Müller et al. 1998b). However, as we discuss below, their
comments on emotional relations and the “we”-ness of in-
teraction are well-taken.
Hobson holds that theories of infant social development
must account for primitive modes of experiencing of self
and other in interpersonal relations. One of his questions
concerns how infants are aware of persons as having a men-
tal as well as a physical dimension. This remark could be
misunderstood because Hobson is usually at pains to deny
that the initial task for the infant is to discern mental states
(Hobson 1994). Rather, he is usually interested in account-
ing for the formation of the self-other distinction and, like
us, he locates this in the dynamic of interaction between the
infant and the other. We are also cautious about the solu-
tion Hobson proposes. He suggests that “humans are
equipped with a propensity for forms of role-taking that
both link an individual infant or child or adult with some-
one else, and at the same time register the distinctiveness
of self and other.” It is important to know exactly what is
meant here because the term “role-taking” would usually
be interpreted at a much higher level (Flavell et al. 1968).
We assumed that Hobson (and he has confirmed this via e-
mail) does not intend it in this way and his commentary goes
on to describe this process as: “children are moved by the
attitudes of others.” Perhaps all that is really needed is a
propensity to engage with other people (helped by infants’
predisposition to be interested in others’ eyes and faces, as
Ruffman suggests) and the ability to respond to their re-
actions, initially without any clear idea of the other as sep-
arate from the self.
Hobson is critical of our focus on action and instead sug-
gests that what is needed in addition is an emphasis on emo-
tional engagement. We agree with the addition. Further-
more, he asks us how communication is grounded. From
our perspective it is embedded in interaction. This starts
with a pattern in which the infant emits affective signals that
are punctuated in protoconversation by the adult (see, e.g.,
Kaye 1982; Schaffer 1977). Gradually the infant’s contribu-
tion to the interaction becomes more active, in terms of re-
sponding to others on this affective level. At first this is
dyadic, without reference to objects (Chapman 1991). The
goal is just the reaction, there is no communication outside
that. Research over the past thirty years has suggested that
infants treat humans differently from objects because they
react contingently (Watson 1972), and caregivers are intent
on extending the length of bouts of affective engagement
with very young infants (Stern 1977). We contend that a
much leaner interpretation can be used instead of the one
offered by Hobson. Indeed, we agree with his later sugges-
tion regarding the ability to be “moved” by another’s atti-
tudes. This develops apace within dyadic interaction within
the first year and makes possible the development of triadic
interaction (subject-interlocutor–object) and the capacity
for symbolic thinking.
In the target article we place much stress on the epis-
temic triangle as a basis for development. We need to clar-
ify its relation with triadic interaction following Meins’s
comments. What is referred to is interaction with other
people about aspects of the world. It makes no difference
if there are several other people involved – this would also
be triadic in our sense. The point is to distinguish this form
of interaction from forms of interaction in early infancy
that are dyadic in that they involve the infant just interact-
ing with the physical world or with a person. However, it is
a misinterpretation by Wilson-Brune & Woodward to
assume that we believe that the development of infant’s so-
cial knowledge only begins with triadic interaction. This
would be a completely non-developmental account. The
question of how infants develop the capacity for triadic in-
teraction from dyadic interaction must be addressed (this
issue was discussed in sect. 3.1 in our target article). Lee-
kam points out that children with either autism or Wil-
liams syndrome have difficulties with dyadic interaction but
for different reasons. Children with autism focus on dyadic
interaction with objects, whereas children with Williams
syndrome are more dyadically engaged with people. Both
groups have difficulty with triadic interaction. By Leekam’s
analysis the problems identified in these syndromes are
much more basic than at the “theory of mind” level (Lee-
kam, in press).
Wilson-Brune & Woodward suggest that our approach
does not hold in the case of the emergence of pointing be-
cause infants’ first pointing gestures may not be commu-
nicative but may instead index their own attention. Al-
though there is much controversy about the origins of
pointing, the evidence is consistent with our approach. We
expect (as do Moore & Corkum 1994) that infants first get
into forms of interaction for other reasons and then learn
within such interaction. For example, we would expect that
infants’ first pointing gestures would not be clearly social.
As Wilson-Brune & Woodward suggest (and also as stated
in our article), there are clear developments in the se-
quence of pointing skills.
Thus, the lesson that we learn from our commentators in
this section is that there is much to be gleaned from dyadic
interaction in the first year of life, particularly in the level
of affective engagement that the infant develops. We accept
these ideas into our theory with thanks, especially as these
commentaries remind us of the insights of parent-infant in-
teraction studies in the 1970s and of Reddy’s (e.g., 1991;
2003) impassioned critique of theory theory based in part
on her rich descriptions of infant-parent interaction in the
first year.
R2.2. Language and criteria
There are a number of points raised about our use of
Wittgenstein’s notion of criteria. These range from ques-
tions regarding word learning to the suggestion that the no-
tion of criteria implies an enculturation position that we
claimed to be avoiding.
The word learning problem raised by Miller & Müller
is that there are limitless possible meanings of new words,
whether they are object labels or verbs. Thus, they suggest
that the problems with word learning as correlating words
with things also apply to correlating words with events.
They also state that learning mental state terms would be
particularly difficult because psychological states are not di-
rectly observable. To solve these problems they offer an in-
teresting, if traditional, solution – that because the problem
of mapping word to world is so intractable children may use
Response/Carpendale & Lewis: Constructing an understanding of mind
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2004) 27:1 135
the structure of language as a cue to mental verb meaning.
We do not deny that sentence structure is important in the
child’s language development in general and perhaps in
learning the meaning of mental verbs. However, we have
three responses to Miller & Müller’s analysis. First, in sec-
tion 3.2 of our target article and here above we rehearse the
Wittgensteinian argument that learning meanings of men-
tal verbs is not a matter of naming inner unobservable states
(Montgomery 2002), a view that is supported in a number
of commentaries (Montgomery, Bickhard, Sokol &
Lalonde).
Second, we disagree with the assumptions about lan-
guage that lead to setting up the problem of word learning
in this way. Miller & Müller appear to assume the con-
straints approach to the problem of word learning, accord-
ing to which word learning involves creating and eliminat-
ing many possible hypotheses about how new words map
onto the world (Tomasello 2001). The solution they suggest
is that syntactic bootstrapping constrains the number of
possible hypotheses. In contrast to this slightly disembed-
ded solution, we endorse the social pragmatic approach to
word learning described by Tomasello (2001), according to
which children are “engaged in social interactions in which
they are attempting to understand and interpret adult com-
municative intentions – so as to make sense of the current
situation (Nelson 1985)” (Tomasello 2001, p. 113). We view
meaning as related to the purposes for which words are
used within interaction (Budwig et al. 2000; Turnbull &
Carpendale 1999a). Third, the structure of language may
be important in children’s learning the meaning of mental
verbs, but the leap from syntax to meaning is still magical.3
It is not clear how the word learning problem is resolved by
changing it to the unpacking of syntax (which is what Miller
& Müller seem to imply by referring to the “language struc-
ture”) and mapping onto mental states. We endorse Bud-
wig’s suggestion to study constructions as the unit of analy-
sis, because such a usage-based unit provides a far more
credible route into meaning through language (Budwig
1998; Tomasello 1998).
Our suggestion to look beyond mental state terms to
study talk about human activity is reflected on by Symons.
He argues that we should not only look at parent-child dis-
course as a window on the process by which children ac-
quire such terms, but we should also consider the child’s
spontaneous utterances during “solitary” tasks. This is an in-
teresting idea that is compatible with our approach, and
Symons considers this as an important potential route into
an understanding of the child’s internal mental states. From
the unpublished study that he recounts, children’s “dis-
course in solitary tasks” correlates highly with false belief
understanding. Without more information about the task
and whether the children were asked to narrate while per-
forming it, we find it hard to judge whether Symons has
identified a mechanism in keeping with Vygotsky’s ideas.
We agree that all children’s activities, whether in discussion
with adults, peers, siblings, or “alone,” are useful markers
of their constructions of mental state terms. Like Symons,
our aim is to bridge the gap between parents’/others’ men-
tal state discourse and the child’s constructions. However,
we would add that it is not sufficient to correlate the fre-
quency of mental state terms with test data. We agree with
Budwig that it is important to examine how interactants
use mental state terms for various purposes. In doing so the
mechanism that Symons refers to retains its triadic struc-
ture, within its interactional context. As we noted in our tar-
get article, words that are not considered mental state terms
may still be important in talk about the psychological world.
Although there is little research on this topic, Lohmann and
Tomasello’s (2003) language training study found no differ-
ence in training effect on false belief understanding be-
tween a condition in which mental state terms were used
and a condition in which communication verbs such as “say”
and “tell” were used.
Another commentary asks us to identify how children
come to learn criteria for mental state terms. Barresi &
Moore are concerned that our theory potentially reduces
to teacher-based enculturation. We feel that their depiction
of language and criteria in our target article is incomplete
because in section 3.1 we are at pains to identify the cen-
trality of children’s constructions of knowledge. This dis-
cussion was set into the framework of practices and criteria
in section 3.2 to identify the dynamics of the epistemic tri-
angle. In contrast to Barresi & Moore, we suggest that our
combined use of Piagetian theory and criteria protects us
from an enculturation view. In addressing this criticism we
refer to a distinction that Bickhard points out in his com-
mentary, which is that, although children learn the mean-
ing of words in terms of criteria, what is learned is not con-
stituted by the criteria. Furthermore, it is not just that
children learn culturally specific words for mental phe-
nomena such as seeing; rather, these words are added to
and become part of a practice. So, according to our position
(and against a possibility considered by Barresi & Moore),
learning practices do not depend on a theory of mind; in-
fants develop expectations about what will happen in cer-
tain situations in their practical, lived knowledge. For ex-
ample, when a child learns to point declaratively to direct
others’ attention she is beginning to learn something about
other people, the world, and how to coordinate her direct-
edness toward aspects of the world with other people’s di-
rectedness, or attention. Then, within interactions in which
words are used to accompany pointing, she may add the
word “look” to this shared practice. That is, this practice of
pointing is one possible criterion for the use of the word
“look.” And, of course, the use of words is a constructive
process, it cannot simply be social transmitted (see Nel-
son’s comment about word use without meaning).
R2.3. Structure and executive functions
A third set of commentaries ask us to clarify the nature of
the cognitive system that the child develops. Miller &
Müller argue that we need to describe the knowledge
structures that characterize different levels of social under-
standing. The term “structure” is ambiguous because it can
be interpreted as causally determining thinking or as a for-
mal description of forms of thought (Chandler 1991; Chap-
man 1987b). We assume that Miller & Müller would not
mean it in the causal or functional sense but rather in the
formal sense. However, in the list of theories they provide
it is likely that a majority of theorists think of their struc-
tures as causal in the process of reasoning. In addition, one
position that is missing, the theory theory, is assumed by
Gopnik and Wellman (1992, p. 147) to be causal in the
sense that the process of reasoning involves applying the
laws of the theory. Another issue is whether structures are
general across content. Most of the theorists listed by Miller
& Müller would take this position; that is, once acquired,
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the structure would apply across content and in various cir-
cumstances. Our position, however, is that functionally 
distinct structures develop for each of the forms of joint at-
tention. For example, pointings of different types (follow-
ing pointing, following gaze, etc.) develop individually but
these become reciprocally assimilated. That is, they are all
activated by interacting with people and are combined
gradually during social interactions.
In discussing the development of structure, Miller &
Müller quote Piaget (1967, p. 147): “Genesis emanates
from a structure and culminates in another structure.”
There are suggestions in some other commentaries that go
beyond our original analysis and illustrate just what is im-
plied in this quotation. Fonagy is in broad agreement with
our position and in drawing connections between Piaget
and Bowlby (as does Symons from a critical perspective).
But Fonagy also suggests other ways to think about the con-
nections between attachment and social understanding. We
agree with him (and Steele, who also mentions it) that an
issue which we did not discuss is the role of attachment in
emotional regulation. The structure of parent-child inter-
action plays a role in the child’s emotional regulation, and
this structure is gradually internalized into the patterns we
see in classic attachment relationships. Fonagy also extends
the same sort of argument to effortful control and inhibi-
tion, as abilities that develop within interpersonal engage-
ment and are fostered by secure attachment relationships.
We agree and, as we argue below, this fits nicely with our
position that executive functioning is influenced by the
child’s history of social experience, not just an unfolding in
maturation.
Fernyhough also wants us to specify the cognitive pro-
cesses that result from developmental processes, whereas
Gerrans asks us to specify the cognitive processes that lead
to development. This reveals the greatly differing theoreti-
cal perspectives that have been put to us. Our approach is
far closer to Chesnokova in her useful term “agency me-
diation” and to Fernyhough, who says that we explain how
social competence develops but not what it is. Fernyhough
is right that this is an aspect that we only hinted at and did
not fully develop. He further wonders if the epistemic tri-
angle is just a context for development or whether it, in ad-
dition, plays a role in children’s reasoning about the mind.
Fernyhough’s discussion of Vygotsky is welcome and it is
consistent with our position, developed from Chapman’s
theory. Chapman’s position, drawing on Piaget, Vygotsky,
and Gal’perin, is that the epistemic triangle is interiorized
as a whole:
interiorized communicative exchange between the subject and
the interiorized interlocutor is the origin of reflective aware-
ness. The coordination of cognitive operations by the subject
and the interlocutor is the source of the “operational composi-
tions” that characterize concrete operations. Such coordina-
tions are the interiorized counterpart of interpersonal cooper-
ation. (Chapman 1991, p. 219)
Piaget (1962/2000) agreed with Vygotsky’s view that re-
flective thought arises due to the interiorization of egocen-
tric speech. Thus, in response to Miller & Müller, devel-
opment “emanates” from the structure of triadic interaction
which includes the structures that the child brings to the in-
teraction, and it “culminates” in the interiorized structure
of the epistemic triangle. As skills become consolidated,
further levels of the structure involve the ability to reflect
upon this interiorised epistemic triangle. These develop in
a local, piecemeal way, not – as hinted at by Miller & Müller
– by the application of a new rule or representation system.
The issue of structure has been made more complex by
recent work, which links social development with what are
taken to be domain general skills under the banner of ex-
ecutive functions. Hala suggests that our position is com-
patible with executive function accounts. We agree that an
aspect of our approach that needs elaboration is in relation
to the notion of executive functions, and in our target arti-
cle we could only acknowledge that in a brief note. Two key
issues are raised. First, as has often been pointed out (Mon-
sell 1996; Rabbitt 1997; Towse et al. 2000), the notion of ex-
ecutive functions is complex and ill-defined even in adults,
so we must be immediately cautious about describing indi-
vidual skills or the ragbag of “executive” skills as given.
However, recent structural equation modeling analyses
suggest that in both adults (Miyake et al. 2000) and children
(Shimmon et al. 2003) there is distinctiveness between ar-
eas of executive test performance (e.g., working memory is
distinct from set shifting), but individual constructs like
these fit best into a unified latent variable “executive func-
tion.” However, performance on test batteries does not re-
veal conceptual links between, or a developmental model
of, such skills. An advantage of an activity-based approach
is that we do not have to think of something like “attention”
or “attention-shifting” as independent characteristics of the
child which the child brings to the interaction. Instead the
child’s “attentiveness” may well be influenced by the inter-
action of the dyad (Hobson, in press).
Therefore, second, we do not think it is helpful to assume
that executive functions simply unfold with maturation.
Rather, we agree with Hala that the development of these
particular skills is likely to be complex, embedded within
the nature of children’s experiences. She points out that
there might be a deeper relation between executive skills
and different aspects of social understanding and that there
is a bidirectional relationship between the child and other
people. We would take the analysis further to examine a
number of other bidirectional patterns of influence within
the epistemic triangle – including interactions between
each executive skill. It is these links that we take to be the
more complex structures that are developing in the child
and which are hinted at in the research cited by Hala. Al-
though we acknowledge that such ideas are in need of sup-
portive evidence, we note recent data which show that so-
cial interaction (maternal verbal scaffolding of the child) at
age 3 years is linked with the child’s language at age 4 and
search retrieval skills at age 6 (Landry et al. 2002). Such
findings suggest that the development of executive skills is
embedded in the child’s social experiences.
R3. Should the theory be extended?
Several commentators have offered suggestions about how
our theory can be improved. In our response on infancy,
above, we agreed that an understanding of social develop-
ment must have as its starting point the dyadic exchanges
between individuals. One of the points that we understated
in the target article was that much of this interaction is
highly affectively laden and what the child constructs within
the interaction is charged with emotion. In the main, the
commentaries discussed in this section reflect upon the
ways in which the theory we present can be improved by
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embedding the epistemic triangle within a wider and more
enriched social process – the reason why we are prepared
to refer to it as the epistemic-relational triangle. The target
article suggests that this framework is needed in order to
understand the dynamic between the subject-interlocutor
and subject-object interaction involved in the development
of knowledge. We admit that we couched our analysis in a
way that enabled an exchange and critique of the traditional
approaches in this area that we have just discussed – ap-
proaches in which mental states are segregated from any-
thing that remotely resembles human experience. The
commentaries we discuss in this section mainly point out
that there is more to the development of social knowledge
than the emergence of the child’s ability to reflect on cog-
nitive mental states like beliefs. These other aspects of de-
velopment hinge on issues that we hinted at in the target ar-
ticle, surrounding the nature and importance of affective
engagement both in infancy and, indeed, all human social
understanding. We welcome such a move, as long as the dy-
namic of subject-interlocutor and subject-object is kept in
place.
R3.1. The role of relationships in social development:
Let’s get emotional
We are impressed by the ways in which several of the com-
mentators extend our analysis of the role of the individual’s
constructions within interactions into specific types of rela-
tionships such as siblings and peers, and the importance of
affect engagement, particularly in attachment relationships
and emotional relatedness. However, as a result of com-
ments from Gerrans, Meins, and Steele, we first need to
clarify the relational position we endorse.
Gerrans seems to think that rejecting individualism
means we cannot talk about the characteristics of individu-
als, like those with autism. To the contrary, rejecting indi-
vidualism does not mean that we ignore the fact that indi-
viduals vary in the characteristics they bring to interaction.
McGeer asks us to clarify that a rejection of individualism
does not imply rejecting internalism. We agree. We do not
just focus on the individual or the social. Relationism or sys-
temism takes the strengths of both individualism and col-
lectivism. Our “mechanism” is the internalization of action
and interaction. That is, our explanation for the develop-
ment of social understanding cannot be individualistic be-
cause it depends on the relations between people. But nei-
ther is it holistic because obviously individuals interact and
bring their characteristics to that interaction. Gerrans is
right that children with disorders such as autism have some
neurological impairment. However, the whole story cannot
be told on the basis of the individual. Instead, the relations
between people are essential, because children with other
difficulties such as deafness or severe social deprivation
may also develop an autism-like syndrome (Hobson 2002).
In contrast to Gerrans, Meins claims that we focus too
much on the child and that “the child’s attributes may ini-
tially be rather unimportant.” We should not focus on either
the child or the other person; rather it is the relations be-
tween them that are important. Of course, both interactants
will influence those relations due to their characteristics.
The claim that individual differences in caregivers are im-
portant is embedded in our position, and therefore we do
not assume that all mother-infant and child-sibling rela-
tionships are the same, contrary to Meins’s reading. Meins
is right that the effects of siblings and of parenting style
have been found only with preschoolers but this reflects the
nature of the available data, not necessarily that we are try-
ing to explain the wrong evidence. Within our framework it
is important to examine the nature of sibling relationships
(the quality of interaction, etc.), not just whether or not the
child has a sibling.
Meins notes that we mention the link between attach-
ment security and social understanding and implies that we
believe this is a direct link. In fact, we mention this as evi-
dence that requires an explanation, not as an explanation it-
self. However, we do clearly agree with Meins that mere ex-
posure to mental state language is not enough for children’s
social development. What she calls for in her final para-
graph regarding an integrated system is just what we mean
by a focus on relations.
Howe is in agreement with our position and suggests ex-
tensions by further focusing on children’s sibling relation-
ships, their friendships, and their pretend play. We agree,
and further suggest that in such extensions we need a the-
ory with which to make sense of various forms of interac-
tion. We wanted to make it clear that the Piagetian distinc-
tion between constraining and cooperative relationships
was originally introduced by Piaget (1932/1965b, 1977/
1995) by contrasting parent and peer relations. Steele
views Piaget’s distinction between constraining and coop-
erative relationships as a “dichotomous model.” However,
the target article states clearly that Piaget’s distinction
refers to a continuous model because any relationship (i.e.,
parent-child, siblings, and peers) is some mixture of these
two types.
We acknowledge Steele’s claim that other aspects of so-
cial relationships should be considered to capture the com-
plexities of human relationships. Some of his suggestions
appear to refer to the content of discussion. In our article
we recognize the importance of both what is being talked
about and the influence of the relationship on the child’s
understanding of that talk. Steele extends this analysis to
describe the types of attachment relationship, but not ex-
plicitly to the processes that constitute such types. We feel
that a more profitable extension of our analysis within at-
tachment theory would be to follow the suggestion of Fon-
agy and Thompson & Raikes, who focus more closely
upon the dynamics of attachment and emotional relation-
ships. Both these perspectives are constructive, affective
additions to the approach we propose. We feel that, just as
cognitively based models like ours need an emotional di-
mension provided by these theoretical perspectives, at-
tachment-based accounts also need an analysis of triadic in-
teraction in our sense, particularly into which language is
integrated. So we hope that the argument is more “new”
than Steele suggests.
We also concur with Banerjee who discusses the role of
social experience, or self-regulation, in advanced social 
understanding, such as the role of peer interactions in
learning about interpretation. Zerwas, Balaraman &
Brownell (Zerwas et al.) provide an elaboration of the
role of peers in social development and the special chal-
lenges and opportunities afforded by peers, involving op-
portunities for cooperation as well as conflict. The role of
conflict is also discussed by Howe and Thompson &
Raikes. At least one important aspect of conflict between
mothers and their children concerns how mothers deal with
and talk about inevitable conflicts that occur with young
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toddlers (Laible & Thompson 2002). This line of evidence
fits with the evidence reviewed in our target article.
Most of the commentaries discussed in this section sug-
gest that we should extend our framework to include dif-
ferent types of social relationships. Two commentators
(Nelson, Vinden) feel that an understanding of such rela-
tionships can be achieved only within a wider cultural
framework and that we did not go far enough in this direc-
tion. Vinden advances a constructivistic view of encultura-
tion, albeit using terminology slightly different from ours.
We do not disagree with her suggestion. Our purpose was
to distinguish our position of construction and reconstruc-
tion from a view of passive socialization or the transmission
of knowledge. We do not dismiss the importance of culture.
We agree that the child will influence the relationship with
her caregivers, but we do not think that enculturation is the
right word for this, given that it is often taken to consist of
the passive passing on of beliefs, conventions, and so on,
from one generation to the next. Nelson also thinks that we
did not go far enough in the cultural-historical direction.
We agree that such an approach should be taken and we be-
lieve that ours could easily be expanded in that direction.
However, we would emphasize that “culture” should not be
reified. It is created and recreated by interactants within
everyday interactions (Berger & Luckmann 1966), thus the
epistemic triangle is a means of understanding the dynamic
between individual action and everyday practices. In the
next section we elaborate on further possible developments
of our theory raised in the commentaries.
R3.2. Broadening our conception of social
understanding: Let’s get more emotional 
(and normative)
In this section we add four perspectives from the commen-
tators which are consistent with and further extend our the-
ory. First, we must broaden the age span examined in the
target article, as suggested by Mitchell. Banerjee and
Jenkins & Oatley helpfully list further development in so-
cial understanding beyond five years of age. We want to em-
phasize our strong agreement that our list of issues beyond
false belief needs to be extended, because Lourenço ap-
peared to have the impression that we might be thinking
that development in social understanding stops at age eight
years with the beginnings of an interpretative understand-
ing of knowledge. Jenkins and Oatley provide examples of
distributed cognition within the crew of a navy ship to hint
at the use of the epistemic triangle in adult learning, as each
specialist tries to negotiate meaning with his or her col-
league. Their term “prioritization of joint goals” can be ap-
plied well after age eight years. Banerjee further broadens
the conceptualization of social understanding to include
irony (see also Yasui 2003), self-presentational motives, and
emotions such as embarrassment in a wider variety of rela-
tionships, particularly with peers. To this broadening of how
we think about social understanding and social competence
we could add the development of competence in social in-
teraction, such as politeness (Brown & Levinson 1987; Turn-
bull 2003). Our theory provides a framework with which to
incorporate these extensions. Only if developmental psy-
chology extends the focus of the field in directions like these
will we be able to address McGeer’s question of what is in-
cluded in “social understanding.” We agree with her sug-
gestion that what is developing is not just a body of knowl-
edge, but rather a set of practices and that this involves the
development of social agency and the ability to interact
within a community. The issue of agency is also hinted at by
Sokol & Lalonde (see Sokol & Chandler 2003). Russell
(1996) has identified the depth of the role of agency in the
development of knowledge, but he downplays analysis of its
social dimension.
The second issue concerns the extension of our frame-
work to include other aspects of cognition, not usually linked
to a social dimension. Smith questions whether we can ac-
count for the development of normativity from the per-
spective of the epistemic triangle. We recognize that the is-
sue of normativity, or how we get from the causal conditions
of knowledge to normative knowledge, is a neglected prob-
lem in developmental psychology, and it is also a test of an
adequate theory of development. We did not deal with the
issue of normativity, but we believe that our approach could
be extended to do so for the reason that our position is based
on Piagetian ideas about the development of knowledge.
(Note that the computational approach advocated by Ger-
rans and the neuro-reductive approach championed by
Craig & Barrett cannot recognize normativity as a topic of
study.) As Smith (1993) argues, one of the goals of Piaget’s
genetic (i.e., developmental) epistemology was to ground
normativity in the natural world – that is, to “show how to
secure a place for the normative within the natural” (Kitch-
ener 2004, p. 61). In Kitchener’s words, Piaget’s solution to
this problem was that “epistemic norms emerge from cer-
tain kind of social relations between individuals – those in-
volving cooperation” (p. 62). Therefore, a necessary compo-
nent for normativity is social interaction of particular types.
By this token, all of Smith’s examples of normativity are
rooted in social interaction because they are justifications.
We suggest that an act of judgment does not exist outside of
human practices. For example, Smith’s case [E] appears to
be an instance of the epistemic triangle in action.
Third, several commentators argue that we need to in-
clude emotions more fully (Banerjee, Fonagy, Hobson,
Izard, Thompson & Raikes). We agree with Izard that
there are a number of ways in which our account could be
further extended to integrate the role of emotions. She
points out many areas of literature that could enrich our
perspective. As we argue below, with reference to a similar
point made by Fonagy, such additions will more fully in-
corporate the role of emotions in social development be-
ginning in infancy, and they are entirely consistent with our
approach. Like Izard, we would avoid any hard and fast line
between cognition and emotion because many emotions
cannot be simply separated from cognition, as in surprise,
envy, and jealousy. Second, as Izard suggests, emotions may
play a role in influencing the relationships young children
engage in, which in turn may influence the development of
their social understanding. Such emotion may be partially
attributed to the child’s characteristics but must take into
account the interaction between the child and the other
person. We agree with Banerjee that the notion of self-reg-
ulation provides a crucial link with our own framework for
understanding the child’s internalization of the epistemic
triangle. From our perspective it follows that children learn
about emotions in the same way that they learn about be-
liefs and intentions. Finally, Thompson & Raikes extend the
need to study emotional development in children’s early
understanding of mental states within a broader attachment
framework.
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The fourth area of research suggested in the commen-
taries is a focus upon more intricate details of the child’s
conversations with others (Astington, Nelson, Siegal,
Thompson & Raikes, Walker-Andrews & Hudson). We
find Nelson’s label of “collaborative construction” helpful as
it places the child’s developing understanding within a net-
work of social relationships and the ebb and flow of every-
day discourse. It provides clear guidelines for how research
on children’s understanding of the mind should be con-
ducted. This is exemplified in the research areas described
by Walker-Andrews & Hudson: We agree that the work
they review on emotion perception, pretence understand-
ing, event knowledge, and autobiographical memory will
add to the richness of our account of mental state under-
standing. Thompson & Raikes suggest that we neglect sev-
eral explicit and implicit features of conversational dis-
course such as provocative questions, elaborative detail,
and mothers’ reference to emotions. We agree that it is im-
portant to consider other aspects of relationships beyond
cooperation and constraint, as well as to examine coopera-
tive interaction in concrete detail. However, we also feel
that when considering factors such as these, the notion of
cooperation may be useful because such forms of discourse
may facilitate development more in cooperative relation-
ships than in constraining relationships.
Astington makes the interesting suggestion that the
child’s linguistic ability and experience in social and com-
municative interaction may play different roles in social de-
velopment, although she acknowledges that the two factors
are related. However, in the view we take of language as ac-
tivity, it would seem to be very hard conceptually to sepa-
rate such factors. There are also potential empirical prob-
lems with the way theory of mind data are collected, which
we refer to in the target article’s concluding section. To use
Astington’s research examples, we need to know about the
quality of interactions of deaf children with hearing par-
ents, and the parent-child dyads in hearing children with no
siblings but high language ability, in order to reveal the pos-
sible reasons why these children appear to be different in
their false belief performance compared to other groups.
Nevertheless, Astington’s commentary underlines the im-
portance of analyzing language and communication in
detail, as well as our conceptions of language (Budwig,
Nelson). The important issue is that reference to “conver-
sation” alone is not sufficient either to undermine our posi-
tion or to explain the influence of interaction on cognition.
Indeed, it can lead to the problems that are inherent in
Siegal’s account. He appears to suggest that (1) the child’s
theory of mind is situated within her or his cognitive archi-
tecture, and (2) the false belief performance is essentially
an understanding of conversation. The fact that Siegal of-
fers no definition of “conversation” stands in contrast to the
accounts of Nelson and Thompson & Raikes. His de-
scription offers little in the way in which the architecture
develops or how the term conversation helps in his analy-
sis. The target article and many commentaries attempt to
grapple with these links.
R4. Feeling our way forward
We expected more criticism of both our use of a Wittgen-
steinian analysis of word-world relations and the blend with
a mix of Piagetian and Vygotskian constructivism. We are
slightly puzzled by the relative lack of explicit critiques of
either these individual theories or how we put them to-
gether. We see this cocktail as providing a fundamental cri-
tique of the study of social development, or indeed any de-
velopmental or cognitive theory, in which meaning is
slipped in before the theory is articulated. We welcome fur-
ther discussion on this issue because we agree with Nelson
that the implications are potentially profound.
The stumbling block for many of our commentators was
the lack of a “mechanism” in our theory. One implication of
the theoretical origins of our approach is that it is activity-
based and grounded in practices, not internal representa-
tions. Structure arises as a result of the process. Thus, the
mechanism and the process are the same, and each is based
on the child’s constructions of social interactions, where
meanings are negotiated. We realize that this unsettles
some commentators but it follows naturally from our cri-
tique of their assumptions. The implications for research
are first that we need more (not less) neurotic task fixation
(although not just on false belief tasks), in which we try to
work out how children construct meaning in a wider range
of settings and tasks beyond false belief. Second, we need
to conduct research on the development of children’s
shared practices upon which mental state understanding
develops. The studies of Judy Dunn and the ideas outlined
in the conclusion to our target article provide examples.
It was clear from the commentaries that we need to ex-
tend the theory, and most of the commentators felt that this
was a relatively straightforward task. Although we need to
add affective engagement in infancy and beyond, we agree
with many (e.g., Banerjee, Fonagy, Izard, Steele) that
cognition and emotion should not be completely separated
– both are aspects of the individual’s reaction to and con-
structions of events. But we maintain that the epistemic 
triangle is a vital formulation for understanding how indi-
viduals develop knowledge and it adds to the affective en-
gagements described by many, including those from an at-
tachment perspective. We have not described how our
framework might work at higher levels of the structure, and
we need to go further in explaining the development of
structure by providing an account of how the epistemic tri-
angle within particular domains of thought itself becomes
an object of reflection.
We thank the referees of the original submission, the 
editors at BBS, and the commentators for their work, their
challenges, and their constructive criticism. They have
forced us to assimilate some points and painfully to accom-
modate others, thus reassuring us that the constructive
process continues in development. As Astington’s com-
mentary suggests, it seems that the field is changing. We
look forward to a further consolidation of socially grounded
theory of children’s social understanding.
NOTES
1. Lourenço also suggests that our theory is not necessary be-
cause it does not go beyond theories such as Selman’s (1980). Sel-
man’s theory is compatible with our position, but there are some
important differences. Selman already assumes much of what we
are trying to explain because he does not provide an account of in-
fant social development. Furthermore he does not account for the
role of language in social development. What he does do well is
provide a description of the levels of complexity of different situ-
ations of social understanding, and integrating his theory could po-
tentially extend our position.
Lourenço also asserts that we claimed to differ from Thelen
and Smith because of the “ideas of interactionism and transac-
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tionalism.” In fact, we did not say this. Rather, in Note 3 in our tar-
get article we state that although we have much in common with
dynamic systems theories we appear to differ from Thelen et al.
(2001) in the starting point in infant development. That is, they
seem to assume objectivity rather than explain it (Müller &
Carpendale 2001).
2. We refer anyone still convinced of fundamental differences
between Piaget and Vygotsky to Smith’s (1996) test of 10 state-
ments from each of these theorists, which stump even experts (see
also Amin & Valsiner 2004).
3. Miller & Müller note that in other work (Turnbull &
Carpendale 1999a) we reject the code model of language (i.e., the
view that language works by encoding meaning in words and ut-
terances that are then transmitted to others for decoding) and they
argue that the “language code” is also important. Our reasons for
rejecting the code model is that the same word or utterance can
be used to convey different meanings when used within different
contexts of ongoing sequences of interaction (Turnbull & Carpen-
dale 1999a). That is, as Budwig notes, language is indexical (e.g.,
Budwig et al. 2000; Suchman 1987; Turnbull 2003). This suggests
that rather than thinking of language as having fixed meanings at-
tached to representations (the view of language that Wittgenstein
argued against), we should think of language as a means for di-
recting and coordinating attention with others within shared so-
cial settings (Tomasello 2001; 2003). Miller and Müller are right
that a word such as “think” can be used in many different ways, in
many different language games. From this we take the point that
we need to describe in more concrete detail how children might
learn about the many ways the word “think” can be used.
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